This is now used by the http2 code. It has two different symbols at the
end of the base64 table to make the output "url safe".

Bug: https://github.com/tatsuhiro-t/nghttp2/issues/62

Curl_base64_decode allocates the output string by itself and two other
strings were not freed either.

... to aid when for example prefixed with a space or other weird
character.

warning C4267: '=' : conversion from 'size_t' to 'long', possible loss
of data

The member connection_id of struct connectdata is a long (always a
32-bit signed integer on Visual C++) and the member next_connection_id
of struct conncache is a size_t, so one of them should be changed to
match the other.

This patch the size_t in struct conncache to long (the less invasive
change as that variable is only ever used in a single code line).

Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=1399

1 - fixes the warnings when built without http2 support

2 - adds CURLE_HTTP2, a new error code for errors detected by nghttp2
basically when they are about http2 specific things.

CyaSSL 3.0.0 returns a unique error code if no CA cert is available,
so translate that into CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE when peer verification
is requested.

- Replace CURLAUTH_GSSNEGOTIATE with CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE
- CURL_VERSION_GSSNEGOTIATE is deprecated which
  is served by CURL_VERSION_SSPI, CURL_VERSION_GSSAPI and
  CURUL_VERSION_SPNEGO now.
- Remove display of feature 'GSS-Negotiate'

That auth mech has never existed neither on MS nor on Unix side.
There is only Negotiate over SPNEGO.

Macros defined: KRB5_MECHANISM and SPNEGO_MECHANISM called from
HTTP, FTP and SOCKS on Unix

This reverts commit cb3e6dfa and instead fixes the problem
differently.

The reverted commit addressed a test failure in test 1021 by simplifying
and generalizing the code flow in a way that damaged the
performance. Now we modify the flow so that Curl_proxyCONNECT() again
does as much as possible in one go, yet still do test 1021 with and
without valgrind. It failed due to mistakes in the multi state machine.

Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=1397
Reported-by: Paul Saab

with CURL_NO_OLDIES defined, it doesn't compile because this deprecated
symbol (*INFILE) is used

Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=1398

It's wrong to assume that we can send a single SPNEGO packet which will
complete the authentication. It's a *negotiation* — the clue is in the
name. So make sure we handle responses from the server.

Curl_input_negotiate() will already handle bailing out if it thinks the
state is GSS_S_COMPLETE (or SEC_E_OK on Windows) and the server keeps
talking to us, so we should avoid endless loops that way.

GSSAPI doesn't work very well if we forget everything ever time.

XX: Is Curl_http_done() the right place to do the final cleanup?

This is the correct way to do SPNEGO. Just ask for it

Now I correctly see it trying NTLMSSP authentication when a Kerberos ticket
isn't available. Of course, we bail out when the server responds with the
challenge packet, since we don't expect that. But I'll fix that bug next...

This is just fundamentally broken. SPNEGO (RFC4178) is a protocol which
allows client and server to negotiate the underlying mechanism which will
actually be used to authenticate. This is *often* Kerberos, and can also
be NTLM and other things. And to complicate matters, there are various
different OIDs which can be used to specify the Kerberos mechanism too.

A SPNEGO exchange will identify *which* GSSAPI mechanism is being used,
and will exchange GSSAPI tokens which are appropriate for that mechanism.

But this SPNEGO implementation just strips the incoming SPNEGO packet
and extracts the token, if any. And completely discards the information
about *which* mechanism is being used. Then we *assume* it was Kerberos,
and feed the token into gss_init_sec_context() with the default
mechanism (GSS_S_NO_OID for the mech_type argument).

Furthermore... broken as this code is, it was never even *used* for input
tokens anyway, because higher layers of curl would just bail out if the
server actually said anything *back* to us in the negotiation. We assume
that we send a single token to the server, and it accepts it. If the server
wants to continue the exchange (as is required for NTLM and for SPNEGO
to do anything useful), then curl was broken anyway.

So the only bit which actually did anything was the bit in
Curl_output_negotiate(), which always generates an *initial* SPNEGO
token saying "Hey, I support only the Kerberos mechanism and this is its
token".

You could have done that by manually just prefixing the Kerberos token
with the appropriate bytes, if you weren't going to do any proper SPNEGO
handling. There's no need for the FBOpenSSL library at all.

The sane way to do SPNEGO is just to *ask* the GSSAPI library to do
SPNEGO. That's what the 'mech_type' argument to gss_init_sec_context()
is for. And then it should all Just Work™.

That 'sane way' will be added in a subsequent patch, as will bug fixes
for our failure to handle any exchange other than a single outbound
token to the server which results in immediate success.

Bumping it to 1KiB in commit aaaf9e50 is all very well, but having hit
a hard limit once let's just make it cope by reallocating as necessary.

... by removing the extra mutex locks around th call to
Curl_flush_cookies() which takes care of the locking itself already.

Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2014-02/0184.html

conversion to 'int' from 'long int' may alter its value

Reported-by: David Woodhouse

Before GnuTLS 3.3.6, the gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname() function
didn't actually check IP addresses in SubjectAltName, even though it was
explicitly documented as doing so. So do it ourselves...

Reported-by: David Woodhouse

The old way using getpwuid could cause problems in programs that enable
reading from netrc files simultaneously in multiple threads.

Reported-by: David Woodhouse

This previously caused a fatal error (with a confusing error code, at
that).

Reported by: Glen A Johnson Jr.

Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2014-07/0103.html
Reported-by: David Woodhouse

The AES-GCM ciphers were added to GnuTLS as late as ver. 3.0.1 but
the code path in which they're referenced here is only ever used for
somewhat older GnuTLS versions. This caused undeclared identifier errors
when compiling against those.

This seems to have become necessary for SRP support to work starting
with GnuTLS ver. 2.99.0. Since support for SRP was added to GnuTLS
before the function that takes this priority string, there should be no
issue with backward compatibility.

This makes the behaviour consistent with what happens if a date can
be extracted from the certificate but is expired.

This showed itself on some systems with torture failures
in tests 1060 and 1061

... pointed out by MSVC2013

Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=1391