- Oct 29, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7194)
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Richard Levitte authored
Needed to clear a clash between ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings and ERR_load_crypto_strings Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Believe it or not, the VMS C compiler is remarking on this Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
These functions are generalizations of EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl() and EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(). They will parse the value, and then pass the parsed result and length to a callback that knows exactly how to pass them on to a main _ctrl function, along with a context structure pointer. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
If a MAC isn't available as an EVP_MAC, the MAC test falls back to the corresponding EVP_PKEY method. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
The MAC EVP_PKEY implementations are currently implemented for each MAC. However, with the EVP_MAC API, only one such implementation is needed. This implementation takes into account the differences between HMAC and CMAC implementations, and observes that all other current MAC implementations seem to follow the HMAC model. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
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Richard Levitte authored
We currently implement EVP MAC methods as EVP_PKEY methods. This change creates a separate EVP API for MACs, to replace the current EVP_PKEY ones. A note about this EVP API and how it interfaces with underlying MAC implementations: Other EVP APIs pass the EVP API context down to implementations, and it can be observed that the implementations use the pointer to their own private data almost exclusively. The EVP_MAC API deviates from that pattern by passing the pointer to the implementation's private data directly, and thereby deny the implementations access to the EVP_MAC context structure. This change is made to provide a clearer separation between the EVP library itself and the implementations of its supported algorithm classes. Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by:
Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 28, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7510)
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Pauli authored
Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation that can potentially provide a side channel. Reviewed-by:
Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)
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Pauli authored
Avoid a timing attack that leaks information via a side channel that triggers when a BN is resized. Increasing the size of the BNs prior to doing anything with them suppresses the attack. Thanks due to Samuel Weiser for finding and locating this. Reviewed-by:
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Pauli authored
There is a side channel attack against the division used to calculate one of the modulo inverses in the DSA algorithm. This change takes advantage of the primality of the modulo and Fermat's little theorem to calculate the inverse without leaking information. Thanks to Samuel Weiser for finding and reporting this. Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Found by Coverity Scan Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
This also gave enough reason to collect the stuff that's common for all iOS config targets into the template "ios-common". Fixes #7318 Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7403)
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
The new Configure summary box (41349b5e) now hides the warning about the missing seed source (2805ee1e ) too much. To make it more visible again, add warning markers. Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 27, 2018
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Fraser Tweedale authored
The Name Constraints extension contains GeneralSubtree values indicating included or excluded subtrees. It is defined as: GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE { base GeneralName, minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } RFC 5280 further specifies: Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be absent. Because the minimum fields has DEFAULT 0, and certificates should be encoded using DER, the situation where minimum = 0 occurs in a certificate should not arise. Nevertheless, it does arise. For example, I have seen certificates issued by Microsoft programs that contain GeneralSubtree values encoded thus. Enhance the Name Constraints matching routine to handle the case where minimum is specified. If present, it must be zero. The maximum field remains prohibited. Reviewed-by: Paul Yang...
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- Oct 26, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Fixes #7394 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Since 1fb9fdc3 we may attempt to buffer a record from the next epoch that has already been buffered. Prior to that this never occurred. We simply ignore a failure to buffer a duplicated record. Fixes #6902 Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by:
Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
In commit 820e414d (pr #5247) the summary output of the Configure command was optimized towards instructing people how to create issue reports. It turned out that the wording of this message can confuse new OpenSSL users and make them think that they are seeing an error message. This commit makes the summary output start with a success to prevent a misunderstanding. Also it gives more hints to new OpenSSL users. Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Commit 5b4cb385 (#7382) introduced a bug which had the effect that RAND_add()/RAND_seed() failed for buffer sizes less than 32 bytes. The reason was that now the added random data was used exlusively as entropy source for reseeding. When the random input was too short or contained not enough entropy, the DRBG failed without querying the available entropy sources. This commit makes drbg_add() act smarter: it checks the entropy requirements explicitely. If the random input fails this check, it won't be added as entropy input, but only as additional data. More precisely, the behaviour depends on whether an os entropy source was configured (which is the default on most os): - If an os entropy source is avaible then we declare the buffer content as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular reseeding. - If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail inevitably. So drbg_add() uses a trick to mix the buffer contents into the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: it generates a dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data. Related-to: #7449 Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Increase the load buffer size such that it exceeds the chunk size by a comfortable amount. This is done to avoid calling RAND_add() with a small final chunk. Instead, such a small final chunk will be added together with the previous chunk (unless it's the only one). Related-to: #7449 Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
The failure of RAND_load_file was only noticed because of the heap corruption which was reported in #7499 and fixed in commit 5b4cb385 . To prevent this in the future, RAND_load_file() now explicitly checks RAND_status() and reports an error if it fails. Related-to: #7449 Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 25, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
When building shared libraries on Windows, we had a clash between 'libcrypto.lib' the static routine library and 'libcrypto.lib' the import library. We now change it so the static versions of our libraries get '_static' appended to their names. These will never get installed, but can still be used for our internal purposes, such as internal tests. When building non-shared, the renaming mechanism doesn't come into play. In that case, the static libraries 'libcrypto.lib' and 'libssl.lib' are installed, just as always. Fixes #7492 Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7496)
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- Oct 23, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
This value is used to set DRBG_MAX_LENGTH Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 22, 2018
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Pauli authored
NIST has updated their guidelines in appendix D of SP 800-56B rev2 (draft) providing a formula for the number of security bits it terms of the length of the RSA key. This is an implementation of this formula using fixed point arithmetic. For integers 1 .. 100,000 it rounds down to the next smaller 8 bit strength 270 times. It never errs to the high side. None of the rounded values occur near any of the commonly selected lengths. Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
This bug was introduced by #7382 which enhanced RAND_add() to accept large buffer sizes. As a consequence, RAND_add() now fails for buffer sizes less than 32 bytes (i.e. less than 256 bits). In addition, rand_drbg_get_entropy() forgets to reset the attached drbg->pool in the case of an error, which leads to the heap corruption. The problem occurred with RAND_load_file(), which reads the file in chunks of 1024 bytes each. If the size of the final chunk is less than 32 bytes, then RAND_add() fails, whence RAND_load_file() fails silently for buffer sizes n = k * 1024 + r with r = 1,...,31. This commit fixes the heap corruption only. The other issues will be addressed in a separate pull request. Thanks to Gisle Vanem for reporting this issue. Fixes #7449 Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 21, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
We only had targets for the "simple" shared library names (libfoo.so and not libfoo.so.x.y on Unix, import library libfoo.lib but not libfoo.dll on Windows). This has created some confusion why it wasn't possible to rebuild the less "simple" name directly (just as an example, someone who mistook the import library on Windows for a static library, removed the DLL and then found it was difficult to rebuild directly), so we change the target to include all possible names. Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 19, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
An unknown PSK identity could be because its actually a session resumption attempt. Sessions resumptions and external PSKs are indistinguishable so the callbacks need to fail gracefully if they don't recognise the identity. Fixes #7433 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Previously when a ClientHello arrives with a valid cookie using DTLSv1_listen() we only "peeked" at the message and left it on the underlying fd. This works fine for single threaded applications but for multi-threaded apps this does not work since the fd is typically reused for the server thread, while a new fd is created and connected for the client. By "peeking" we leave the message on the server fd, and consequently we think we've received another valid ClientHello and so we create yet another fd for the client, and so on until we run out of fds. In this new approach we remove the ClientHello and buffer it in the SSL object. Fixes #6934 Reviewed-by:
Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7375)
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Matt Caswell authored
Rather than using init_buf we use the record layer read and write buffers in DTLSv1_listen(). These seem more appropriate anyway and will help with the next commit. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #7428 Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
Yes, it's second halving, i.e. it's now 1/4 of original size, or more specifically inner loop. The challenge with Keccak is that you need more temporary registers than there are available. By reversing the order in which columns are assigned in Chi, it's possible to use three of A[][] registers as temporary prior their assigment. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
{make|swap|get|set}context are removed in POSIX.1-2008, but glibc apparently keeps providing it. Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 18, 2018
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armfazh authored
The formula used for this is now kVarianceBlocks = ((255 + 1 + md_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size) + 1 Notice that md_block_size=64 for SHA256, which results on the magic constant kVarianceBlocks = 6. However, md_block_size=128 for SHA384 leading to kVarianceBlocks = 4. CLA:trivial Reviewed-by:
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Also, some readers of the code find starting the count at 1 for EE cert confusing (since RFC5280 counts only non-self-issued intermediate CAs, but we also counted the leaf). Therefore, never count the EE cert, and adjust the path length comparison accordinly. This may be more clear to the reader. Reviewed-by:
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