Windows 8 SDKs complain that GetVersion() is deprecated.

We only use GetVersion like this:

	(GetVersion() < 0x80000000)

which checks if the Windows version is NT based. Use a macro check_winnt()
which uses GetVersion() on older SDK versions and true otherwise.
(cherry picked from commit a4cc3c80

)

Conflicts:
	apps/apps.c
	crypto/bio/bss_log.c

Backported by Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openss.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41c9cfbc)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	.gitignore

(cherry picked from commit 04f670cf)

Conflicts:
	.gitignore

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Fix typo in ssl3_get_cert_verify: we can only skip certificate verify
message if certificate is absent.

NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8 is NOT vulnerable to CVE-2015-0205 as it doesn't
support DH certificates and this typo prohibits skipping of
certificate verify message for sign only certificates anyway.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_pkt.c

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.

CVE-2014-3571

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_pkt.c

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e793809ba50c1e90ab592fb640a856168e50f3de)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4a4d4158)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4138e388)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb62ab4b)

OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 4b4c1fcc)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
	doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
	ssl/d1_srvr.c
	ssl/s3_srvr.c

Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.

CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit b15f8769)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
	ssl/s3_clnt.c

By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.

1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.

If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.

2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.

Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.

3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.

Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.

This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).

CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 208a6012)

Conflicts:
	crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

(these are needed for certificate fingerprint fixes)
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86edf13b)

According to X6.90 null, object identifier, boolean, integer and enumerated
types can only have primitive encodings: return an error if any of
these are received with a constructed encoding.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit f5e4b6b5)

Conflicts:
	crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c

Causes more problems than it fixes: even though error codes
are not part of the stable API, several users rely on the
specific error code, and the change breaks them. Conversely,
we don't have any concrete use-cases for constant-time behaviour here.

This reverts commit 1bb01b1b

.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d45282fc)

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

listed after TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.

RT: 3575
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

When we're configured with no-ssl3 and we receive an SSL v3 Client Hello, we set
the method to NULL.  We didn't used to do that, and it breaks things.  This is a
regression introduced in 62f45cc2

.  Keep the old
method since the code is not able to deal with a NULL method at this time.

CVE-2014-3569, PR#3571

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 392fa7a9)

Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>

so the Win32 compile picks it up correctly.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e2e5326e)

The different -I compiler parameters will take care of the rest...

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8202802f)

Conflicts:
	crypto/evp/evp_enc.c

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55c7a4cf)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 40155f40)

Conflicts:
	e_os.h

Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 87d388c9)

The 1**0 test will fail for FIPS capable builds because it uses the
old BIGNUM code in the 1.2 FIPS module which can't be fixed.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>