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if (mac_size < 0)
goto err;
}
/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
/*if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
* (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
/*if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
/* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
* this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
* (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
* together with the actual payload) */
/*prefix_len = do_spp_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
if (prefix_len <= 0)
goto err;
if (prefix_len > (SPP_RT_HEADER_LENGTH +
SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
/* insufficient space */
/*SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
}*/
if (create_empty_fragment) {
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
/* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
* which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
* if we want to align the real payload, then we can
* just pretent we simply have two headers. */
align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SPP_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
#endif
p = wb->buf + align;
wb->offset = align;
} else if (prefix_len) {
p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
} else {
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
align = (long)wb->buf + SPP_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
#endif
p = wb->buf + align;
wb->offset = align;
}
/* write the header */
*(p++)=type&0xff;
wr->type=type;
*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
/* field where we are to write out packet length */
plen=p;
p+=2;
/* Write the slice ID as the 4th byte of the header. */
wr->slice_id = slice == NULL ? 0 : slice->slice_id;
*(p++)=wr->slice_id;
/* Stats */
if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
s->write_stats.app_bytes += len;
else if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
s->write_stats.handshake_bytes += len;
else if (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
s->write_stats.alert_bytes += len;
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
s->write_stats.handshake_bytes += SPP_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
else
s->write_stats.header_bytes += SPP_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
#ifdef DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Writing record header: ");
spp_print_buffer(wb->buf + wb->offset, SPP_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
#endif
/* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (eivlen <= 1)
eivlen = 0;
}
/* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
else
eivlen = 0;
} else {
eivlen = 0;
}
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
wr->data=p + eivlen;
wr->length=(int)len;
wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
/* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
* wr->data */
/*#if DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Decrypted packet:");
spp_print_buffer(wr->input, wr->len);
#endif*/
/* first we compress */
if (s->compress != NULL) {
if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
} else {
memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
wr->input=wr->data;
}
/* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
* from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
* wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
if (mac_size != 0 && slice != NULL) {
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Generating 3MAC\n");
#endif
s->write_stats.mac_bytes += mac_size*3;
/* Must have read access, so write the read MAC. */
spp_copy_mac_state(s, slice->read_mac, 1);
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
goto err;
/* Compute the write hash. */
if (slice->write_mac != NULL) {
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Generating write MAC\n");
#endif
spp_copy_mac_state(s, slice->write_mac, 1);
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen + mac_size]),1) < 0)
goto err;
} else {
/* Copy from the previous record. */
memcpy(&(p[wr->length + eivlen + mac_size]), spp_ctx->write_mac, mac_size);
}
/* Must be an end point, write the integrity hash. */
if (s->def_ctx->read_access) {
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Generating integrity MAC\n");
#endif
spp_copy_mac_state(s, s->def_ctx->read_mac, 1);
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen + (mac_size*2)]),1) < 0)
goto err;
} else {
/* Copy from the previous record. */
memcpy(&(p[wr->length + eivlen + (mac_size*2)]), spp_ctx->integrity_mac, mac_size);
}
wr->length+=(mac_size*3);
} else if (mac_size != 0) {
/* This will only happen when sending the finished message at the end of the handshake.
* Instead of using a slice, use the parameters computed via the standard TLS handshake to
* both encrypt and generate MAC. */
s->write_stats.mac_bytes += mac_size;
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
goto err;
wr->length+=mac_size;
}
/* If we do not have read access, then the MACs were interpreted as part of the payload. */
if (spp_ctx != NULL) {
if (s->proxy) {
OPENSSL_free(spp_ctx->read_mac);
}
OPENSSL_free(spp_ctx);
}
wr->input=p;
wr->data=p;
if (eivlen) {
/* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
goto err; */
wr->length += eivlen;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Unencrypted packet: ");
spp_print_buffer(wr->data, wr->length);
#endif
/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
/* This is a call to spp_enc which will encrypt or not
* depending upon whether we have the encryption material. */
s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Encrypted packet: ");
spp_print_buffer(wr->data, wr->length);
#endif
s->write_stats.bytes += wr->length + SPP_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
/* record length after mac and block padding */
s2n(wr->length,plen);
/* we should now have
* wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
* wr->length long */
wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
wr->length+=SPP_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
if (create_empty_fragment) {
/* we are in a recursive call;
* just return the length, don't write out anything here
*/
return wr->length;
}
/* now let's set up wb */
wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
/* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
s->s3->wpend_type=type;
s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
done:
/* we now just need to write the buffer */
return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
/* Does not need changing since above function simply writes buffer to
* the wire. */
err:
return -1;
}
/* This function is not actually changed from ssl3_write_bytes,
* but we need to change do_write, so we copy this here as well. */
int spp_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) {
const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
unsigned int n,nw;
int i,tot;
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
tot=s->s3->wnum;
s->s3->wnum=0;
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
i=s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
}
/* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
* out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
* for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
* the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
* it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
* number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
* buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
* will notice
*/
if (len < tot) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return(-1);
}
n=(len-tot);
for (;;) {
if (!s->proxy && n > s->max_send_fragment)
nw=s->max_send_fragment;
else
nw=n;
i=do_spp_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
if (i <= 0) {
s->s3->wnum=tot;
return i;
}
if ((i == (int)n) ||
(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
/* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
* in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
return tot+i;
}
n-=i;
tot+=i;
}
}