Commit 444b1d41 authored by Adam Langley's avatar Adam Langley
Browse files

AEAD support.

This change adds an AEAD interface to EVP and an AES-GCM implementation
suitable for use in TLS.
parent 4055ca1f
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+4 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ LIBSRC= encode.c digest.c evp_enc.c evp_key.c evp_acnf.c evp_cnf.c \
	c_all.c c_allc.c c_alld.c evp_lib.c bio_ok.c \
	evp_pkey.c evp_pbe.c p5_crpt.c p5_crpt2.c \
	e_old.c pmeth_lib.c pmeth_fn.c pmeth_gn.c m_sigver.c \
	e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c e_rc4_hmac_md5.c
	e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c e_rc4_hmac_md5.c \
	evp_aead.c

LIBOBJ=	encode.o digest.o evp_enc.o evp_key.o evp_acnf.o evp_cnf.o \
	e_des.o e_bf.o e_idea.o e_des3.o e_camellia.o\
@@ -42,7 +43,8 @@ LIBOBJ= encode.o digest.o evp_enc.o evp_key.o evp_acnf.o evp_cnf.o \
	c_all.o c_allc.o c_alld.o evp_lib.o bio_ok.o \
	evp_pkey.o evp_pbe.o p5_crpt.o p5_crpt2.o \
	e_old.o pmeth_lib.o pmeth_fn.o pmeth_gn.o m_sigver.o \
	e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o e_rc4_hmac_md5.o
	e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o e_rc4_hmac_md5.o \
	evp_aead.o

SRC= $(LIBSRC)

+211 −21
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1227,47 +1227,48 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
		}
	}

static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
                        const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
static ctr128_f aes_gcm_set_key(AES_KEY *aes_key, GCM128_CONTEXT *gcm_ctx,
				const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
	{
	EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
	if (!iv && !key)
		return 1;
	if (key)
		{ do {
#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
		if (BSAES_CAPABLE)
			{
			AES_set_encrypt_key(key,ctx->key_len*8,&gctx->ks.ks);
			CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm,&gctx->ks,
			AES_set_encrypt_key(key,key_len*8,aes_key);
			CRYPTO_gcm128_init(gcm_ctx,aes_key,
					(block128_f)AES_encrypt);
			gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
			break;
			return (ctr128_f)bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
			}
		else
#endif
#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
		if (VPAES_CAPABLE)
			{
			vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key,ctx->key_len*8,&gctx->ks.ks);
			CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm,&gctx->ks,
			vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key,key_len*8,aes_key);
			CRYPTO_gcm128_init(gcm_ctx,aes_key,
					(block128_f)vpaes_encrypt);
			gctx->ctr = NULL;
			break;
			return NULL;
			}
		else
#endif
		(void)0;	/* terminate potentially open 'else' */

		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
		CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f)AES_encrypt);
	AES_set_encrypt_key(key, key_len*8, aes_key);
	CRYPTO_gcm128_init(gcm_ctx, aes_key, (block128_f)AES_encrypt);
#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
		gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt;
	return (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt;
#else
		gctx->ctr = NULL;
	return NULL;
#endif
		} while (0);
	}

static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
                        const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
	{
	EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data;
	if (!iv && !key)
		return 1;
	if (key)
		{
		gctx->ctr = aes_gcm_set_key(&gctx->ks.ks, &gctx->gcm, key, ctx->key_len);
		/* If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use
		 * saved IV.
		 */
@@ -1977,4 +1978,193 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap(void)
	return &aes_256_wrap;
	}

#define EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN 16

struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx {
	union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ks;
	GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;
	ctr128_f ctr;
	unsigned char tag_len;
};

static int aead_aes_gcm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
	const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len)
	{
	struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx;
	const size_t key_bits = key_len * 8;

	if (key_bits != 128 && key_bits != 256)
		{
		EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT, EVP_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
		return 0;  /* EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this. */
		}

	if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH)
		tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;

	if (tag_len > EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN)
		{
		EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT, EVP_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE);
		return 0;
		}

	gcm_ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx));
	if (gcm_ctx == NULL)
		return 0;

#ifdef AESNI_CAPABLE
	if (AESNI_CAPABLE)
		{
		aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, key_bits, &gcm_ctx->ks.ks);
		CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gcm_ctx->gcm, &gcm_ctx->ks.ks,
				   (block128_f)aesni_encrypt);
		gcm_ctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
		}
	else
#endif
		{
		gcm_ctx->ctr = aes_gcm_set_key(&gcm_ctx->ks.ks, &gcm_ctx->gcm,
					       key, key_len);
		}
	gcm_ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
	ctx->aead_state = gcm_ctx;

	return 1;
	}

static void aead_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx)
	{
	struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
	OPENSSL_free(gcm_ctx);
	}

static ssize_t aead_aes_gcm_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
	unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len,
	const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
	const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
	const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len)
	{
	size_t bulk = 0;
	const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
	GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;

	if (max_out_len < in_len + gcm_ctx->tag_len)
		{
		EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_SEAL, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
		return -1;
		}

	memcpy(&gcm, &gcm_ctx->gcm, sizeof(gcm));
	CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, nonce, nonce_len);

	if (ad_len > 0 && CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len))
		return -1;

	if (gcm_ctx->ctr)
		{
		if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk,
						in_len - bulk, gcm_ctx->ctr))
			return -1;
		}
	else
		{
		if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk,
					  in_len - bulk))
			return -1;
		}

	CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out + in_len, gcm_ctx->tag_len);
	return in_len + gcm_ctx->tag_len;
	}

static ssize_t aead_aes_gcm_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
	unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len,
	const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
	const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
	const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len)
	{
	size_t bulk = 0;
	const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
	unsigned char tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN];
	size_t out_len;
	GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;

	if (in_len < gcm_ctx->tag_len)
		{
		EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
		return -1;
		}

	out_len = in_len - gcm_ctx->tag_len;

	if (max_out_len < out_len)
		{
		EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
		return -1;
		}

	memcpy(&gcm, &gcm_ctx->gcm, sizeof(gcm));
	CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, nonce, nonce_len);

	if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len))
		return -1;

	if (gcm_ctx->ctr)
		{
		if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk,
						in_len-bulk-gcm_ctx->tag_len,
						gcm_ctx->ctr))
			return -1;
		}
	else
		{
		if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk,
					  in_len - bulk - gcm_ctx->tag_len))
			return -1;
		}

	CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, gcm_ctx->tag_len);
	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in + out_len, gcm_ctx->tag_len) != 0)
		{
		EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
		return -1;
		}

	return out_len;
	}

static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_gcm = {
	16,  /* key len */
	12,  /* nonce len */
	EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN,  /* overhead */
	EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN,  /* max tag length */

	aead_aes_gcm_init,
	aead_aes_gcm_cleanup,
	aead_aes_gcm_seal,
	aead_aes_gcm_open,
};

static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_gcm = {
	32,  /* key len */
	12,  /* nonce len */
	EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN,  /* overhead */
	EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN,  /* max tag length */

	aead_aes_gcm_init,
	aead_aes_gcm_cleanup,
	aead_aes_gcm_seal,
	aead_aes_gcm_open,
};

const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm()
	{
	return &aead_aes_128_gcm;
	}

const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm()
	{
	return &aead_aes_256_gcm;
	}

#endif
+115 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1266,6 +1266,111 @@ void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth,
	int (*ctrl_str)(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
					const char *type, const char *value));

/* Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data.
 *
 * AEAD couples confidentiality and integrity in a single primtive. AEAD
 * algorithms take a key and then can seal and open individual messages. Each
 * message has a unique, per-message nonce and, optionally, additional data
 * which is authenticated but not included in the output. */

struct evp_aead_st;
typedef struct evp_aead_st EVP_AEAD;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
/* EVP_aes_128_gcm is AES-128 in Galois Counter Mode. */
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm(void);
/* EVP_aes_256_gcm is AES-256 in Galois Counter Mode. */
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm(void);
#endif

/* EVP_AEAD_key_length returns the length, in bytes, of the keys used by
 * |aead|. */
size_t EVP_AEAD_key_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead);

/* EVP_AEAD_nonce_length returns the length, in bytes, of the per-message nonce
 * for |aead|. */
size_t EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead);

/* EVP_AEAD_max_overhead returns the maximum number of additional bytes added
 * by the act of sealing data with |aead|. */
size_t EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(const EVP_AEAD *aead);

/* EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len returns the maximum tag length when using |aead|. This
 * is the largest value that can be passed as |tag_len| to
 * |EVP_AEAD_CTX_init|. */
size_t EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD *aead);

/* An EVP_AEAD_CTX represents an AEAD algorithm configured with a specific key
 * and message-independent IV. */
typedef struct evp_aead_ctx_st {
	const EVP_AEAD *aead;
	/* aead_state is an opaque pointer to whatever state the AEAD needs to
	 * maintain. */
	void *aead_state;
} EVP_AEAD_CTX;

#define EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH 0

/* EVP_AEAD_init initializes |ctx| for the given AEAD algorithm from |impl|.
 * The |impl| argument may be NULL to choose the default implementation.
 * Authentication tags may be truncated by passing a size as |tag_len|. A
 * |tag_len| of zero indicates the default tag length and this is defined as
 * EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH for readability.
 * Returns 1 on success. Otherwise returns 0 and pushes to the error stack. */
int EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead,
		      const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
		      size_t tag_len, ENGINE *impl);

/* EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup frees any data allocated by |ctx|. */
void EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx);

/* EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal encrypts and authenticates |in_len| bytes from |in| and
 * authenticates |ad_len| bytes from |ad| and writes the result to |out|,
 * returning the number of bytes written, or -1 on error.
 *
 * This function may be called (with the same EVP_AEAD_CTX) concurrently with
 * itself or EVP_AEAD_CTX_open.
 *
 * At most |max_out_len| bytes are written to |out| and, in order to ensure
 * success, |max_out_len| should be |in_len| plus the result of
 * EVP_AEAD_overhead.
 *
 * The length of |nonce|, |nonce_len|, must be equal to the result of
 * EVP_AEAD_nonce_length for this AEAD.
 *
 * EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal never results in a partial output. If |max_out_len| is
 * insufficient, -1 will be returned.
 *
 * If |in| and |out| alias then |out| must be <= |in|. */
ssize_t EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
			  unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len,
			  const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
			  const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
			  const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len);

/* EVP_AEAD_CTX_open authenticates |in_len| bytes from |in| and |ad_len| bytes
 * from |ad| and decrypts at most |in_len| bytes into |out|. It returns the
 * number of bytes written, or -1 on error.
 *
 * This function may be called (with the same EVP_AEAD_CTX) concurrently with
 * itself or EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal.
 *
 * At most |in_len| bytes are written to |out|. In order to ensure success,
 * |max_out_len| should be at least |in_len|.
 *
 * The length of |nonce|, |nonce_len|, must be equal to the result of
 * EVP_AEAD_nonce_length for this AEAD.
 *
 * EVP_AEAD_CTX_open never results in a partial output. If |max_out_len| is
 * insufficient, -1 will be returned.
 *
 * If |in| and |out| alias then |out| must be <= |in|. */
ssize_t EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
			  unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len,
			  const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
			  const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
			  const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len);

void EVP_add_alg_module(void);

/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
@@ -1277,6 +1382,11 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
/* Error codes for the EVP functions. */

/* Function codes. */
#define EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT				 187
#define EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN				 188
#define EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_SEAL				 189
#define EVP_F_AEAD_CTX_OPEN				 185
#define EVP_F_AEAD_CTX_SEAL				 186
#define EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY				 165
#define EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_CIPHER				 176
#define EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY				 133
@@ -1293,6 +1403,9 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
#define EVP_F_DSA_PKEY2PKCS8				 135
#define EVP_F_ECDSA_PKEY2PKCS8				 129
#define EVP_F_ECKEY_PKEY2PKCS8				 132
#define EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_INIT				 180
#define EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_OPEN				 190
#define EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_SEAL				 191
#define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX				 123
#define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY			 163
#define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL			 124
@@ -1408,10 +1521,12 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
#define EVP_R_NO_VERIFY_FUNCTION_CONFIGURED		 105
#define EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE	 150
#define EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED			 151
#define EVP_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT			 172
#define EVP_R_PKCS8_UNKNOWN_BROKEN_TYPE			 117
#define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR			 145
#define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR			 146
#define EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA			 106
#define EVP_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE				 171
#define EVP_R_TOO_LARGE					 164
#define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER				 160
#define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST				 161

crypto/evp/evp_aead.c

0 → 100644
+192 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
 * 
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 * 
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
 * the code are not to be removed.
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 * 
 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */

#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>

#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>

#include "evp_locl.h"

size_t EVP_AEAD_key_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead)
	{
	return aead->key_len;
	}

size_t EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead)
	{
	return aead->nonce_len;
	}

size_t EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(const EVP_AEAD *aead)
	{
	return aead->overhead;
	}

size_t EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD *aead)
	{
	return aead->max_tag_len;
	}

int EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead,
		      const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
		      size_t tag_len, ENGINE *impl)
	{
	ctx->aead = aead;
	if (key_len != aead->key_len)
		{
		EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_INIT,EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE);
		return 0;
		}
	return aead->init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len);
	}

void EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx)
	{
	if (ctx->aead == NULL)
		return;
	ctx->aead->cleanup(ctx);
	ctx->aead = NULL;
	}

/* check_alias returns 0 if |out| points within the buffer determined by |in|
 * and |in_len| and 1 otherwise.
 *
 * When processing, there's only an issue if |out| points within in[:in_len]
 * and isn't equal to |in|. If that's the case then writing the output will
 * stomp input that hasn't been read yet.
 *
 * This function checks for that case. */
static int check_alias(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
		       const unsigned char *out)
	{
	if (out <= in)
		return 1;
	if (in + in_len < out)
		return 1;
	return 0;
	}

ssize_t EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
			  unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len,
			  const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
			  const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
			  const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len)
	{
	size_t possible_out_len = in_len + ctx->aead->overhead;
	ssize_t r;

	if (possible_out_len < in_len /* overflow */ ||
	    possible_out_len > SSIZE_MAX /* return value cannot be
					    represented */)
		{
		EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_SEAL, EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
		goto error;
		}

	if (!check_alias(in, in_len, out))
		{
		EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_SEAL, EVP_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
		goto error;
		}

	r = ctx->aead->seal(ctx, out, max_out_len, nonce, nonce_len,
			    in, in_len, ad, ad_len);
	if (r >= 0)
		return r;

error:
	/* In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller
	 * that doesn't check the return value doesn't send raw data. */
	memset(out, 0, max_out_len);
	return -1;
	}

ssize_t EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
			 unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len,
			 const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
			 const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
			 const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len)
	{
	ssize_t r;

	if (in_len > SSIZE_MAX)
		{
		EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_OPEN, EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
		goto error;  /* may not be able to represent return value. */
		}

	if (!check_alias(in, in_len, out))
		{
		EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_OPEN, EVP_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
		goto error;
		}

	r = ctx->aead->open(ctx, out, max_out_len, nonce, nonce_len,
			    in, in_len, ad, ad_len);

	if (r >= 0)
		return r;

error:
	/* In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller
	 * that doesn't check the return value doesn't try and process bad
	 * data. */
	memset(out, 0, max_out_len);
	return -1;
	}
+10 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -70,6 +70,11 @@

static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[]=
	{
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT),	"AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN),	"AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_SEAL),	"AEAD_AES_GCM_SEAL"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_CTX_OPEN),	"AEAD_CTX_OPEN"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_CTX_SEAL),	"AEAD_CTX_SEAL"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY),	"AESNI_INIT_KEY"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_CIPHER),	"AESNI_XTS_CIPHER"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY),	"AES_INIT_KEY"},
@@ -86,6 +91,9 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[]=
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_DSA_PKEY2PKCS8),	"DSA_PKEY2PKCS8"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_ECDSA_PKEY2PKCS8),	"ECDSA_PKEY2PKCS8"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_ECKEY_PKEY2PKCS8),	"ECKEY_PKEY2PKCS8"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_INIT),	"EVP_AEAD_CTX_init"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_OPEN),	"EVP_AEAD_CTX_open"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_SEAL),	"EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX),	"EVP_CipherInit_ex"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY),	"EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL),	"EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl"},
@@ -204,10 +212,12 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_VERIFY_FUNCTION_CONFIGURED),"no verify function configured"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),"operation not supported for this keytype"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED),"operaton not initialized"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT)  ,"output aliases input"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PKCS8_UNKNOWN_BROKEN_TYPE),"pkcs8 unknown broken type"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR),"private key decode error"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR),"private key encode error"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA)    ,"public key not rsa"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE)         ,"tag too large"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE)             ,"too large"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER)        ,"unknown cipher"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST)        ,"unknown digest"},
Loading