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    • Emilia Kasper's avatar
      Rework the default cipherlist. · a556f342
      Emilia Kasper authored
      
      
       - Always prefer forward-secure handshakes.
       - Consistently order ECDSA above RSA.
       - Next, always prefer AEADs to non-AEADs, irrespective of strength.
       - Within AEADs, prefer GCM > CHACHA > CCM for a given strength.
       - Prefer TLS v1.2 ciphers to legacy ciphers.
       - Remove rarely used DSS, IDEA, SEED, CAMELLIA, CCM from the default
         list to reduce ClientHello bloat.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      a556f342
  23. Mar 04, 2016
  24. Mar 03, 2016
    • Emilia Kasper's avatar
      Refactor ClientHello extension parsing · 06217867
      Emilia Kasper authored
      
      
      1) Simplify code with better PACKET methods.
      
      2) Make broken SNI parsing explicit. SNI was intended to be extensible
      to new name types but RFC 4366 defined the syntax inextensibly, and
      OpenSSL has never parsed SNI in a way that would allow adding a new name
      type. RFC 6066 fixed the definition but due to broken implementations
      being widespread, it appears impossible to ever extend SNI.
      
      3) Annotate resumption behaviour. OpenSSL doesn't currently handle all
      extensions correctly upon resumption. Annotate for further clean-up.
      
      4) Send an alert on ALPN protocol mismatch.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
      06217867
  25. Mar 01, 2016
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  28. Feb 26, 2016
  29. Feb 25, 2016
    • Emilia Kasper's avatar
      CVE-2016-0798: avoid memory leak in SRP · 380f18ed
      Emilia Kasper authored
      
      
      The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had confusing
      memory management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly
      allocated, and sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no
      way of distinguishing these two cases.
      
      Specifically, SRP servers that configure a secret seed to hide valid
      login information are vulnerable to a memory leak: an attacker
      connecting with an invalid username can cause a memory leak of around
      300 bytes per connection.
      
      Servers that do not configure SRP, or configure SRP but do not configure
      a seed are not vulnerable.
      
      In Apache, the seed directive is known as SSLSRPUnknownUserSeed.
      
      To mitigate the memory leak, the seed handling in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
      is now disabled even if the user has configured a seed.
      
      Applications are advised to migrate to SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user. However,
      note that OpenSSL makes no strong guarantees about the
      indistinguishability of valid and invalid logins. In particular,
      computations are currently not carried out in constant time.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      380f18ed