Newer
Older
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
//#define DEBUG
/* Proxy key material encryption functions. */
int envelope_seal(EVP_PKEY **pub_key, unsigned char *plaintext, int plaintext_len,
unsigned char **encrypted_key, int *encrypted_key_len, unsigned char *iv,
unsigned char *ciphertext, unsigned char **shared_secret_key, int *shared_secret_key_len);
int envelope_open(EVP_PKEY *priv_key, unsigned char *ciphertext, int ciphertext_len,
unsigned char *encrypted_key, int encrypted_key_len, unsigned char *iv,
unsigned char *plaintext, unsigned char **shared_secret_key, int *shared_secret_key_len);
int spp_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char **ek,
int *ekl, unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY **pubk, int npubk, unsigned char **key, int *key_len);
int spp_OpenInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
const unsigned char *ek, int ekl, const unsigned char *iv,
EVP_PKEY *priv, unsigned char **shared_secret, int *shared_secret_key_len);
int spp_encrypt_key_mat_server(unsigned char *symmetric_key, int symmetric_key_len,
unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *plain_text, int plain_text_len, unsigned char *cipher_text);
int spp_decrypt_key_mat_client(unsigned char *symmetric_key, int symmetric_key_len,
unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *cipher_text, int cipher_text_len, unsigned char *plain_text);
/* Matteo -- START*/
// Compute a time difference - NOTE: Return 1 if the difference is negative, otherwise 0
int timeval_subtract(struct timeval *result, struct timeval *t2, struct timeval *t1){
long int diff = (t2->tv_usec + 1000000 * t2->tv_sec) - (t1->tv_usec + 1000000 * t1->tv_sec);
result->tv_sec = diff / 1000000;
result->tv_usec = diff % 1000000;
return (diff<0);
}
// Compute a time difference - NOTE: Return 1 if the difference is negative, otherwise 0
void log_time(char *message, struct timeval *currTime, struct timeval *prevTime, struct timeval *originTime){
// Local time passed variables
struct timeval tPassed;
struct timeval tPassedBeg;
// Get current time
gettimeofday(currTime, NULL);
// Compute time passed from last
timeval_subtract(&tPassed, currTime, prevTime);
// Compute time passed
timeval_subtract(&tPassedBeg, currTime, originTime);
// Logging
printf("[CURR_TIME=%ld.%06ld TIME_LAST=%ld.%06ld TIME_PASSED=%ld.%06ld]\t%s", (long int)(currTime->tv_sec), (long int)(currTime->tv_usec), (long int)(tPassed.tv_sec), (long int)(tPassed.tv_usec),(long int)(tPassedBeg.tv_sec), (long int)(tPassedBeg.tv_usec), message);
// Update previous time
prevTime = currTime;
}
/* Matteo -- END*/
void spp_init_slice(SPP_SLICE *slice) {
slice->read_ciph = slice->read_mac = slice->write_mac = NULL;
slice->read_mat_len = slice->other_read_mat_len = slice->write_mat_len = slice->other_write_mat_len = 0;
slice->purpose = NULL;
slice->read_access = slice->write_access = 0;
memset(&(slice->read_mat[0]), 0, sizeof(slice->read_mat));
memset(&(slice->other_read_mat[0]), 0, sizeof(slice->other_read_mat));
memset(&(slice->write_mat[0]), 0, sizeof(slice->write_mat));
memset(&(slice->other_write_mat[0]), 0, sizeof(slice->other_write_mat));
}
void spp_init_proxy(SPP_PROXY *proxy) {
proxy->session = proxy->sess_cert = proxy->peer = NULL;
proxy->read_slice_ids_len = proxy->write_slice_ids_len = 0;
proxy->address = NULL;
proxy->done = 0;
proxy->proxy_id = 0;
}
int spp_generate_slice_keys(SSL *s) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < s->slices_len; i++) {
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&(s->slices[i]->read_mat[0]), EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH) <= 0)
return -1;
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&(s->slices[i]->write_mat[0]), EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH) <= 0)
return -1;
}
return 1;
}
int spp_copy_mac_state(SSL *s, SPP_MAC *mac, int send) {
if (send) {
if (mac == NULL) {
s->write_hash = NULL;
memset(s->s3->write_mac_secret, 0, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memset(s->s3->write_sequence, 0, 8);
} else {
s->write_hash = mac->write_hash;
memcpy(s->s3->write_mac_secret, mac->write_mac_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
s->s3->write_mac_secret_size = mac->write_mac_secret_size;
memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, mac->write_sequence, 8);
}
} else {
if (mac == NULL) {
s->read_hash = NULL;
memset(s->s3->read_mac_secret, 0, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memset(s->s3->read_sequence, 0, 8);
} else {
s->read_hash = mac->read_hash;
memcpy(s->s3->read_mac_secret, mac->read_mac_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
s->s3->read_mac_secret_size = mac->read_mac_secret_size;
memcpy(s->s3->read_sequence, mac->read_sequence, 8);
}
}
return 1;
}
int spp_copy_mac_back(SSL *s, SPP_MAC *mac, int send) {
if (mac == NULL)
return 1;
if (send) {
//mac->write_hash = s->write_hash;
//memcpy(mac->write_mac_secret, s->s3->write_mac_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
//mac->write_mac_secret_size = s->s3->write_mac_secret_size;
memcpy(mac->write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, 8);
} else {
//mac->read_hash = s->read_hash;
//memcpy(mac->read_mac_secret, s->s3->read_mac_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
//mac->read_mac_secret_size = s->s3->read_mac_secret_size;
memcpy(mac->read_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, 8);
}
return 1;
}
int spp_copy_ciph_state(SSL *s, SPP_CIPH *ciph, int send) {
if (send) {
s->enc_write_ctx = ciph->enc_write_ctx;
} else {
s->enc_read_ctx = ciph->enc_read_ctx;
}
}
SPP_PROXY* spp_get_next_proxy(SSL *s, SPP_PROXY* proxy, int forward) {
int i;
if (s->proxies_len == 0) {
return NULL;
}
if (forward) {
// Return the first proxy
if (proxy == NULL) {
return s->proxies[0];
}
for (i = 0; i < s->proxies_len-1; i++) {
if (s->proxies[i]->proxy_id == proxy->proxy_id) {
return s->proxies[i+1];
}
}
} else {
// Return the last one
if (proxy == NULL) {
return s->proxies[s->proxies_len-1];
}
for (i = s->proxies_len - 1; i >= 1; i--) {
if (s->proxies[i]->proxy_id == proxy->proxy_id) {
return s->proxies[i-1];
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
int spp_get_proxy_certificate(SSL *s, SPP_PROXY* proxy) {
int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
X509 *x=NULL;
const unsigned char *q,*p;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SPP_ST_CR_PRXY_CERT_A,
SPP_ST_CR_PRXY_CERT_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2l3(p,llen);
if (llen+3 != n) {
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) {
n2l3(p,l);
if ((l+nc+3) > llen) {
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q=p;
x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l);
if (x == NULL) {
al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (q != (p+l)) {
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x=NULL;
nc+=l+3;
p=q;
}
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0) ) {
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (sc == NULL) goto err;
if (proxy->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(proxy->sess_cert);
proxy->sess_cert=sc;
sc->cert_chain=sk;
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
* certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
sk=NULL;
/* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
need_cert = 1;
if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
if (need_cert && i < 0) {
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (need_cert) {
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
/* Why would the following ever happen?
* We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
proxy->peer=x;
} else {
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
sc->peer_key= NULL;
proxy->peer=NULL;
}
x=NULL;
ret=1;
if (0)
{
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
return(ret);
}
int spp_get_proxy_key_exchange(SSL *s, SPP_PROXY* proxy)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param,*p;
int al,j,ok;
long i,param_len,n,alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
int curve_nid = 0;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SPP_ST_CR_PRXY_KEY_EXCH_A,
SPP_ST_CR_PRXY_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (proxy->sess_cert != NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (proxy->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
RSA_free(proxy->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
proxy->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (proxy->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
DH_free(proxy->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
proxy->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (proxy->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
EC_KEY_free(proxy->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
proxy->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
} else {
proxy->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
param_len=0;
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(proxy->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(proxy->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
proxy->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
dh=NULL;
}
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
{
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
* server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
* Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
*/
/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
* and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We
* also need one byte for the length of the encoded point
*/
param_len=4;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
p+=3;
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p+=1;
if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += encoded_pt_len;
n-=param_len;
p+=encoded_pt_len;
/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
* the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
* key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(proxy->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(proxy->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
proxy->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
ecdh=NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
}
else if (alg_k)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
int sigalg;
if (2 > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
/* Should never happen */
if (sigalg == -1)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
if (md == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
p += 2;
n -= 2;
}
else
md = EVP_sha1();
if (2 > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
/* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
/* wrong packet length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
int num;
unsigned int size;
j=0;
q=md_buf;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size);
q+=size;
j+=size;
}
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
{
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
else
{
/* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (dh != NULL)
DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
if (ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
int spp_get_proxy_done(SSL *s, SPP_PROXY* proxy) {
int ok,ret=0;
long n;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SPP_ST_CR_PRXY_DONE_A,
SPP_ST_CR_PRXY_DONE_B,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (n > 0) {
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return -1;
}
proxy->done = 1;
ret=1;
return(ret);
}
int spp_get_proxy_key_material(SSL *s, SPP_PROXY* proxy) {
/* This method does nothing. The client/server just read these messages
* which are actually intended for the proxies, and added them to the
* Finished message digest. The message contents should be ignored. */
int n, ok;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SPP_ST_CR_PRXY_MAT_A,
SPP_ST_CR_PRXY_MAT_B,
SPP_MT_PROXY_KEY_MATERIAL,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
&ok);
if (!ok) return n;
return 1;
}
int spp_send_proxy_key_material(SSL *s, SPP_PROXY* proxy) {
unsigned char *p,*d;
int n,i,j,found;
SPP_SLICE *slice;
EVP_PKEY *pub_key = NULL;
EVP_PKEY **pub_keys = OPENSSL_malloc(1 * sizeof(EVP_PKEY *));
unsigned char *shared_secret=NULL;
int shared_secret_len;
// unsigned char *encrypted_key_mat = NULL;
/* THIS PROBABLY NEEDS TO BE CHANGED TO BE MORE DYNAMIC AND HAVE THE REAL LENGTH*/
unsigned char encrypted_key_mat[1024];
int encrypted_key_mat_len = 0; //[1] = {0};
unsigned char envelope_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
// unsigned char *envelope_iv = NULL;
unsigned char **encrypted_envelope_keys = OPENSSL_malloc(1 * sizeof(unsigned char *));
// unsigned char encrypted_envelope_keys[1][128]
int encrypted_envelope_key_len[1] = {0};
//unsigned char *key_mat;
/* I'm not sure about this buffer size... got it by printing it out when
running code... should probably be doing things better :'(
Also, note that unsigned chars are used in various places, but this buffer
is a char?!??!
HACK The size of this buffer should be different...
It is dangerous right now and we risk overflowing later on...
*/
char temp_buff[21848] = {0};
if (s->state == SPP_ST_CW_PRXY_MAT_A) {
// Pack the message into the temp buffer
p=d=&(temp_buff[0]);
n = 0;
for (i = 0; i < proxy->read_slice_ids_len; i++) {
slice = SPP_get_slice_by_id(s, proxy->read_slice_ids[i]);
if (slice == NULL)
goto err;
s1n(slice->slice_id, p);
s2n(EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH, p);
memcpy(p, slice->read_mat, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
p += EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH;
found = 0;
for (j = 0; j < proxy->write_slice_ids_len; j++) {
if (proxy->write_slice_ids[j] == slice->slice_id) {
found=1;
break;
}
}
// Write permission, so add the write key
if (found) {
s2n(EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH, p);
memcpy(p, slice->write_mat, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
p += EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH;
} else {
// No write permission, write a 0
s2n(0, p);
}
}
n = p-d;
/* Encrypt using envelopes. What this means is that the data we are
sending will be encrypted with a randomly generated shared secret key.
The shared secret key is then encrypted via the RSA pub key of the
destination.
*/
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p = &(d[4]);
/* Need to free this later on still */
//key_mat = malloc(n * sizeof(unsigned char *));
//pub_key = X509_get_pubkey(SSL_get_peer_certificate(s));
pub_key = X509_get_pubkey(proxy->peer);
pub_keys[0] = pub_key;
encrypted_envelope_keys[0] = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(pub_keys[0]->pkey.rsa));
memset(envelope_iv, 0, sizeof envelope_iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
/* seal the envelope */
encrypted_key_mat_len = envelope_seal(
pub_keys,
temp_buff,
n,
encrypted_envelope_keys,
&encrypted_envelope_key_len,
envelope_iv,
encrypted_key_mat,
&shared_secret,
&shared_secret_len);
/* store the shared secret */
//memcpy(s->proxy_key_mat_shared_secret, shared_secret, sizeof(shared_secret));
/* Don't need to save the shared secrets with proxies.*/
if (shared_secret != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(shared_secret,shared_secret_len);
/* Before we free the key, let's copy it out to the shared_secret... */
OPENSSL_free(shared_secret);
}
*(d++)=SPP_MT_PROXY_KEY_MATERIAL;
/* calculate the size of the payload */
n = 4; /* to store length of encrypted envelope key and destination ID*/
n += encrypted_envelope_key_len[0]; /* to store the encrypted envelope key */
n += EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH; /* to store the iv */
n += 3; /* to store the length of the encrypted data */
n += encrypted_key_mat_len; /* to store the encrypted key material */
// printf("total legnth of message: %d\n", n);
l2n3(n,d);
//p = &(((unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data)[4]);
// p = &(d[4]);
/* If we are server, we send to client (1), otherwise we send to server (2)*/
s1n(proxy->proxy_id, d);
/* Now we need to handle writing encryption stuff! */
/* write the length of the encrypted key */
l2n3(encrypted_envelope_key_len[0], d);
// l2n3(1, d);
/* write the encrypted envelope key */
memcpy(d, encrypted_envelope_keys[0], encrypted_envelope_key_len[0]);
/* free the allocated mem */
OPENSSL_free(encrypted_envelope_keys[0]);
/* advance pointer! */
d += encrypted_envelope_key_len[0];
memcpy(d, envelope_iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
/* advance pointer */
d += EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH;
/* write the legnth of encrypted key material */
l2n3(encrypted_key_mat_len, d);
/* write the encrypted key material */
memcpy(d, encrypted_key_mat, encrypted_key_mat_len);
/* advance pointer! */
d += encrypted_key_mat_len;
// printf("after copying relevant stuff (is %d bytes)...\n", n);
// spp_print_buffer(p, n);
// memcpy(&(d2[4]), temp_buff, n);
s->state=SPP_ST_CW_PRXY_MAT_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
/*
Here we should realy ensure that we are writing the size of the
encrypted key material
*/
s->init_num=n+4;
s->init_off=0;
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Sending proxy key material, n=%d\n", n);
spp_print_buffer((unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
#endif
}
/* SPP_ST_CW_PRXY_MAT_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
printf("Error sending proxy key material\n");
return(-1);
}
int spp_send_end_key_material_client(SSL *s) {
EVP_PKEY *pub_key = NULL;
EVP_PKEY **pub_keys = OPENSSL_malloc(1 * sizeof(EVP_PKEY *));
//unsigned char *shared_secret;
//int shared_secret_len;