- Mar 15, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5445)
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Matt Caswell authored
It is quite likely for there to be multiple certificates with empty subjects, which are still distinct because of subjectAltName. Therefore we allow multiple certificates with an empty Subject even if unique_subject is set to yes. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Commit 87e8feca (16 years ago!) introduced a bug where if we are attempting to insert a cert with a duplicate subject name, and duplicate subject names are not allowed (which is the default), then we get an unhelpful error message back (error number 2). Prior to that commit we got a helpful error message which displayed details of the conflicting entry in the database. That commit was itself attempting to fix a bug with the noemailDN option where we were setting the subject field in the database too early (before extensions had made any amendments to it). This PR moves the check for a conflicting Subject name until after all changes to the Subject have been made by extensions etc. This also, co-incidentally Fixes the ca crashing bug described in issue 5109. Fixes #5109 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
This reverts commit a3d684ff . Empty Subjects are permissible Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
This reverts commit dd37f6f1 . Empty Subjects are permissible. Reviewed-by:
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- Mar 14, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
The void* needs to be cast to a char* first. Fixes #5614 Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5615)
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- Mar 12, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
We should be using ASN1_OBJECT_free() not OPENSSL_free(). Fixes #5568 Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5599)
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Matt Caswell authored
If a mem allocation failed we would ignore it. This commit fixes it to always check. Reviewed-by:
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- Mar 11, 2018
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by:Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> GH: #5582
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- Mar 08, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
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- Mar 07, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
BIO_get_mem_data() and BIO_get_mem_ptr() assign to *pp, not pp Reviewed-by:
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- Mar 05, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
99bb59d9 at ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5507)
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- Mar 04, 2018
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by:
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- Mar 03, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by:
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- Mar 02, 2018
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Reviewed-by:
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- Mar 01, 2018
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Ivan Filenko authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5458)
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- Feb 26, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Fixes #5405, #1381 The base64 filter BIO reads its input in chunks of B64_BLOCK_SIZE bytes. When processing input in PEM format it can happen in rare cases that - the trailing PEM marker crosses the boundary of a chunk, and - the beginning of the following chunk contains valid base64 encoded data. This happened in issue #5405, where the PEM marker was split into "-----END CER" and "TIFICATE-----" at the end of the first chunk. The decoding of the first chunk terminated correctly at the '-' character, which is treated as an EOF marker, and b64_read() returned. However, when called the second time, b64_read() read the next chunk and interpreted the string "TIFICATE" as valid base64 encoded data, adding 6 extra bytes '4c 81 48 08 04 c4'. This patch restores the assignment of the error code to 'ctx->cont', which was deleted accidentally in commit 5562cfac and which prevents b64_read() from reading additional data on subsequent calls. This issue was observed and reported by Annie Yousar. Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 22, 2018
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White_Rabbit authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
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Philippe Antoine authored
Before reading first byte as length Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 21, 2018
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Pavel Kopyl authored
The memory pointed to by the 'push' is freed by the X509_NAME_ENTRY_free() in do_body(). The second time it is referenced to (indirectly) in certify_cert:X509_REQ_free(). Reviewed-by:
Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by:
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Pavel Kopyl authored
X509v3_add_ext: free 'sk' if the memory pointed to by it was malloc-ed inside this function. X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk: return an error if X509v3_add_ext() fails. This prevents use of a freed memory in do_body:sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(). Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
This could in theory result in an overread - but due to the over allocation of the underlying buffer does not represent a security issue. Thanks to Fedor Indutny for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 13, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
when the data block ends with SPACEs or NULs. The problem is, you can't see if the data ends with SPACE or NUL or a combination of both. This can happen for instance with openssl rsautl -decrypt -hexdump Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 09, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
the possibly indeterminate pointer value in wpend_buf. Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 02, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
BN_from_montgomery_word doesn't have a constant memory access pattern. Replace the pointer trick with a constant-time select. There is, of course, still the bn_correct_top leak pervasive in BIGNUM itself. See also https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22904 from BoringSSL. (backport from f345b1f3 signed off by David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>) Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 01, 2018
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David Benjamin authored
The exponent here is one of d, dmp1, or dmq1 for RSA. This value and its bit length are both secret. The only public upper bound is the bit width of the corresponding modulus (RSA n, p, and q, respectively). Although BN_num_bits is constant-time (sort of; see bn_correct_top notes in preceding patch), this does not fix the root problem, which is that the windows are based on the minimal bit width, not the upper bound. We could use BN_num_bits(m), but BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime is public API and may be called with larger exponents. Instead, use all top*BN_BITS2 bits in the BIGNUM. This is still sensitive to the long-standing bn_correct_top leak, but we need to fix that regardless. This may cause us to do a handful of extra multiplications for RSA keys which are just above a whole number of words, but that is not a standard RSA key size. Reviewed-by:
Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
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David Benjamin authored
(This patch was written by Andy Polyakov. I only wrote the commit message. Mistakes in the analysis are my fault.) BN_num_bits, by way of BN_num_bits_word, currently leaks the most-significant word of its argument via branching and memory access pattern. BN_num_bits is called on RSA prime factors in various places. These have public bit lengths, but all bits beyond the high bit are secret. This fully resolves those cases. There are a few places where BN_num_bits is called on an input where the bit length is also secret. This does *not* fully resolve those cases as we still only look at the top word. Today, that is guaranteed to be non-zero, but only because of the long-standing bn_correct_top timing leak. Once that is fixed, a constant-time BN_num_bits on such inputs must count bits on each word. Instead, those cases should not call BN_num_bits at all. In particular, BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime uses the exponent bit width to pick windows, but it should be using the maximum bit width. The next patch will fix this. Thanks to Dinghao Wu, Danfeng Zhang, Shuai Wang, Pei Wang, and Xiao Liu for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 30, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
In TLS we have a check to make sure an incoming reneg ClientHello is acceptable. The equivalent check is missing in the DTLS code. This means that if a client does not signal the ability to handle secure reneg in the initial handshake, then a subsequent reneg handshake should be rejected by the server. In the DTLS case the reneg was being allowed if the the 2nd ClientHello had a renegotiation_info extension. This is incorrect. While incorrect, this does not represent a security issue because if the renegotiation_info extension is present in the second ClientHello it also has to be *correct*. Therefore this will only work if both the client and server believe they are renegotiating, and both know the previous Finished result. This is not the case in an insecure rengotiation attack. I have also tidied up the check in the TLS code and given a better check for determining whether we are renegotiating or not. Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 24, 2018
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Rich Salz authored
Thanks to Yun Jiang for pointing this out. Reviewed-by:
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Rich Salz authored
Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5141 Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Todd Short authored
Reviewed-by:
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Jonathan Scalise authored
Updated uses of gmtime to now call OPENSSL_gmtime instead. Used similar preprocessor logic to make sure localtime_r is called instead of localtime when applicable. Reviewed-by:
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J Mohan Rao Arisankala authored
If tlsext ticket decrypt callback returns error, cleanup ctxs Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 23, 2018
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Cristian Stoica authored
CLA: trivial Signed-off-by:
Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@nxp.com> Reviewed-by:
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Cristian Stoica authored
CLA: trivial Signed-off-by:
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- Jan 22, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
An index.txt entry which has an empty Subject name field will cause ca to crash. Therefore check it when we load it to make sure its not empty. Fixes #5109 Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Misconfiguration (e.g. an empty policy section in the config file) can lead to an empty Subject. Since certificates should have unique Subjects this should not be allowed. Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 21, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 16, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Commit 9f944291 changed the semantics of BN_copy() to additionally copy the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag if it is set. This turns out to be ill advised as it has unintended consequences. For example calling BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() can sometimes return a result with the flag set and sometimes not as a result. This can lead to later failures if we go down code branches that do not support constant time, but check for the presence of the flag. The original commit was made due to an issue in BN_MOD_CTX_set(). The original PR fixed the problem in that function, but it was changed in review to fix it in BN_copy() instead. The solution seems to be to revert the BN_copy() change and go back to the originally proposed way. Reviewed-by:
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- Jan 09, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
In the case of a protocol version alert being sent by a peer the record version number may not be what we are expecting. In DTLS records with an unexpected version number are silently discarded. This probably isn't appropriate for alerts, so we tolerate a mismatch in the minor version number. This resolves an issue reported on openssl-users where an OpenSSL server chose DTLS1.0 but the client was DTLS1.2 only and sent a protocol_version alert with a 1.2 record number. This was silently ignored by the server. Reviewed-by:
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