Commit c1ca9d32 authored by Dr. Stephen Henson's avatar Dr. Stephen Henson
Browse files

Add Kerberos fix which was in 0.9.8-stable but never committed to HEAD and

1.0.0. Original fix was on 2007-Mar-09 and had the log message: "Fix kerberos
ciphersuite bugs introduced with PR:1336."
parent 48435b20
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+3 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -350,6 +350,9 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
			case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
			ok = 1;

			case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:
			ok = 1;

			}

		return ok;
+10 −8
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -981,7 +981,9 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)

	if (!ok) return((int)n);

	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
	if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
		((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5) && 
		(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)))
		{
		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
		return(1);
@@ -2868,13 +2870,6 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
	DH *dh;
#endif

	sc=s->session->sess_cert;
	if (sc == NULL)
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
		goto err;
		}

	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;

@@ -2882,6 +2877,13 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
	if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
		return(1);

	sc=s->session->sess_cert;
	if (sc == NULL)
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
		goto err;
		}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
	rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
#endif
+2 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -2286,7 +2286,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
			goto err;
			}
		if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
		if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
		    {
		    /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
		     * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
@@ -2296,8 +2296,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
		     * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 
		     * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
		     */
		    if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
			   (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
		    if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
			       SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);