Keep copy of any host, path and port values allocated by
OCSP_parse_url and free as necessary.

Treat a zero length passed to ssleay_rand_add a no op: the existing logic
zeroes the md value which is very bad. OpenSSL itself never does this
internally and the actual call doesn't make sense as it would be passing
zero bytes of entropy.

Thanks to Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de> for reporting this bug.
(cherry picked from commit 5be1ae28)

A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.

Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
(cherry picked from commit 96db9023b881d7cd9f379b0c154650d6c108e9a3)

Enable TLS padding extension using official value from:

http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml

Use bufsiz - 1 not BUFSIZ - 1 when prompting for a password in
the openssl utility.

Thanks to Rob Mackinnon, Leviathan Security for reporting this issue.

New -hash_old to generate CRL hashes using old
(before OpenSSL 1.0.0) algorithm.

A short PEM encoded sequence if passed to the BIO, and the file
had 2 \n following would fail.

PR#3289

Add additional check to catch this in ASN1_item_verify too.
(cherry picked from commit 66e8211c)

Allow setting of security level in cipher string using the
@SECLEVEL=N syntax.

Since ssltest needs to test low security ciphersuites and keys
set security level to zero so they aren't rejected.

Add a debugging security callback option to s_client/s_server. This will
print out each security parameter as it is accepted or rejected.

Security callback: selects which parameters are permitted including
sensible defaults based on bits of security.

The "parameters" which can be selected include: ciphersuites,
curves, key sizes, certificate signature algorithms, supported
signature algorithms, DH parameters, SSL/TLS version, session tickets
and compression.

In some cases prohibiting the use of a parameters will mean they are
not advertised to the peer: for example cipher suites and ECC curves.
In other cases it will abort the handshake: e.g DH parameters or the
peer key size.

Documentation to follow...

New function ssl_cipher_disabled.

Check for disabled client ciphers using ssl_cipher_disabled.

New function to return only supported ciphers.

New option to ciphers utility to print only supported ciphers.

Add auto DH parameter support. This is roughly equivalent to the
ECDH auto curve selection but for DH. An application can just call

SSL_CTX_set_auto_dh(ctx, 1);

and appropriate DH parameters will be used based on the size of the
server key.

Unlike ECDH there is no way a peer can indicate the range of DH parameters
it supports. Some peers cannot handle DH keys larger that 1024 bits for
example. In this case if you call:

SSL_CTX_set_auto_dh(ctx, 2);

Only 1024 bit DH parameters will be used.

If the server key is 7680 bits or more in size then 8192 bit DH parameters
will be used: these will be *very* slow.

The old export ciphersuites aren't supported but those are very
insecure anyway.

Add functions to return the "bits of security" for various public key
algorithms. Based on SP800-57.

(cherry picked from commit bc5ec653ba65fedb1619c8182088497de8a97a70)

(cherry picked from commit 1f44dac2)

Don't clear verification errors from the error queue unless
SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR is set.

If errors occur during verification and SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR
is set return 2 so applications can issue warnings.
(cherry picked from commit 2dd6976f6d02f98b30c376951ac38f780a86b3b5)

Some CMS SignedData structure use a signature algorithm OID such
as SHA1WithRSA instead of the RSA algorithm OID. Workaround this
case by tolerating the signature if we recognise the OID.

Use a previously unused value as we will be updating multiple released
branches.
(cherry picked from commit 0737acd2a8cc688902b5151cab5dc6737b82fb96)

Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140

Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix.
(cherry picked from commit 2198be3483259de374f91e57d247d0fc667aef29)

Conflicts:

	CHANGES

(cherry picked from commit 7a3e67f029969620966b8a627b8485d83692cca5)