Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X. (07df5018) · Commits · CYBER - Cyber Security / TS 103 523 MSP / TLMSP / TLMSP OpenSSL

doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod

+3 −2

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -88,9 +88,10 @@ As of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c, this option has no effect.

		...

		=item SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
		=item SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG

		As of OpenSSL 0.9.7h and 0.9.8a, this option has no effect.
		Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X.
		OS X 10.8..10.8.3 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers.

		=item SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG

ssl/s3_lib.c

+13 −3

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -3066,7 +3066,10 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
		s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
		}
		s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
		#endif
		#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
		s->s3->is_probably_safari = 0;
		#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
		#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */

		rp = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
		wp = s->s3->wbuf.buf;
		@@ -4128,11 +4131,18 @@ SSL_CIPHER ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
		if (!ok) continue;
		ii=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,c);
		if (ii >= 0)
		{
		if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) && (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && s->s3->is_probably_safari)
		{
		if (!ret) ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
		}
		else
		{
		ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
		break;
		}
		}
		}
		return(ret);
		}

ssl/ssl.h

+1 −1

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st
		#define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x00000008L
		#define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x00000010L
		#define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x00000020L
		#define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x00000040L /* no effect since 0.9.7h and 0.9.8b */
		#define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG 0x00000040L
		#define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0x00000080L
		#define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0x00000100L
		#define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0x00000200L

ssl/ssl3.h

+9 −1

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -580,7 +580,15 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
		* as the types were received in the client hello. */
		unsigned short *tlsext_custom_types;
		size_t tlsext_custom_types_count; /* how many tlsext_custom_types */
		#endif

		#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
		/* This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
		* running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari
		* on 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support. */
		char is_probably_safari;
		#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */

		#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
		} SSL3_STATE;

		#endif

ssl/t1_lib.c

+89 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -1762,6 +1762,89 @@ unsigned char ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
		return ret;
		}

		#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
		/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
		* SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in \|d\|, of length \|n\|.
		* Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
		* SNI,
		* elliptic_curves
		* ec_point_formats
		*
		* We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
		* but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
		* Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
		* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
		*/
		static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL s, const unsigned char data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
		unsigned short type, size;
		static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
		0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
		0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
		0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
		0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
		0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
		0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */

		0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
		0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
		0x01, /* 1 point format */
		0x00, /* uncompressed */
		};

		/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
		static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
		0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
		0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
		0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
		0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
		0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
		0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
		0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
		0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
		};

		if (data >= (d+n-2))
		return;
		data += 2;

		if (data > (d+n-4))
		return;
		n2s(data,type);
		n2s(data,size);

		if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
		return;

		if (data+size > d+n)
		return;
		data += size;

		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
		{
		const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
		const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);

		if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
		return;
		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
		return;
		if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
		return;
		}
		else
		{
		const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);

		if (data + len != d+n)
		return;
		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
		return;
		}

		s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
		}
		#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */

		static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL s, unsigned char p, unsigned char d, int n, int *al)
		{
		unsigned short type;
		@@ -1781,6 +1864,12 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char
		s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED \|
		SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
		#endif

		#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
		if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
		ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
		#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */

		/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
		if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
		{

Admin message