Updates CHANGES and NEWS for the new release

 Changes between 1.0.2q and 1.0.2r [xx XXX xxxx]

  *) 0-byte record padding oracle

     If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls

     SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one)

     then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte

     record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is

     received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently

     based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this

     amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data.

     In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in

     use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain

     commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown()

     twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do

     this but some do anyway).

     This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod

     Aviram, with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew

     Hourselt. It was reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.

     (CVE-2019-1559)

     [Matt Caswell]

  *) Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0().

     [Richard Levitte]

  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2q and OpenSSL 1.0.2r [under development]

      o

      o 0-byte record padding oracle (CVE-2019-1559)

  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2p and OpenSSL 1.0.2q [20 Nov 2018]