- Aug 15, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6741)
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Pauli authored
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Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6963)
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- Aug 14, 2018
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Tomas Mraz authored
If application explicitly calls CONF_modules_load_file() the SSL conf module will be initialized twice and the module data would leak. We need to free it before initializing it again. Fixes #6835 Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Philip Prindeville authored
The logs are usually not looked at, and when they are it's almost always after they've completed and returned a status. That being the case, "progress" output is useless if it's always seen after the fact. Signed-off-by:
Philip Prindeville <philipp@redfish-solutions.com> Reviewed-by:
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Dmitry Yakovlev authored
To avoid crash (same as #5138 fixed in 44f23cd2 ) CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6949)
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- Aug 13, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
Originally fopen(3) was called from bio/bss_file.c, which performed the aliasing. Then fopen(3) was moved to o_fopen.c, while "magic" definition was left behind. It's still useful on 32-bit platforms, so pull it to o_fopen.c. Reviewed-by:
Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
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- Aug 12, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
This allows the original path to be displayed when it's shown to be invalid, so the user can relate without question. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Extra slashes in paths are permissible in Unix-like platforms... however, when compared with the result from 'which', which returns canonical paths, the comparison might fail even though the compared paths may be equivalent. We make the NDK path canonical internally to ensure the equivalence compares as equal, at least for the most trivial cases. Fixes #6917 Reviewed-by:
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- Aug 11, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Since 0.9.7, all i2d_ functions were documented to allocate an output buffer if the user didn't provide one, under these conditions (from the 1.0.2 documentation): For OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if B<*out> is B<NULL> memory will be allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the data just written. i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was found not to do this, and would crash if a NULL output buffer was provided. Fixes #6914 Reviewed-by:Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6918)
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- Aug 09, 2018
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Pauli authored
to the now released RFC 8410. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6910)
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Matt Caswell authored
Commit 88393244 removed some NULL checks from the stack code. This caused a no-comp build to fail in the client and server fuzzers. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
This reverts commit 88393244 . Removing these checks changes the behaviour of the API which is not appropriate for a minor release. This also fixes a failure in the fuzz tests when building with no-comp. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
A client that has fallen back could detect an inappropriate fallback if the TLSv1.3 downgrade protection sentinels are present. Fixes #6756 Reviewed-by:
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- Aug 08, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Test that a server can handle an unecrypted alert when normally the next message is encrypted. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
At certain points in the handshake we could receive either a plaintext or an encrypted alert from the client. We should tolerate both where appropriate. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
If we sent early_data and then received back an HRR, the enc_write_ctx was stale resulting in errors if an alert needed to be sent. Thanks to Quarkslab for reporting this. In any case it makes little sense to encrypt alerts using the client_early_traffic_secret, so we add special handling for alerts sent after early_data. All such alerts are sent in plaintext. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Under certain error conditions a call to SSLfatal could accidently be missed. Reviewed-by:
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- Aug 07, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
In 38eca7fe a new check for the pem_str member of the entries of the ASN1 method table was introduced. Because the test condition was split into two TEST_true(...) conditions, the test outputs error diagnostics for all entries which have pem_str != NULL. This commit joins the two test conditions into a single condition. Reviewed-by:
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Rich Salz authored
Also add build-time errors to keep them in sync. Thanks to GitHub user YuDudysheva for reporting this. Reviewed-by:
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Rich Salz authored
Thanks to GitHub user zsergey105 for reporting this. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
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Patrick Steuer authored
Signed-off-by:
Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
Rationale is that it wasn't providing accurate statistics anyway. For statistics to be accurate CRYPTO_get_alloc_counts should acquire a lock and lock-free additions should not be an option. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
Goal here is to facilitate writing "thread-opportunistic" code that withstands Thread Sanitizer's scrutiny. "Thread-opportunistic" is when exact result is not required, e.g. some statistics, or execution flow doesn't have to be unambiguous. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
Checks are left in OPENSSL_sk_shift, OPENSSL_sk_pop and OPENSSL_sk_num. This is because these are used as "opportunistic" readers, pulling whatever datai, if any, set by somebody else. All calls that add data don't check for stack being NULL, because caller should have checked if stack was actually created. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
In some cases it's about redundant check for return value, in some cases it's about replacing check for -1 with comparison to 0. Otherwise compiler might generate redundant check for <-1. [Even formatting and readability fixes.] Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
Documentation says "at most B<len> bytes will be written", which formally doesn't prohibit zero. But if zero B<len> was passed, the call to memcpy was bound to crash. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Richard Levitte authored
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Pauli authored
The CRYPTO_memcmp test isn't testing the test framework. It would seem to better belong in the sanity tests. Reviewed-by:
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- Aug 06, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
In some scenarios the connection could fail without an alert being sent. This causes a later assertion failure. Thanks to Quarkslab for reporting this. Reviewed-by:
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Patrick Steuer authored
Signed-off-by:
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