- 14 May, 2016 1 commit
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isnotnick authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 12 May, 2016 1 commit
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Richard Levitte authored
RT#4522 Reviewed-by:
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- 11 May, 2016 4 commits
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Rich Salz authored
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Steven Valdez authored
RT#4363 Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 2ab851b7) Conflicts: crypto/ec/ec_key.c
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
RT#4256 Reviewed-by:
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
When *pp is NULL, don't write garbage, return an unexpected pointer or leak memory on error. Reviewed-by:
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- 10 May, 2016 2 commits
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
RT#4538 Reviewed-by:
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- 09 May, 2016 3 commits
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Richard Levitte authored
Originally submitted by Kurt Cancemi <kurt@x64architecture.com> Closes RT#4533 Reviewed-by:
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David Benjamin authored
Per RFC 5246, Note: this extension is not meaningful for TLS versions prior to 1.2. Clients MUST NOT offer it if they are offering prior versions. However, even if clients do offer it, the rules specified in [TLSEXT] require servers to ignore extensions they do not understand. Although second sentence would suggest that there would be no interop problems in always offering the extension, WebRTC has reported issues with Bouncy Castle on < TLS 1.2 ClientHellos that still include signature_algorithms. See also https://bugs.chromium.org/p/webrtc/issues/detail?id=4223 RT#4390 Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
BIO_eof() was always returning true when using a BIO pair. It should only be true if the peer BIO is empty and has been shutdown. RT#1215 Reviewed-by:
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- 08 May, 2016 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
RT#3826 Reviewed-by:Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- 06 May, 2016 3 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
PR#4449 Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
PR#4466 Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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- 05 May, 2016 3 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The default ASN.1 handling can be used for SEED. This also makes CMS work with SEED. PR#4504 Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Try to set the ASN.1 parameters for CMS encryption even if the IV length is zero as the underlying cipher should still set the type. This will correctly result in errors if an attempt is made to use an unsupported cipher type. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
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- 04 May, 2016 3 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The name length limit check in x509_name_ex_d2i() includes the containing structure as well as the actual X509_NAME. This will cause large CRLs to be rejected. Fix by limiting the length passed to ASN1_item_ex_d2i() which will then return an error if the passed X509_NAME exceeds the length. RT#4531 Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
RT#4527 Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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- 03 May, 2016 12 commits
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Only treat an ASN1_ANY type as an integer if it has the V_ASN1_INTEGER tag: V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER is an internal only value which is never used for on the wire encoding. Thanks to David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> for reporting this bug. This was found using libFuzzer. RT#4364 (part)CVE-2016-2108. Reviewed-by:Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
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Matt Caswell authored
A few functions in the recently added EVP_EncodeInit docs don't apply to the 1.0.x branches. Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
With the EVP_EncodeUpdate function it is the caller's responsibility to determine how big the output buffer should be. The function writes the amount actually used to |*outl|. However this could go negative with a sufficiently large value for |inl|. We add a check for this error condition. Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most likely result in a crash. Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. CVE-2016-2105 Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. CVE-2016-2176 Reviewed-by:Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms. The first form is like this: EVP_EncryptInit() EVP_EncryptUpdate() i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can be no overflows in internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur. This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls this function directly. CVE-2016-2106 Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
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- 02 May, 2016 3 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reported by David Benjamin Reviewed-by:
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TJ Saunders authored
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TJ Saunders authored
If no serverinfo extension is found in some cases, do not abort the handshake, but simply omit/skip that extension. Check for already-registered serverinfo callbacks during serverinfo registration. Update SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo() documentation to mention the need to reload the same serverinfo per certificate, for servers with multiple server certificates. Reviewed-by:
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- 29 Apr, 2016 4 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: -
Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject excessively large X509_NAME structures. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne(). Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to restrictions on certificate size. Reviewed-by:
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