This adds an async IO test. There are two test runs. The first one does
a normal handshake with lots of async IO events. The second one does the
same but this time breaks up all the written records into multiple records
of one byte in length. We do this all the way up until the CCS.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

In the new state machine if using nbio and we get the header of a
handshake message is one record with the body in the next, with an nbio
event in the middle, then the connection was failing. This is because
s->init_num was getting reset. We should only reset it after we have
read the whole message.

RT#4394

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

ChangeCipherSpec messages have a defined value. They also may not occur
in the middle of a handshake message. The current logic will accept a
ChangeCipherSpec with value 2. It also would accept up to three bytes of
handshake data before the ChangeCipherSpec which it would discard
(because s->init_num gets reset).

Instead, require that s->init_num is 0 when a ChangeCipherSpec comes in.

RT#4391

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The write BIO for handshake messages is bufferred so that we only write
out to the network when we have a complete flight. There was some
complexity in the buffering logic so that we switched buffering on and
off at various points through out the handshake. The only real reason to
do this was historically it complicated the state machine when you wanted
to flush because you had to traverse through the "flush" state (in order
to cope with NBIO). Where we knew up front that there was only going to
be one message in the flight we switched off buffering to avoid that.

In the new state machine there is no longer a need for a flush state so
it is simpler just to have buffering on for the whole handshake. This
also gives us the added benefit that we can simply call flush after every
flight even if it only has one message in it. This means that BIO authors
can implement their own buffering strategies and not have to be aware of
the state of the SSL object (previously they would have to switch off
their own buffering during the handshake because they could not rely on
a flush being received when they really needed to write data out). This
last point addresses GitHub Issue #322.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

RT#4543

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Add doc-nit-check to help find future issues.
Make podchecker be almost clean.
Remove trailing whitespace.
Tab expansion

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

RT#1817

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

the fact that it's community-supported target.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

GH: #102

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Defintions of macros similar to _XOPEN_SOURCE belong in command line
or in worst case prior first #include directive in source. As for
macros is was allegedly controlling. One can argue that we are
probably better off demanding S_IS* macros but there are systems
that just don't comply, hence this compromise solution...

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

In the X509 app check that the obtained public key is valid before we
attempt to use it.

Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Since with SSL_VERIFY_NONE, the connection may continue and the
session may even be cached, we should save some evidence that the
chain was not sufficiently verified and would have been rejected
with SSL_VERIFY_PEER.  To that end when a CT callback returs failure
we set the verify result to X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS.

Note: We only run the CT callback in the first place if the verify
result is still X509_V_OK prior to start of the callback.

RT #4502

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

PEM_read(), PEM_read_bio(), PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO() and
PEM_do_header().

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

adds missing check for defined(__GNUC__)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1094)

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

GH: #1017

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

STORE doesn't exist for now

HMAC doesn't have any error codes

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

- Adjust mkerr.pl to produce the line length we used for source
  reformating.

- Have mkerr.pl keep track of preprocessor directive indentation

  Among others, do not spuriously throw away a #endif at the end of
  header files.

- Make sure mkerr.pl specifies any header inclusion correctly

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Set ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM when verificaiton cannot
continue due to malloc failure.  Also, when X509_verify_cert()
returns <= 0 make sure that the verification status does not remain
X509_V_OK, as a last resort set it it to X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED,
just in case some code path returns an error without setting an
appropriate value of ctx->error.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/526)

RT#1466

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

RT#1466

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Also adds 'esc_2254' to the possible command line name options

RT#1466

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Tidy up and simplify OBJ_dup() and OBJ_create().

Sanity check added OIDs: don't allow duplicates.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

A number of the METHOD functions weren't properly handling malloc failures.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

There were some unchecked calls to OPENSSL_strdup().

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

In the CAPI engine there were some unchecked calls to OPENSSL_strdup().

GH Issue #830

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>