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  1. Sep 10, 2019
  3. Sep 09, 2019
    • Bernd Edlinger's avatar
      Change DH_generate_parameters back to order 2q subgroup · 1f9dc86b
      Bernd Edlinger authored 
      

For for G=2 and 5 DH_generate_parameters will continue to generate
the order 2q subgroup for compatibility with previous versions.

For G=3 DH_generate_parameters generates an order q subgroup, but it
will not pass the check in DH_check with previous OpenSSL versions.

Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9820)
      1f9dc86b
    • Nicola Tuveri's avatar
      [ec] Match built-in curves on EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters · 9a43a733
      Nicola Tuveri authored 
      Description
-----------

Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.

This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
  parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
  ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)

A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.

Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.

Motivation
----------

This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
  generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
  be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
  code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface

Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.

It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.

Related commits
---------------

While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).

The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:

- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats

Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.

This commit includes a partial backport of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555
(commit 8402cd5f75f8c2f60d8bd39775b24b03dd8b3b38)
for which the main author is Shane Lontis.

Responsible Disclosure
----------------------

This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785


were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.

The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.

_______________________________________________________________________________

Co-authored-by: default avatarShane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>

(Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808

)

Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9809)
      9a43a733
  5. Sep 07, 2019
  7. Aug 30, 2019
  9. Aug 29, 2019
  11. Aug 20, 2019
    • Pauli's avatar
      Start up DEVRANDOM entropy improvement for older Linux devices. · 3ff98f55
      Pauli authored 
      

Improve handling of low entropy at start up from /dev/urandom by waiting for
a read(2) call on /dev/random to succeed.  Once one such call has succeeded,
a shared memory segment is created and persisted as an indicator to other
processes that /dev/urandom is properly seeded.

This does not fully prevent against attacks weakening the entropy source.
An attacker who has control of the machine early in its boot sequence
could create the shared memory segment preventing detection of low entropy
conditions.  However, this is no worse than the current situation.

An attacker would also be capable of removing the shared memory segment
and causing seeding to reoccur resulting in a denial of service attack.
This is partially mitigated by keeping the shared memory alive for the
duration of the process's existence.  Thus, an attacker would not only need
to have called call shmctl(2) with the IPC_RMID command but the system
must subsequently enter a state where no instances of libcrypto exist in
any process.  Even one long running process will prevent this attack.

The System V shared memory calls used here go back at least as far as
Linux kernel 2.0.  Linux kernels 4.8 and later, don't have a reliable way
to detect that /dev/urandom has been properly seeded, so a failure is raised
for this case (i.e. the getentropy(2) call has already failed).

Reviewed-by: default avatarBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9595)

[manual merge]
      3ff98f55
  13. Aug 06, 2019
  15. Jul 31, 2019
  17. Jul 25, 2019
    • Richard Levitte's avatar
      Fix default installation paths on mingw · 54aa9d51
      Richard Levitte authored 
      

Mingw config targets assumed that resulting programs and libraries are
installed in a Unix-like environment and the default installation
prefix was therefore set to '/usr/local'.

However, mingw programs are installed in a Windows environment, and
the installation directories should therefore have Windows defaults,
i.e. the same kind of defaults as the VC config targets.

A difficulty is, however, that a "cross compiled" build can't figure
out the system defaults from environment the same way it's done when
building "natively", so we have to fall back to hard coded defaults in
that case.

Tests can still be performed when cross compiled on a non-Windows
platform, since all tests only depend on the source and build
directory, and otherwise relies on normal local paths.

CVE-2019-1552

Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9400)
      54aa9d51
  19. Jul 23, 2019
  21. Jul 24, 2019
  23. Jun 30, 2019
  25. Jun 09, 2019
  27. May 28, 2019
  29. May 27, 2019
  31. May 21, 2019
  33. Feb 26, 2019
  35. Feb 20, 2019
    • Billy Brumley's avatar
      SCA hardening for mod. field inversion in EC_GROUP · 48e82c8e
      Billy Brumley authored 
      

This commit adds a dedicated function in `EC_METHOD` to access a modular
field inversion implementation suitable for the specifics of the
implemented curve, featuring SCA countermeasures.

The new pointer is defined as:
`int (*field_inv)(const EC_GROUP*, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX*)`
and computes the multiplicative inverse of `a` in the underlying field,
storing the result in `r`.

Three implementations are included, each including specific SCA
countermeasures:
  - `ec_GFp_simple_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through
    blinding.
  - `ec_GFp_mont_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through Fermat's
    Little Theorem (FLT) inversion.
  - `ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv()`, that uses `BN_GF2m_mod_inv()` which
    already features SCA hardening through blinding.

From a security point of view, this also helps addressing a leakage
previously affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates.

This commit also adds a new error reason code (i.e.,
`EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT`) to improve consistency between the three
implementations as all of them could fail for the same reason but
through different code paths resulting in inconsistent error stack
states.

Co-authored-by: default avatarNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>

(cherry picked from commit e0033efc

)

Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8262)
      48e82c8e
  37. Feb 14, 2019
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Don't signal SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START for TLSv1.3 post-handshake messages · 37857e9b
      Matt Caswell authored 
      

The original 1.1.1 design was to use SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and
SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal start/end of a post-handshake message
exchange in TLSv1.3. Unfortunately experience has shown that this confuses
some applications who mistake it for a TLSv1.2 renegotiation. This means
that KeyUpdate messages are not handled properly.

This commit removes the use of SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and
SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal the start/end of a post-handshake
message exchange. Individual post-handshake messages are still signalled in
the normal way.

This is a potentially breaking change if there are any applications already
written that expect to see these TLSv1.3 events. However, without it,
KeyUpdate is not currently usable for many applications.

Fixes #8069

Reviewed-by: default avatarRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8096)

(cherry picked from commit 4af5836b)
      37857e9b
  39. Feb 02, 2019
  41. Feb 01, 2019
  43. Dec 07, 2018
  45. Nov 24, 2018
  47. Nov 20, 2018
  49. Oct 17, 2018
  51. Oct 16, 2018
    • Dr. Matthias St. Pierre's avatar
      DRBG: fix reseeding via RAND_add()/RAND_seed() with large input · dbf0a496
      Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored 
      

In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed()
was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is
picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer
was limited to the size of 4096 bytes.

When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG,
the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored
by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code.
As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively
ignored.

This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which
does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit
to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits
but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems
like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion.

Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to
pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state,
which forces a reinstantiation on next call.

Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the
openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue
has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG
reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional
randomness provided by the application.

Fixes #7381

Reviewed-by: default avatarPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7382)

(cherry picked from commit 3064b551)
      dbf0a496
  53. Sep 11, 2018
  55. Sep 10, 2018
  57. Aug 21, 2018
  59. Aug 15, 2018
  61. Aug 14, 2018