Loading crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c +117 −35 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -7,6 +7,44 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and * "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5). * * For TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 the TLS PRF algorithm is given by: * * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5(S1, label + seed) XOR * P_SHA-1(S2, label + seed) * * where P_MD5 and P_SHA-1 are defined by P_<hash>, below, and S1 and S2 are * two halves of the secret (with the possibility of one shared byte, in the * case where the length of the original secret is odd). S1 is taken from the * first half of the secret, S2 from the second half. * * For TLS v1.2 the TLS PRF algorithm is given by: * * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed) * * where hash is SHA-256 for all cipher suites defined in RFC 5246 as well as * those published prior to TLS v1.2 while the TLS v1.2 protocol is in effect, * unless defined otherwise by the cipher suite. * * P_<hash> is an expansion function that uses a single hash function to expand * a secret and seed into an arbitrary quantity of output: * * P_<hash>(secret, seed) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(1) + seed) + * HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(2) + seed) + * HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(3) + seed) + ... * * where + indicates concatenation. P_<hash> can be iterated as many times as * is necessary to produce the required quantity of data. * * A(i) is defined as: * A(0) = seed * A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1)) */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdarg.h> #include <string.h> Loading Loading @@ -168,25 +206,41 @@ const EVP_KDF tls1_prf_kdf_meth = { kdf_tls1_prf_derive }; /* * Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and * "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5). * * P_<hash> is an expansion function that uses a single hash function to expand * a secret and seed into an arbitrary quantity of output: * * P_<hash>(secret, seed) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(1) + seed) + * HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(2) + seed) + * HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(3) + seed) + ... * * where + indicates concatenation. P_<hash> can be iterated as many times as * is necessary to produce the required quantity of data. * * A(i) is defined as: * A(0) = seed * A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1)) */ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, size_t sec_len, const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len, unsigned char *out, size_t olen) { int chunk; EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_tmp = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL; unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t A1_len; size_t chunk; EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_Ai = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL; unsigned char Ai[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t Ai_len; int ret = 0; chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); if (!ossl_assert(chunk > 0)) goto err; ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC); ctx_tmp = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC); ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC); ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC); if (ctx == NULL || ctx_tmp == NULL || ctx_init == NULL) if (ctx == NULL || ctx_Ai == NULL || ctx_init == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_FLAGS, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) != 1) goto err; Loading @@ -196,59 +250,85 @@ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, goto err; if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init)) goto err; if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx, ctx_init)) chunk = EVP_MAC_size(ctx_init); if (chunk == 0) goto err; if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, seed, seed_len)) /* A(0) = seed */ if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx_Ai, ctx_init)) goto err; if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, A1, &A1_len)) if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx_Ai, seed, seed_len)) goto err; for (;;) { /* Reinit mac contexts */ /* calc: A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1)) */ if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx_Ai, Ai, &Ai_len)) goto err; /* calc next chunk: HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i) + seed) */ if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx, ctx_init)) goto err; if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, A1, A1_len)) if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, Ai, Ai_len)) goto err; if (olen > (size_t)chunk && !EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx_tmp, ctx)) /* save state for calculating next A(i) value */ if (olen > chunk && !EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx_Ai, ctx)) goto err; if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, seed, seed_len)) goto err; if (olen > (size_t)chunk) { size_t mac_len; if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &mac_len)) goto err; out += mac_len; olen -= mac_len; /* calc the next A1 value */ if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) goto err; } else { /* last one */ if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, A1, &A1_len)) if (olen <= chunk) { /* last chunk - use Ai as temp bounce buffer */ if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, Ai, &Ai_len)) goto err; memcpy(out, A1, olen); memcpy(out, Ai, olen); break; } if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL)) goto err; out += chunk; olen -= chunk; } ret = 1; err: EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx); EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_tmp); EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai); EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_init); OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1)); OPENSSL_cleanse(Ai, sizeof(Ai)); return ret; } /* * Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and * "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5). * * For TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1: * * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5(S1, label + seed) XOR * P_SHA-1(S2, label + seed) * * S1 is taken from the first half of the secret, S2 from the second half. * * L_S = length in bytes of secret; * L_S1 = L_S2 = ceil(L_S / 2); * * For TLS v1.2: * * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed) */ static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen, const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len, unsigned char *out, size_t olen) { if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) { /* TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 */ size_t i; unsigned char *tmp; if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, slen/2 + (slen & 1), /* calc: L_S1 = L_S2 = ceil(L_S / 2) */ size_t L_S1 = (slen + 1) / 2; size_t L_S2 = L_S1; if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, L_S1, seed, seed_len, out, olen)) return 0; Loading @@ -256,7 +336,7 @@ static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md, KDFerr(KDF_F_TLS1_PRF_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen/2, slen/2 + (slen & 1), if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen - L_S2, L_S2, seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) { OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen); return 0; Loading @@ -266,6 +346,8 @@ static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md, OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen); return 1; } /* TLS v1.2 */ if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, sec, slen, seed, seed_len, out, olen)) return 0; Loading Loading
crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c +117 −35 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -7,6 +7,44 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and * "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5). * * For TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 the TLS PRF algorithm is given by: * * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5(S1, label + seed) XOR * P_SHA-1(S2, label + seed) * * where P_MD5 and P_SHA-1 are defined by P_<hash>, below, and S1 and S2 are * two halves of the secret (with the possibility of one shared byte, in the * case where the length of the original secret is odd). S1 is taken from the * first half of the secret, S2 from the second half. * * For TLS v1.2 the TLS PRF algorithm is given by: * * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed) * * where hash is SHA-256 for all cipher suites defined in RFC 5246 as well as * those published prior to TLS v1.2 while the TLS v1.2 protocol is in effect, * unless defined otherwise by the cipher suite. * * P_<hash> is an expansion function that uses a single hash function to expand * a secret and seed into an arbitrary quantity of output: * * P_<hash>(secret, seed) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(1) + seed) + * HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(2) + seed) + * HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(3) + seed) + ... * * where + indicates concatenation. P_<hash> can be iterated as many times as * is necessary to produce the required quantity of data. * * A(i) is defined as: * A(0) = seed * A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1)) */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdarg.h> #include <string.h> Loading Loading @@ -168,25 +206,41 @@ const EVP_KDF tls1_prf_kdf_meth = { kdf_tls1_prf_derive }; /* * Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and * "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5). * * P_<hash> is an expansion function that uses a single hash function to expand * a secret and seed into an arbitrary quantity of output: * * P_<hash>(secret, seed) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(1) + seed) + * HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(2) + seed) + * HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(3) + seed) + ... * * where + indicates concatenation. P_<hash> can be iterated as many times as * is necessary to produce the required quantity of data. * * A(i) is defined as: * A(0) = seed * A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1)) */ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, size_t sec_len, const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len, unsigned char *out, size_t olen) { int chunk; EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_tmp = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL; unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t A1_len; size_t chunk; EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_Ai = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL; unsigned char Ai[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t Ai_len; int ret = 0; chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); if (!ossl_assert(chunk > 0)) goto err; ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC); ctx_tmp = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC); ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC); ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC); if (ctx == NULL || ctx_tmp == NULL || ctx_init == NULL) if (ctx == NULL || ctx_Ai == NULL || ctx_init == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_FLAGS, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) != 1) goto err; Loading @@ -196,59 +250,85 @@ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, goto err; if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init)) goto err; if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx, ctx_init)) chunk = EVP_MAC_size(ctx_init); if (chunk == 0) goto err; if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, seed, seed_len)) /* A(0) = seed */ if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx_Ai, ctx_init)) goto err; if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, A1, &A1_len)) if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx_Ai, seed, seed_len)) goto err; for (;;) { /* Reinit mac contexts */ /* calc: A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1)) */ if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx_Ai, Ai, &Ai_len)) goto err; /* calc next chunk: HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i) + seed) */ if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx, ctx_init)) goto err; if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, A1, A1_len)) if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, Ai, Ai_len)) goto err; if (olen > (size_t)chunk && !EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx_tmp, ctx)) /* save state for calculating next A(i) value */ if (olen > chunk && !EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx_Ai, ctx)) goto err; if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, seed, seed_len)) goto err; if (olen > (size_t)chunk) { size_t mac_len; if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &mac_len)) goto err; out += mac_len; olen -= mac_len; /* calc the next A1 value */ if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) goto err; } else { /* last one */ if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, A1, &A1_len)) if (olen <= chunk) { /* last chunk - use Ai as temp bounce buffer */ if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, Ai, &Ai_len)) goto err; memcpy(out, A1, olen); memcpy(out, Ai, olen); break; } if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL)) goto err; out += chunk; olen -= chunk; } ret = 1; err: EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx); EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_tmp); EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai); EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_init); OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1)); OPENSSL_cleanse(Ai, sizeof(Ai)); return ret; } /* * Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and * "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5). * * For TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1: * * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5(S1, label + seed) XOR * P_SHA-1(S2, label + seed) * * S1 is taken from the first half of the secret, S2 from the second half. * * L_S = length in bytes of secret; * L_S1 = L_S2 = ceil(L_S / 2); * * For TLS v1.2: * * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed) */ static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen, const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len, unsigned char *out, size_t olen) { if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) { /* TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 */ size_t i; unsigned char *tmp; if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, slen/2 + (slen & 1), /* calc: L_S1 = L_S2 = ceil(L_S / 2) */ size_t L_S1 = (slen + 1) / 2; size_t L_S2 = L_S1; if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, L_S1, seed, seed_len, out, olen)) return 0; Loading @@ -256,7 +336,7 @@ static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md, KDFerr(KDF_F_TLS1_PRF_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen/2, slen/2 + (slen & 1), if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen - L_S2, L_S2, seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) { OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen); return 0; Loading @@ -266,6 +346,8 @@ static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md, OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen); return 1; } /* TLS v1.2 */ if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, sec, slen, seed, seed_len, out, olen)) return 0; Loading