Commit 592ac253 authored by Matt Caswell's avatar Matt Caswell
Browse files

Add sanity check in ssl3_cbc_digest_record 



For SSLv3 the code assumes that |header_length| > |md_block_size|. Whilst
this is true for all SSLv3 ciphersuites, this fact is far from obvious by
looking at the code. If this were not the case then an integer overflow
would occur, leading to a subsequent buffer overflow. Therefore I have
added an explicit sanity check to ensure header_length is always valid.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 29b0a15a)
parent d8896822

ssl/s3_cbc.c

+12 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -639,12 +639,22 @@ void ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, 


    if (k > 0) {

        if (is_sslv3) {

            unsigned overhang;



            /*

             * The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. overhang is

             * the number of bytes beyond a single block that the header

             * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5).

             */

            unsigned overhang = header_length - md_block_size;

             * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). There are no

             * ciphersuites in SSLv3 that are not SHA1 or MD5 based and

             * therefore we can be confident that the header_length will be

             * greater than |md_block_size|. However we add a sanity check just

             * in case

             */

            if (header_length <= md_block_size) {

                /* Should never happen */

                return;

            }

            overhang = header_length - md_block_size;

            md_transform(md_state.c, header);

            memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);

            memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size - overhang);