- May 03, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Only treat an ASN1_ANY type as an integer if it has the V_ASN1_INTEGER tag: V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER is an internal only value which is never used for on the wire encoding. Thanks to David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> for reporting this bug. This was found using libFuzzer. RT#4364 (part)CVE-2016-2108. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> CVE-2016-2107 MR: #2572
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Matt Caswell authored
A few functions in the recently added EVP_EncodeInit docs don't apply to the 1.0.x branches. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
With the EVP_EncodeUpdate function it is the caller's responsibility to determine how big the output buffer should be. The function writes the amount actually used to |*outl|. However this could go negative with a sufficiently large value for |inl|. We add a check for this error condition. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most likely result in a crash. Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. CVE-2016-2105 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. CVE-2016-2176 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms. The first form is like this: EVP_EncryptInit() EVP_EncryptUpdate() i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can be no overflows in internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur. This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls this function directly. CVE-2016-2106 Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 3f358213)
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- May 02, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reported by David Benjamin Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 05aef4bb)
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TJ Saunders authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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TJ Saunders authored
If no serverinfo extension is found in some cases, do not abort the handshake, but simply omit/skip that extension. Check for already-registered serverinfo callbacks during serverinfo registration. Update SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo() documentation to mention the need to reload the same serverinfo per certificate, for servers with multiple server certificates. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- Apr 29, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject excessively large X509_NAME structures. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 77076dc9) Conflicts: crypto/x509/x509_err.c crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne(). Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b33d1141)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to restrictions on certificate size. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 295f3a24)
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- Apr 27, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The traditional private key encryption algorithm doesn't function properly if the IV length of the cipher is zero. These ciphers (e.g. ECB mode) are not suitable for private key encryption anyway. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit d78df5df)
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- Apr 26, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
The i2d_X509() function can return a negative value on error. Therefore we should make sure we check it. Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 446ba8de)
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- Apr 25, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
This causes a compilation failure when using --strict-warnings in 1.0.2 and 1.0.1 Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for finding and reporting this. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 79356a83)
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Andy Polyakov authored
IBM argues that in certain scenarios capability query is really expensive. At the same time it's asserted that query results can be safely cached, because disabling CPACF is incompatible with reboot-free operation. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 670ad0fb)
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- Apr 23, 2016
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Backport of commits: 79c7f74d bdcd660e from master. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- Apr 22, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
If the ASN.1 BIO is presented with a large length field read it in chunks of increasing size checking for EOF on each read. This prevents small files allocating excessive amounts of data. CVE-2016-2109 Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c6298139)
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- Apr 07, 2016
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Andy Polyakov authored
As it turns out branch hints grew as kind of a misconception. In addition their interpretation by GNU assembler is affected by assembler flags and can end up with opposite meaning on different processors. As we have to loose quite a lot on misinterprerations, especially on newer processors, we just omit them altogether. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 20b88bb1)
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David Benjamin authored
Free up parsed X509_NAME structure if the CertificateRequest message contains excess data. The security impact is considered insignificant. This is a client side only leak and a large number of connections to malicious servers would be needed to have a significant impact. This was found by libFuzzer. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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- Apr 04, 2016
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Todd Short authored
* Perform ALPN after the SNI callback; the SSL_CTX may change due to that processing * Add flags to indicate that we actually sent ALPN, to properly error out if unexpectedly received. * document ALPN functions * unit tests Backport of commit 817cd0d5 Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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- Mar 26, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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- Mar 18, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
no-comp on Windows was not actually suppressing compilation of the code, although it was suppressing its use. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Ensure we check for a NULL return from OPENSSL_malloc Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
If a call to EVP_DecryptUpdate fails then a memory leak could occur. Ensure that the memory is freed appropriately. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
There is a potential double free in EVP_DigestInit_ex. This is believed to be reached only as a result of programmer error - but we should fix it anyway. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit ffe9150b)
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- Mar 14, 2016
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> MR: #2341
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- Mar 09, 2016
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Richard Levitte authored
If there is cause to think LD_LIBRARY_PATH_32 and LD_PRELOAD_32 are appropriate variables to touch, do so. Otherwise, touch the usual LD_LIBRARY_PATH and LD_PRELOAD. This covers for older installations that don't have a mix of 32-bit and 64-bit libs. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit a772e9d0)
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Richard Levitte authored
Submitted by Erik Forsberg <erik@efca.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 86e75432)
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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- Mar 08, 2016
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
This improves ABI compatibility when symbol resolution is not lazy. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- Mar 07, 2016
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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