Commit bd045777 authored by Dr. Matthias St. Pierre's avatar Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
Browse files

md_rand.c: don't stop polling until properly initialized



Previously, the RNG sets `initialized=1` after the first call to
RAND_poll(), although its criterion for being initialized actually
is whether condition `entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED` is true.

This commit now assigns `initialized=(entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED)`,
which has the effect that on the next call, RAND_poll() will be
called again, if it previously failed to obtain enough entropy.

Reviewed-by: default avatarPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7438)
parent f2828a14
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+4 −6
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -275,7 +275,6 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
    static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
    int i, j, k;
    size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num;
    int ok;
    long md_c[2];
    unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
    EVP_MD_CTX *m;
@@ -362,14 +361,13 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)

    if (!initialized) {
        RAND_poll();
        initialized = 1;
        initialized = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
    }

    if (!stirred_pool)
        do_stir_pool = 1;

    ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
    if (!ok) {
    if (!initialized) {
        /*
         * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
         * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
@@ -408,7 +406,7 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
            rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
            n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
        }
        if (ok)
        if (initialized)
            stirred_pool = 1;
    }

@@ -500,7 +498,7 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);

    EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
    if (ok)
    if (initialized)
        return (1);
    else if (pseudo)
        return 0;