Commit 9b5f1c8f authored by Dr. Matthias St. Pierre's avatar Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
Browse files

rand_unix.c: assimilate syscall_random() with getrandom(2)



Change return value type to ssize_t and ensure that a negative value
is returned only if a corresponding errno is set.

Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6990)
parent 8e5da579
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+37 −20
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -77,8 +77,6 @@ static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
# endif
#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__DJGPP__) */

int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen);

#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)) && \
        !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
# error "UEFI and VXWorks only support seeding NONE"
@@ -88,6 +86,8 @@ int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen);
    || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \
    || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI))

static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen);

# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)

#  ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
@@ -192,22 +192,29 @@ void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
#  if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
/*
 * sysctl_random(): Use sysctl() to read a random number from the kernel
 * Returns the size on success, 0 on failure.
 * Returns the number of bytes returned in buf on success, -1 on failure.
 */
static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
    int mib[2];
    size_t done = 0;
    size_t len;

    /*
     * Note: sign conversion between size_t and ssize_t is safe even
     * without a range check, see comment in syscall_random()
     */

    /*
     * On FreeBSD old implementations returned longs, newer versions support
     * variable sizes up to 256 byte. The code below would not work properly
     * when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a
     * multiple of longs, which should never be the case.
     */
    if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0))
        return 0;
    if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) {
        errno = EINVAL;
        return -1;
    }

    /*
     * On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only
@@ -217,7 +224,8 @@ static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
     * Just return an error on older NetBSD versions.
     */
#if   defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ < 400000000
    return 0;
    errno = ENOSYS;
    return -1;
#endif

    mib[0] = CTL_KERN;
@@ -226,7 +234,7 @@ static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
    do {
        len = buflen;
        if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1)
            return done;
            return done > 0 ? done : -1;
        done += len;
        buf += len;
        buflen -= len;
@@ -238,10 +246,20 @@ static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)

/*
 * syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
 * returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or <= 0 on error.
 * returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error.
 */
int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
    /*
     * Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
     * get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by
     *
     *   2 * DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^13
     *
     * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
     * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
     */

    /*
     * Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
     *
@@ -253,10 +271,10 @@ int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
     * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
     */
#  if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
    extern int getentropy(void *bufer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
    extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));

    if (getentropy != NULL)
        return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? buflen : 0;
        return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
#  else
    union {
        void *p;
@@ -271,19 +289,18 @@ int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
    p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
    ERR_pop_to_mark();
    if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
        return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? buflen : 0;
        return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
#  endif

    /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
#  if defined(__linux) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
    return (int)syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
#  endif

#  if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
    return (int)sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
#  endif

    return syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
#  elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
    return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
#  else
    errno = ENOSYS;
    return -1;
#  endif
}

#if  !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)