Commit b2139664 authored by Mark J. Cox's avatar Mark J. Cox
Browse files

Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to 

cause a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2940)
[Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]

Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
in a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2937)  [Steve Henson]

Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function.
(CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]

Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
malicious SSLv2 server.  (CVE-2006-4343)
[Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
parent 8db3f4ac

CHANGES

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@@ -4,6 +4,20 @@ 


 Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l  [xx XXX xxxx]



  *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to

     cause a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2940)

     [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]



  *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result

     in a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2937)  [Steve Henson]



  *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. 

     (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]



  *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a

     malicious SSLv2 server.  (CVE-2006-4343)

     [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]



  *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit

     ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA"

     will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar

NEWS

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@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ 
  This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL

  release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.



  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l:



      o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS  (CVE-2006-2940)

      o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)



  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k:



      o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339

crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c

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@@ -629,6 +629,7 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **in, long inl 
		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);

		return 0;

	} else if(ret == -1) return -1;

        ret = 0;

	/* SEQUENCE, SET and "OTHER" are left in encoded form */

	if((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (utype == V_ASN1_SET) || (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER)) {

		/* Clear context cache for type OTHER because the auto clear when

crypto/dh/dh.h

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@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@ 
#include <openssl/crypto.h>

#include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>

	

#ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS

# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	10000

#endif



#define DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P     0x01

#define DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DH

                                       * implementation now uses constant time
@@ -207,6 +211,7 @@ void ERR_load_DH_strings(void); 
/* Reason codes. */

#define DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR				 101

#define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE				 100

#define DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE                           103



#ifdef  __cplusplus

}

crypto/dh/dh_err.c

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@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_functs[]= 
static ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[]=

	{

{ERR_REASON(DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR)          ,"bad generator"},

{ERR_REASON(DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE)      ,"modulus too large"},               

{ERR_REASON(DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE)       ,"no private value"},

{0,NULL}

	};