Commit f5ebe54c authored by Andy Polyakov's avatar Andy Polyakov Committed by Matt Caswell
Browse files

rsa/rsa_oaep.c: remove memcpy calls from RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP. 



And make RSAErr call unconditional.

Reviewed-by: default avatarRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 75f5e944)
parent db1b63f4

crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c

+51 −31
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, 
                                      const EVP_MD *mgf1md)

{

    int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;

    unsigned int good, found_one_byte;

    unsigned int good = 0, found_one_byte, mask;

    const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;

    /*

     * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em =
@@ -147,8 +147,11 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, 
     * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.

     * This does not leak any side-channel information.

     */

    if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2)

        goto decoding_err;

    if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,

               RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);

        return -1;

    }



    dblen = num - mdlen - 1;

    db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
@@ -157,8 +160,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, 
        goto cleanup;

    }



    if (flen != num) {

        em = OPENSSL_zalloc(num);

    em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);

    if (em == NULL) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,

               ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -167,15 +169,17 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, 


    /*

     * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with

         * BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy

         * to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some

         * side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed

         * memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of

         * |from|.

     * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s

     * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern

     * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.

     */

        memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);

        from = em;

    for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {

        mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);

        flen -= 1 & mask;

        from -= 1 & mask;

        *--em = *from & mask;

    }

    from = em;



    /*

     * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
@@ -222,32 +226,48 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, 
     * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a

     * concern.

     */

    if (!good)

        goto decoding_err;



    msg_index = one_index + 1;

    mlen = dblen - msg_index;



    if (tlen < mlen) {

        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);

        mlen = -1;

    } else {

        memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);

        goto cleanup;

    /*

     * For good measure, do this check in constant tine as well.

     */

    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);



    /*

     * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying

     * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |dblen|

     * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,

     * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information

     * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe

     * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It

     * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal

     * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.

     */

    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen, tlen), dblen, tlen);

    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, dblen - tlen);

    mlen = dblen - msg_index;

    for (from = db + msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {

        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);



        from -= dblen & equals; /* if (i == dblen) rewind   */

        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == dblen) mask = 0 */

        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);

    }



 decoding_err:

    /*

     * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not

     * reveal which kind of decoding error happened.

     */

    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,

           RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);

    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);

 cleanup:

    OPENSSL_cleanse(seed, sizeof(seed));

    OPENSSL_clear_free(db, dblen);

    OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);

    return mlen;



    return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);

}



int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,