Loading crypto/evp/Makefile +4 −2 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ LIBSRC= encode.c digest.c evp_enc.c evp_key.c evp_acnf.c evp_cnf.c \ c_all.c c_allc.c c_alld.c evp_lib.c bio_ok.c \ evp_pkey.c evp_pbe.c p5_crpt.c p5_crpt2.c \ e_old.c pmeth_lib.c pmeth_fn.c pmeth_gn.c m_sigver.c \ e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c e_rc4_hmac_md5.c e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c e_rc4_hmac_md5.c \ evp_aead.c LIBOBJ= encode.o digest.o evp_enc.o evp_key.o evp_acnf.o evp_cnf.o \ e_des.o e_bf.o e_idea.o e_des3.o e_camellia.o\ Loading @@ -42,7 +43,8 @@ LIBOBJ= encode.o digest.o evp_enc.o evp_key.o evp_acnf.o evp_cnf.o \ c_all.o c_allc.o c_alld.o evp_lib.o bio_ok.o \ evp_pkey.o evp_pbe.o p5_crpt.o p5_crpt2.o \ e_old.o pmeth_lib.o pmeth_fn.o pmeth_gn.o m_sigver.o \ e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o e_rc4_hmac_md5.o e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o e_rc4_hmac_md5.o \ evp_aead.o SRC= $(LIBSRC) Loading crypto/evp/e_aes.c +211 −21 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1227,47 +1227,48 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) } } static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) static ctr128_f aes_gcm_set_key(AES_KEY *aes_key, GCM128_CONTEXT *gcm_ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data; if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { do { #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE if (BSAES_CAPABLE) { AES_set_encrypt_key(key,ctx->key_len*8,&gctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm,&gctx->ks, AES_set_encrypt_key(key,key_len*8,aes_key); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(gcm_ctx,aes_key, (block128_f)AES_encrypt); gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; break; return (ctr128_f)bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; } else #endif #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key,ctx->key_len*8,&gctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm,&gctx->ks, vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key,key_len*8,aes_key); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(gcm_ctx,aes_key, (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt); gctx->ctr = NULL; break; return NULL; } else #endif (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f)AES_encrypt); AES_set_encrypt_key(key, key_len*8, aes_key); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(gcm_ctx, aes_key, (block128_f)AES_encrypt); #ifdef AES_CTR_ASM gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt; return (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt; #else gctx->ctr = NULL; return NULL; #endif } while (0); } static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data; if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { gctx->ctr = aes_gcm_set_key(&gctx->ks.ks, &gctx->gcm, key, ctx->key_len); /* If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use * saved IV. */ Loading Loading @@ -1977,4 +1978,193 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap(void) return &aes_256_wrap; } #define EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN 16 struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx { union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ks; GCM128_CONTEXT gcm; ctr128_f ctr; unsigned char tag_len; }; static int aead_aes_gcm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) { struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx; const size_t key_bits = key_len * 8; if (key_bits != 128 && key_bits != 256) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT, EVP_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH); return 0; /* EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this. */ } if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; if (tag_len > EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT, EVP_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } gcm_ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx)); if (gcm_ctx == NULL) return 0; #ifdef AESNI_CAPABLE if (AESNI_CAPABLE) { aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, key_bits, &gcm_ctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gcm_ctx->gcm, &gcm_ctx->ks.ks, (block128_f)aesni_encrypt); gcm_ctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; } else #endif { gcm_ctx->ctr = aes_gcm_set_key(&gcm_ctx->ks.ks, &gcm_ctx->gcm, key, key_len); } gcm_ctx->tag_len = tag_len; ctx->aead_state = gcm_ctx; return 1; } static void aead_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = ctx->aead_state; OPENSSL_free(gcm_ctx); } static ssize_t aead_aes_gcm_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) { size_t bulk = 0; const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = ctx->aead_state; GCM128_CONTEXT gcm; if (max_out_len < in_len + gcm_ctx->tag_len) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_SEAL, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return -1; } memcpy(&gcm, &gcm_ctx->gcm, sizeof(gcm)); CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, nonce, nonce_len); if (ad_len > 0 && CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len)) return -1; if (gcm_ctx->ctr) { if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, in_len - bulk, gcm_ctx->ctr)) return -1; } else { if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, in_len - bulk)) return -1; } CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out + in_len, gcm_ctx->tag_len); return in_len + gcm_ctx->tag_len; } static ssize_t aead_aes_gcm_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) { size_t bulk = 0; const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = ctx->aead_state; unsigned char tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN]; size_t out_len; GCM128_CONTEXT gcm; if (in_len < gcm_ctx->tag_len) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return -1; } out_len = in_len - gcm_ctx->tag_len; if (max_out_len < out_len) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return -1; } memcpy(&gcm, &gcm_ctx->gcm, sizeof(gcm)); CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, nonce, nonce_len); if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len)) return -1; if (gcm_ctx->ctr) { if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, in_len-bulk-gcm_ctx->tag_len, gcm_ctx->ctr)) return -1; } else { if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, in_len - bulk - gcm_ctx->tag_len)) return -1; } CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, gcm_ctx->tag_len); if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in + out_len, gcm_ctx->tag_len) != 0) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return -1; } return out_len; } static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_gcm = { 16, /* key len */ 12, /* nonce len */ EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN, /* overhead */ EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN, /* max tag length */ aead_aes_gcm_init, aead_aes_gcm_cleanup, aead_aes_gcm_seal, aead_aes_gcm_open, }; static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_gcm = { 32, /* key len */ 12, /* nonce len */ EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN, /* overhead */ EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN, /* max tag length */ aead_aes_gcm_init, aead_aes_gcm_cleanup, aead_aes_gcm_seal, aead_aes_gcm_open, }; const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm() { return &aead_aes_128_gcm; } const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm() { return &aead_aes_256_gcm; } #endif crypto/evp/evp.h +115 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1266,6 +1266,111 @@ void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*ctrl_str)(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value)); /* Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data. * * AEAD couples confidentiality and integrity in a single primtive. AEAD * algorithms take a key and then can seal and open individual messages. Each * message has a unique, per-message nonce and, optionally, additional data * which is authenticated but not included in the output. */ struct evp_aead_st; typedef struct evp_aead_st EVP_AEAD; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES /* EVP_aes_128_gcm is AES-128 in Galois Counter Mode. */ const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm(void); /* EVP_aes_256_gcm is AES-256 in Galois Counter Mode. */ const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm(void); #endif /* EVP_AEAD_key_length returns the length, in bytes, of the keys used by * |aead|. */ size_t EVP_AEAD_key_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead); /* EVP_AEAD_nonce_length returns the length, in bytes, of the per-message nonce * for |aead|. */ size_t EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead); /* EVP_AEAD_max_overhead returns the maximum number of additional bytes added * by the act of sealing data with |aead|. */ size_t EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(const EVP_AEAD *aead); /* EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len returns the maximum tag length when using |aead|. This * is the largest value that can be passed as |tag_len| to * |EVP_AEAD_CTX_init|. */ size_t EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD *aead); /* An EVP_AEAD_CTX represents an AEAD algorithm configured with a specific key * and message-independent IV. */ typedef struct evp_aead_ctx_st { const EVP_AEAD *aead; /* aead_state is an opaque pointer to whatever state the AEAD needs to * maintain. */ void *aead_state; } EVP_AEAD_CTX; #define EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH 0 /* EVP_AEAD_init initializes |ctx| for the given AEAD algorithm from |impl|. * The |impl| argument may be NULL to choose the default implementation. * Authentication tags may be truncated by passing a size as |tag_len|. A * |tag_len| of zero indicates the default tag length and this is defined as * EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH for readability. * Returns 1 on success. Otherwise returns 0 and pushes to the error stack. */ int EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead, const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, ENGINE *impl); /* EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup frees any data allocated by |ctx|. */ void EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx); /* EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal encrypts and authenticates |in_len| bytes from |in| and * authenticates |ad_len| bytes from |ad| and writes the result to |out|, * returning the number of bytes written, or -1 on error. * * This function may be called (with the same EVP_AEAD_CTX) concurrently with * itself or EVP_AEAD_CTX_open. * * At most |max_out_len| bytes are written to |out| and, in order to ensure * success, |max_out_len| should be |in_len| plus the result of * EVP_AEAD_overhead. * * The length of |nonce|, |nonce_len|, must be equal to the result of * EVP_AEAD_nonce_length for this AEAD. * * EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal never results in a partial output. If |max_out_len| is * insufficient, -1 will be returned. * * If |in| and |out| alias then |out| must be <= |in|. */ ssize_t EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len); /* EVP_AEAD_CTX_open authenticates |in_len| bytes from |in| and |ad_len| bytes * from |ad| and decrypts at most |in_len| bytes into |out|. It returns the * number of bytes written, or -1 on error. * * This function may be called (with the same EVP_AEAD_CTX) concurrently with * itself or EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal. * * At most |in_len| bytes are written to |out|. In order to ensure success, * |max_out_len| should be at least |in_len|. * * The length of |nonce|, |nonce_len|, must be equal to the result of * EVP_AEAD_nonce_length for this AEAD. * * EVP_AEAD_CTX_open never results in a partial output. If |max_out_len| is * insufficient, -1 will be returned. * * If |in| and |out| alias then |out| must be <= |in|. */ ssize_t EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len); void EVP_add_alg_module(void); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ Loading @@ -1277,6 +1382,11 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void); /* Error codes for the EVP functions. */ /* Function codes. */ #define EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT 187 #define EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN 188 #define EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_SEAL 189 #define EVP_F_AEAD_CTX_OPEN 185 #define EVP_F_AEAD_CTX_SEAL 186 #define EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY 165 #define EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_CIPHER 176 #define EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY 133 Loading @@ -1293,6 +1403,9 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void); #define EVP_F_DSA_PKEY2PKCS8 135 #define EVP_F_ECDSA_PKEY2PKCS8 129 #define EVP_F_ECKEY_PKEY2PKCS8 132 #define EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_INIT 180 #define EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_OPEN 190 #define EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_SEAL 191 #define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX 123 #define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY 163 #define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL 124 Loading Loading @@ -1408,10 +1521,12 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void); #define EVP_R_NO_VERIFY_FUNCTION_CONFIGURED 105 #define EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE 150 #define EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED 151 #define EVP_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT 172 #define EVP_R_PKCS8_UNKNOWN_BROKEN_TYPE 117 #define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR 145 #define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR 146 #define EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA 106 #define EVP_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE 171 #define EVP_R_TOO_LARGE 164 #define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER 160 #define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST 161 Loading crypto/evp/evp_aead.c 0 → 100644 +192 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include <limits.h> #include <string.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/err.h> #include "evp_locl.h" size_t EVP_AEAD_key_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->key_len; } size_t EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->nonce_len; } size_t EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->overhead; } size_t EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->max_tag_len; } int EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead, const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, ENGINE *impl) { ctx->aead = aead; if (key_len != aead->key_len) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_INIT,EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE); return 0; } return aead->init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len); } void EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->aead == NULL) return; ctx->aead->cleanup(ctx); ctx->aead = NULL; } /* check_alias returns 0 if |out| points within the buffer determined by |in| * and |in_len| and 1 otherwise. * * When processing, there's only an issue if |out| points within in[:in_len] * and isn't equal to |in|. If that's the case then writing the output will * stomp input that hasn't been read yet. * * This function checks for that case. */ static int check_alias(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *out) { if (out <= in) return 1; if (in + in_len < out) return 1; return 0; } ssize_t EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) { size_t possible_out_len = in_len + ctx->aead->overhead; ssize_t r; if (possible_out_len < in_len /* overflow */ || possible_out_len > SSIZE_MAX /* return value cannot be represented */) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_SEAL, EVP_R_TOO_LARGE); goto error; } if (!check_alias(in, in_len, out)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_SEAL, EVP_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); goto error; } r = ctx->aead->seal(ctx, out, max_out_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, ad, ad_len); if (r >= 0) return r; error: /* In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller * that doesn't check the return value doesn't send raw data. */ memset(out, 0, max_out_len); return -1; } ssize_t EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) { ssize_t r; if (in_len > SSIZE_MAX) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_OPEN, EVP_R_TOO_LARGE); goto error; /* may not be able to represent return value. */ } if (!check_alias(in, in_len, out)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_OPEN, EVP_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); goto error; } r = ctx->aead->open(ctx, out, max_out_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, ad, ad_len); if (r >= 0) return r; error: /* In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller * that doesn't check the return value doesn't try and process bad * data. */ memset(out, 0, max_out_len); return -1; } crypto/evp/evp_err.c +10 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[]= { {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT), "AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN), "AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_SEAL), "AEAD_AES_GCM_SEAL"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_CTX_OPEN), "AEAD_CTX_OPEN"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_CTX_SEAL), "AEAD_CTX_SEAL"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY), "AESNI_INIT_KEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_CIPHER), "AESNI_XTS_CIPHER"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY), "AES_INIT_KEY"}, Loading @@ -86,6 +91,9 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_DSA_PKEY2PKCS8), "DSA_PKEY2PKCS8"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_ECDSA_PKEY2PKCS8), "ECDSA_PKEY2PKCS8"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_ECKEY_PKEY2PKCS8), "ECKEY_PKEY2PKCS8"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_INIT), "EVP_AEAD_CTX_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_OPEN), "EVP_AEAD_CTX_open"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_SEAL), "EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX), "EVP_CipherInit_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY), "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL), "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl"}, Loading Loading @@ -204,10 +212,12 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_VERIFY_FUNCTION_CONFIGURED),"no verify function configured"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),"operation not supported for this keytype"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED),"operaton not initialized"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT) ,"output aliases input"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PKCS8_UNKNOWN_BROKEN_TYPE),"pkcs8 unknown broken type"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR),"private key decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR),"private key encode error"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA) ,"public key not rsa"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE) ,"tag too large"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE) ,"too large"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER) ,"unknown cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST) ,"unknown digest"}, Loading Loading
crypto/evp/Makefile +4 −2 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ LIBSRC= encode.c digest.c evp_enc.c evp_key.c evp_acnf.c evp_cnf.c \ c_all.c c_allc.c c_alld.c evp_lib.c bio_ok.c \ evp_pkey.c evp_pbe.c p5_crpt.c p5_crpt2.c \ e_old.c pmeth_lib.c pmeth_fn.c pmeth_gn.c m_sigver.c \ e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c e_rc4_hmac_md5.c e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c e_rc4_hmac_md5.c \ evp_aead.c LIBOBJ= encode.o digest.o evp_enc.o evp_key.o evp_acnf.o evp_cnf.o \ e_des.o e_bf.o e_idea.o e_des3.o e_camellia.o\ Loading @@ -42,7 +43,8 @@ LIBOBJ= encode.o digest.o evp_enc.o evp_key.o evp_acnf.o evp_cnf.o \ c_all.o c_allc.o c_alld.o evp_lib.o bio_ok.o \ evp_pkey.o evp_pbe.o p5_crpt.o p5_crpt2.o \ e_old.o pmeth_lib.o pmeth_fn.o pmeth_gn.o m_sigver.o \ e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o e_rc4_hmac_md5.o e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.o e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.o e_rc4_hmac_md5.o \ evp_aead.o SRC= $(LIBSRC) Loading
crypto/evp/e_aes.c +211 −21 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1227,47 +1227,48 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) } } static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) static ctr128_f aes_gcm_set_key(AES_KEY *aes_key, GCM128_CONTEXT *gcm_ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data; if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { do { #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE if (BSAES_CAPABLE) { AES_set_encrypt_key(key,ctx->key_len*8,&gctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm,&gctx->ks, AES_set_encrypt_key(key,key_len*8,aes_key); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(gcm_ctx,aes_key, (block128_f)AES_encrypt); gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; break; return (ctr128_f)bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; } else #endif #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key,ctx->key_len*8,&gctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm,&gctx->ks, vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key,key_len*8,aes_key); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(gcm_ctx,aes_key, (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt); gctx->ctr = NULL; break; return NULL; } else #endif (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f)AES_encrypt); AES_set_encrypt_key(key, key_len*8, aes_key); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(gcm_ctx, aes_key, (block128_f)AES_encrypt); #ifdef AES_CTR_ASM gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt; return (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt; #else gctx->ctr = NULL; return NULL; #endif } while (0); } static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = ctx->cipher_data; if (!iv && !key) return 1; if (key) { gctx->ctr = aes_gcm_set_key(&gctx->ks.ks, &gctx->gcm, key, ctx->key_len); /* If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use * saved IV. */ Loading Loading @@ -1977,4 +1978,193 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap(void) return &aes_256_wrap; } #define EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN 16 struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx { union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ks; GCM128_CONTEXT gcm; ctr128_f ctr; unsigned char tag_len; }; static int aead_aes_gcm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) { struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx; const size_t key_bits = key_len * 8; if (key_bits != 128 && key_bits != 256) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT, EVP_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH); return 0; /* EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this. */ } if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; if (tag_len > EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT, EVP_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } gcm_ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx)); if (gcm_ctx == NULL) return 0; #ifdef AESNI_CAPABLE if (AESNI_CAPABLE) { aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, key_bits, &gcm_ctx->ks.ks); CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gcm_ctx->gcm, &gcm_ctx->ks.ks, (block128_f)aesni_encrypt); gcm_ctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; } else #endif { gcm_ctx->ctr = aes_gcm_set_key(&gcm_ctx->ks.ks, &gcm_ctx->gcm, key, key_len); } gcm_ctx->tag_len = tag_len; ctx->aead_state = gcm_ctx; return 1; } static void aead_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = ctx->aead_state; OPENSSL_free(gcm_ctx); } static ssize_t aead_aes_gcm_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) { size_t bulk = 0; const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = ctx->aead_state; GCM128_CONTEXT gcm; if (max_out_len < in_len + gcm_ctx->tag_len) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_SEAL, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return -1; } memcpy(&gcm, &gcm_ctx->gcm, sizeof(gcm)); CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, nonce, nonce_len); if (ad_len > 0 && CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len)) return -1; if (gcm_ctx->ctr) { if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, in_len - bulk, gcm_ctx->ctr)) return -1; } else { if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, in_len - bulk)) return -1; } CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out + in_len, gcm_ctx->tag_len); return in_len + gcm_ctx->tag_len; } static ssize_t aead_aes_gcm_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) { size_t bulk = 0; const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = ctx->aead_state; unsigned char tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN]; size_t out_len; GCM128_CONTEXT gcm; if (in_len < gcm_ctx->tag_len) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return -1; } out_len = in_len - gcm_ctx->tag_len; if (max_out_len < out_len) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return -1; } memcpy(&gcm, &gcm_ctx->gcm, sizeof(gcm)); CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, nonce, nonce_len); if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len)) return -1; if (gcm_ctx->ctr) { if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, in_len-bulk-gcm_ctx->tag_len, gcm_ctx->ctr)) return -1; } else { if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, in_len - bulk - gcm_ctx->tag_len)) return -1; } CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, gcm_ctx->tag_len); if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in + out_len, gcm_ctx->tag_len) != 0) { EVPerr(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return -1; } return out_len; } static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_gcm = { 16, /* key len */ 12, /* nonce len */ EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN, /* overhead */ EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN, /* max tag length */ aead_aes_gcm_init, aead_aes_gcm_cleanup, aead_aes_gcm_seal, aead_aes_gcm_open, }; static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_gcm = { 32, /* key len */ 12, /* nonce len */ EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN, /* overhead */ EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN, /* max tag length */ aead_aes_gcm_init, aead_aes_gcm_cleanup, aead_aes_gcm_seal, aead_aes_gcm_open, }; const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm() { return &aead_aes_128_gcm; } const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm() { return &aead_aes_256_gcm; } #endif
crypto/evp/evp.h +115 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -1266,6 +1266,111 @@ void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, int (*ctrl_str)(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value)); /* Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data. * * AEAD couples confidentiality and integrity in a single primtive. AEAD * algorithms take a key and then can seal and open individual messages. Each * message has a unique, per-message nonce and, optionally, additional data * which is authenticated but not included in the output. */ struct evp_aead_st; typedef struct evp_aead_st EVP_AEAD; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES /* EVP_aes_128_gcm is AES-128 in Galois Counter Mode. */ const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm(void); /* EVP_aes_256_gcm is AES-256 in Galois Counter Mode. */ const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm(void); #endif /* EVP_AEAD_key_length returns the length, in bytes, of the keys used by * |aead|. */ size_t EVP_AEAD_key_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead); /* EVP_AEAD_nonce_length returns the length, in bytes, of the per-message nonce * for |aead|. */ size_t EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead); /* EVP_AEAD_max_overhead returns the maximum number of additional bytes added * by the act of sealing data with |aead|. */ size_t EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(const EVP_AEAD *aead); /* EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len returns the maximum tag length when using |aead|. This * is the largest value that can be passed as |tag_len| to * |EVP_AEAD_CTX_init|. */ size_t EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD *aead); /* An EVP_AEAD_CTX represents an AEAD algorithm configured with a specific key * and message-independent IV. */ typedef struct evp_aead_ctx_st { const EVP_AEAD *aead; /* aead_state is an opaque pointer to whatever state the AEAD needs to * maintain. */ void *aead_state; } EVP_AEAD_CTX; #define EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH 0 /* EVP_AEAD_init initializes |ctx| for the given AEAD algorithm from |impl|. * The |impl| argument may be NULL to choose the default implementation. * Authentication tags may be truncated by passing a size as |tag_len|. A * |tag_len| of zero indicates the default tag length and this is defined as * EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH for readability. * Returns 1 on success. Otherwise returns 0 and pushes to the error stack. */ int EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead, const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, ENGINE *impl); /* EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup frees any data allocated by |ctx|. */ void EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx); /* EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal encrypts and authenticates |in_len| bytes from |in| and * authenticates |ad_len| bytes from |ad| and writes the result to |out|, * returning the number of bytes written, or -1 on error. * * This function may be called (with the same EVP_AEAD_CTX) concurrently with * itself or EVP_AEAD_CTX_open. * * At most |max_out_len| bytes are written to |out| and, in order to ensure * success, |max_out_len| should be |in_len| plus the result of * EVP_AEAD_overhead. * * The length of |nonce|, |nonce_len|, must be equal to the result of * EVP_AEAD_nonce_length for this AEAD. * * EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal never results in a partial output. If |max_out_len| is * insufficient, -1 will be returned. * * If |in| and |out| alias then |out| must be <= |in|. */ ssize_t EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len); /* EVP_AEAD_CTX_open authenticates |in_len| bytes from |in| and |ad_len| bytes * from |ad| and decrypts at most |in_len| bytes into |out|. It returns the * number of bytes written, or -1 on error. * * This function may be called (with the same EVP_AEAD_CTX) concurrently with * itself or EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal. * * At most |in_len| bytes are written to |out|. In order to ensure success, * |max_out_len| should be at least |in_len|. * * The length of |nonce|, |nonce_len|, must be equal to the result of * EVP_AEAD_nonce_length for this AEAD. * * EVP_AEAD_CTX_open never results in a partial output. If |max_out_len| is * insufficient, -1 will be returned. * * If |in| and |out| alias then |out| must be <= |in|. */ ssize_t EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len); void EVP_add_alg_module(void); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ Loading @@ -1277,6 +1382,11 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void); /* Error codes for the EVP functions. */ /* Function codes. */ #define EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT 187 #define EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN 188 #define EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_SEAL 189 #define EVP_F_AEAD_CTX_OPEN 185 #define EVP_F_AEAD_CTX_SEAL 186 #define EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY 165 #define EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_CIPHER 176 #define EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY 133 Loading @@ -1293,6 +1403,9 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void); #define EVP_F_DSA_PKEY2PKCS8 135 #define EVP_F_ECDSA_PKEY2PKCS8 129 #define EVP_F_ECKEY_PKEY2PKCS8 132 #define EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_INIT 180 #define EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_OPEN 190 #define EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_SEAL 191 #define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX 123 #define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY 163 #define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL 124 Loading Loading @@ -1408,10 +1521,12 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void); #define EVP_R_NO_VERIFY_FUNCTION_CONFIGURED 105 #define EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE 150 #define EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED 151 #define EVP_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT 172 #define EVP_R_PKCS8_UNKNOWN_BROKEN_TYPE 117 #define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR 145 #define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR 146 #define EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA 106 #define EVP_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE 171 #define EVP_R_TOO_LARGE 164 #define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER 160 #define EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST 161 Loading
crypto/evp/evp_aead.c 0 → 100644 +192 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include <limits.h> #include <string.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/err.h> #include "evp_locl.h" size_t EVP_AEAD_key_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->key_len; } size_t EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->nonce_len; } size_t EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->overhead; } size_t EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->max_tag_len; } int EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead, const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len, ENGINE *impl) { ctx->aead = aead; if (key_len != aead->key_len) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_INIT,EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE); return 0; } return aead->init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len); } void EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->aead == NULL) return; ctx->aead->cleanup(ctx); ctx->aead = NULL; } /* check_alias returns 0 if |out| points within the buffer determined by |in| * and |in_len| and 1 otherwise. * * When processing, there's only an issue if |out| points within in[:in_len] * and isn't equal to |in|. If that's the case then writing the output will * stomp input that hasn't been read yet. * * This function checks for that case. */ static int check_alias(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *out) { if (out <= in) return 1; if (in + in_len < out) return 1; return 0; } ssize_t EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) { size_t possible_out_len = in_len + ctx->aead->overhead; ssize_t r; if (possible_out_len < in_len /* overflow */ || possible_out_len > SSIZE_MAX /* return value cannot be represented */) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_SEAL, EVP_R_TOO_LARGE); goto error; } if (!check_alias(in, in_len, out)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_SEAL, EVP_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); goto error; } r = ctx->aead->seal(ctx, out, max_out_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, ad, ad_len); if (r >= 0) return r; error: /* In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller * that doesn't check the return value doesn't send raw data. */ memset(out, 0, max_out_len); return -1; } ssize_t EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) { ssize_t r; if (in_len > SSIZE_MAX) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_OPEN, EVP_R_TOO_LARGE); goto error; /* may not be able to represent return value. */ } if (!check_alias(in, in_len, out)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_OPEN, EVP_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT); goto error; } r = ctx->aead->open(ctx, out, max_out_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, ad, ad_len); if (r >= 0) return r; error: /* In the event of an error, clear the output buffer so that a caller * that doesn't check the return value doesn't try and process bad * data. */ memset(out, 0, max_out_len); return -1; }
crypto/evp/evp_err.c +10 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[]= { {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT), "AEAD_AES_GCM_INIT"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN), "AEAD_AES_GCM_OPEN"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_AES_GCM_SEAL), "AEAD_AES_GCM_SEAL"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_CTX_OPEN), "AEAD_CTX_OPEN"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AEAD_CTX_SEAL), "AEAD_CTX_SEAL"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY), "AESNI_INIT_KEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_CIPHER), "AESNI_XTS_CIPHER"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY), "AES_INIT_KEY"}, Loading @@ -86,6 +91,9 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[]= {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_DSA_PKEY2PKCS8), "DSA_PKEY2PKCS8"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_ECDSA_PKEY2PKCS8), "ECDSA_PKEY2PKCS8"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_ECKEY_PKEY2PKCS8), "ECKEY_PKEY2PKCS8"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_INIT), "EVP_AEAD_CTX_init"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_OPEN), "EVP_AEAD_CTX_open"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_AEAD_CTX_SEAL), "EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX), "EVP_CipherInit_ex"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY), "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy"}, {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL), "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl"}, Loading Loading @@ -204,10 +212,12 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_VERIFY_FUNCTION_CONFIGURED),"no verify function configured"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),"operation not supported for this keytype"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED),"operaton not initialized"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT) ,"output aliases input"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PKCS8_UNKNOWN_BROKEN_TYPE),"pkcs8 unknown broken type"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR),"private key decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR),"private key encode error"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA) ,"public key not rsa"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE) ,"tag too large"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE) ,"too large"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER) ,"unknown cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST) ,"unknown digest"}, Loading