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  1. Jul 23, 2014
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  3. Jul 19, 2014
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  6. Jul 16, 2014
    • Dan Fandrich's avatar
    • Daniel Stenberg's avatar
    • Daniel Stenberg's avatar
      d19dfa97
    • David Woodhouse's avatar
    • David Woodhouse's avatar
      Don't abort Negotiate auth when the server has a response for us · 6bc76194
      David Woodhouse authored
      It's wrong to assume that we can send a single SPNEGO packet which will
      complete the authentication. It's a *negotiation* — the clue is in the
      name. So make sure we handle responses from the server.
      
      Curl_input_negotiate() will already handle bailing out if it thinks the
      state is GSS_S_COMPLETE (or SEC_E_OK on Windows) and the server keeps
      talking to us, so we should avoid endless loops that way.
      6bc76194
    • David Woodhouse's avatar
      Don't clear GSSAPI state between each exchange in the negotiation · f78ae415
      David Woodhouse authored
      GSSAPI doesn't work very well if we forget everything ever time.
      
      XX: Is Curl_http_done() the right place to do the final cleanup?
      f78ae415
    • David Woodhouse's avatar
      Use SPNEGO for HTTP Negotiate · 59431c24
      David Woodhouse authored
      This is the correct way to do SPNEGO. Just ask for it
      
      Now I correctly see it trying NTLMSSP authentication when a Kerberos ticket
      isn't available. Of course, we bail out when the server responds with the
      challenge packet, since we don't expect that. But I'll fix that bug next...
      59431c24
    • David Woodhouse's avatar
      Remove all traces of FBOpenSSL SPNEGO support · 9ad282b1
      David Woodhouse authored
      This is just fundamentally broken. SPNEGO (RFC4178) is a protocol which
      allows client and server to negotiate the underlying mechanism which will
      actually be used to authenticate. This is *often* Kerberos, and can also
      be NTLM and other things. And to complicate matters, there are various
      different OIDs which can be used to specify the Kerberos mechanism too.
      
      A SPNEGO exchange will identify *which* GSSAPI mechanism is being used,
      and will exchange GSSAPI tokens which are appropriate for that mechanism.
      
      But this SPNEGO implementation just strips the incoming SPNEGO packet
      and extracts the token, if any. And completely discards the information
      about *which* mechanism is being used. Then we *assume* it was Kerberos,
      and feed the token into gss_init_sec_context() with the default
      mechanism (GSS_S_NO_OID for the mech_type argument).
      
      Furthermore... broken as this code is, it was never even *used* for input
      tokens anyway, because higher layers of curl would just bail out if the
      server actually said anything *back* to us in the negotiation. We assume
      that we send a single token to the server, and it accepts it. If the server
      wants to continue the exchange (as is required for NTLM and for SPNEGO
      to do anything useful), then curl was broken anyway.
      
      So the only bit which actually did anything was the bit in
      Curl_output_negotiate(), which always generates an *initial* SPNEGO
      token saying "Hey, I support only the Kerberos mechanism and this is its
      token".
      
      You could have done that by manually just prefixing the Kerberos token
      with the appropriate bytes, if you weren't going to do any proper SPNEGO
      handling. There's no need for the FBOpenSSL library at all.
      
      The sane way to do SPNEGO is just to *ask* the GSSAPI library to do
      SPNEGO. That's what the 'mech_type' argument to gss_init_sec_context()
      is for. And then it should all Just Work™.
      
      That 'sane way' will be added in a subsequent patch, as will bug fixes
      for our failure to handle any exchange other than a single outbound
      token to the server which results in immediate success.
      9ad282b1
    • David Woodhouse's avatar
    • David Woodhouse's avatar
      ntlm_wb: Fix hard-coded limit on NTLM auth packet size · 9008f3d5
      David Woodhouse authored
      Bumping it to 1KiB in commit aaaf9e50 is all very well, but having hit
      a hard limit once let's just make it cope by reallocating as necessary.
      9008f3d5
    • Daniel Stenberg's avatar
      RELEASE-NOTES: synced with 4cb25215 · df5169fa
      Daniel Stenberg authored
      curl-7_37_1
      df5169fa
  7. Jul 15, 2014
  8. Jul 14, 2014