Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5230)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5038)

Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4634)

- Mostly missing fall thru comments
- And uninitialized value used in sslapitest.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3440)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2550)

or EVP_CTRL_INIT/EVP_CTRL_COPY was not called or failed.
If that happens in EVP_CipherInit_ex/EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy set cipher = NULL,
aes_gcm_cleanup should check that gctx != NULL before calling OPENSSL_cleanse.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2562)

Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.

Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.

CVE-2017-3731

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

When doing in place encryption the overlapping buffer check can fail
incorrectly where we have done a partial block "Update" operation. This
fixes things to take account of any pending partial blocks.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2275)

If we have previously been passed a partial block in an "Update" call then
make sure we properly increment the output buffer when we use it.

Fixes #2273

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2275)

Lots of references to 16 replaced by AES_BLOCK_SIZE. Also a few other style
tweaks in that function

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2275)

crypto/evp/e_aes.c: Types of inp and out parameters of
AES_xts_en/decrypt functions need to be changed from char to
unsigned char to avoid build error due to
'-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types'.

crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl: Comments need to reflect the above
change.

Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <psteuer@mail.de>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This compiles correctly, but depending on what may be defined, it's
possible that this could fail compilation. The braces are mismatched,
and it's possible to end up with an else followed by another else.

This presumes the indentation is mostly correct and indicative of
intent. Found via static analysis.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1118)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This macro was defined by no-longer-supported __MWERKS__ compiler.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

no-aes is no longer a Configure option and therefore the OPENSSL_NO_AES
guards can be removed.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Don't have #error statements in header files, but instead wrap
the contents of that file in #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_xxx
This means it is now always safe to include the header file.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

OCB is AEAD capable but was not marked as such with the
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER flag.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

They all stop including evp_locl.h, so we also take care of their
adaptation to opaque EVP_CIPHER_CTX, as was promised in an earlier
commit.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Continuing from previous commit ensure our style is consistent for malloc
return checks.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

In CCM mode don't require a tag before initialising decrypt: this allows
the tag length to be set without requiring the tag.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Pointed out by Victor Vasiliev (vasilvv@mit.edu) via Adam Langley
(Google).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The various implementations of EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD expect a buffer of at
least 13 bytes long. Add sanity checks to ensure that the length is at
least that. Also add a new constant (EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) to evp.h to
represent this length. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

- SIGSEGV/ILL in CCM (RT#3688);
- SIGBUS in OCB;

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

CCM

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

This facilitates "universal" builds, ones that target multiple
architectures, e.g. ARMv5 through ARMv7. See commentary in
Configure for details.

Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>