s3_lib.c

			ok = ok && ec_ok;
			}
		if (
			/* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral EC key */
			(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
			/* and we have an ephemeral EC key */
			&& (s->cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
			/* and the client specified an EllipticCurves extension */
			&& ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL))
		)
			{
			ec_ok = 0;
			if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group != NULL)
				{
				ec_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group);
				if ((ec_nid == 0)
					&& (s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth != NULL)
				)
					{
					if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
						{
						ec_search1 = 0xFF;
						ec_search2 = 0x01;
						}
					else if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(s->cert->ecdh_tmp->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
						{
						ec_search1 = 0xFF;
						ec_search2 = 0x02;
						}
					}
				else
					{
					ec_search1 = 0x00;
					ec_search2 = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(ec_nid);
					}
				if ((ec_search1 != 0) || (ec_search2 != 0))
					{
					for (j = 0; j < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length / 2; j++)
						{
						if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j] == ec_search1) && (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[2*j+1] == ec_search2))
							{
							ec_ok = 1;
							break;
							}
						}
					}
				}
			ok = ok && ec_ok;
			}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */

		if (!ok) continue;
		ii=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,c);
		if (ii >= 0)
			{
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
			if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) && (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && s->s3->is_probably_safari)
				{
				if (!ret) ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
				continue;
				}
#endif
			ret=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow,ii);
			break;
			}
		}
	return(ret);
	}

int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
	{
	int ret=0;
	unsigned long alg_k;

	alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
	if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
		{
		if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
			{
			p[ret++]=TLS_CT_GOST94_SIGN;
			p[ret++]=TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN;
			return(ret);
			}
		}
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
	if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kEDH))
		{
#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
		p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
#  endif
#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
		p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
#  endif
		}
	if ((s->version == SSL3_VERSION) &&
		(alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kDHr)))
		{
#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
		p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH;
#  endif
#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
		p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH;
#  endif
		}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
	p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
	p[ret++]=SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
	if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION))
		{
		p[ret++]=TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH;
		p[ret++]=TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH;
		}
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
	/* ECDSA certs can be used with RSA cipher suites as well 
	 * so we don't need to check for SSL_kECDH or SSL_kEECDH
	 */
	if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
		{
		p[ret++]=TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
		}
#endif	
	return(ret);
	}

int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s)
	{
	int ret;

	/* Don't do anything much if we have not done the handshake or
	 * we don't want to send messages :-) */
	if ((s->quiet_shutdown) || (s->state == SSL_ST_BEFORE))
		{
		s->shutdown=(SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
		return(1);
		}

	if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN))
		{
		s->shutdown|=SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN;
#if 1
		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
#endif
		/* our shutdown alert has been sent now, and if it still needs
	 	 * to be written, s->s3->alert_dispatch will be true */
	 	if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
	 		return(-1);	/* return WANT_WRITE */
		}
	else if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
		{
		/* resend it if not sent */
#if 1
		ret=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
		if(ret == -1)
			{
			/* we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth
			 * invocation, we must  have already signalled
			 * return 0 upon a previous invoation,
			 * return WANT_WRITE */
			return(ret);
			}
#endif
		}
	else if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN))
		{
		/* If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed */
		s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,0,NULL,0,0);
		if(!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN))
			{
			return(-1);	/* return WANT_READ */
			}
		}

	if ((s->shutdown == (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) &&
		!s->s3->alert_dispatch)
		return(1);
	else
		return(0);
	}

int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len)
	{
	int ret,n;

#if 0
	if (s->shutdown & SSL_SEND_SHUTDOWN)
		{
		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
		return(0);
		}
#endif
	clear_sys_error();
	if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);

	/* This is an experimental flag that sends the
	 * last handshake message in the same packet as the first
	 * use data - used to see if it helps the TCP protocol during
	 * session-id reuse */
	/* The second test is because the buffer may have been removed */
	if ((s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER) && (s->wbio == s->bbio))
		{
		/* First time through, we write into the buffer */
		if (s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret == 0)
			{
			ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
					     buf,len);
			if (ret <= 0) return(ret);

			s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=ret;
			}

		s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
		n=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
		if (n <= 0) return(n);
		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

		/* We have flushed the buffer, so remove it */
		ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
		s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;

		ret=s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret;
		s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
		}
	else
		{
		ret=s->method->ssl_write_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
			buf,len);
		if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
		}

	return(ret);
	}

static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
	{
	int ret;
	
	clear_sys_error();
	if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
	s->s3->in_read_app_data=1;
	ret=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,buf,len,peek);
	if ((ret == -1) && (s->s3->in_read_app_data == 2))
		{
		/* ssl3_read_bytes decided to call s->handshake_func, which
		 * called ssl3_read_bytes to read handshake data.
		 * However, ssl3_read_bytes actually found application data
		 * and thinks that application data makes sense here; so disable
		 * handshake processing and try to read application data again. */
		s->in_handshake++;
		ret=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,buf,len,peek);
		s->in_handshake--;
		}
	else
		s->s3->in_read_app_data=0;

	return(ret);
	}

int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
	{
	return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 0);
	}

int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
	{
	return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 1);
	}

int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *s)
	{
	if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
		return(1);

	if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)
		return(0);

	s->s3->renegotiate=1;
	return(1);
	}

int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *s)
	{
	int ret=0;

	if (s->s3->renegotiate)
		{
		if (	(s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) &&
			(s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) &&
			!SSL_in_init(s))
			{
/*
if we are the server, and we have sent a 'RENEGOTIATE' message, we
need to go to SSL_ST_ACCEPT.
*/
			/* SSL_ST_ACCEPT */
			s->state=SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE;
			s->s3->renegotiate=0;
			s->s3->num_renegotiations++;
			s->s3->total_renegotiations++;
			ret=1;
			}
		}
	return(ret);
	}
/* If we are using TLS v1.2 or later and default SHA1+MD5 algorithms switch
 * to new SHA256 PRF and handshake macs
 */
long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
	{
	long alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2;
	if (s->method->version == TLS1_2_VERSION &&
	    alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF))
		return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
	return alg2;
	}