- Jun 09, 2019
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9118)
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- May 28, 2019
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
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- May 27, 2019
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Richard Levitte authored
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Richard Levitte authored
Disabled by default Fixes #8360 Reviewed-by:
Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8370) (cherry picked from commit ac4033d658e4dc210ed4552b88069b57532ba3d7)
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- May 21, 2019
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Fixes: #8737 Reviewed-by:
Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> GH: #8741 (cherry picked from commit 70b0b977)
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- Feb 26, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Feb 20, 2019
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Billy Brumley authored
This commit adds a dedicated function in `EC_METHOD` to access a modular field inversion implementation suitable for the specifics of the implemented curve, featuring SCA countermeasures. The new pointer is defined as: `int (*field_inv)(const EC_GROUP*, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX*)` and computes the multiplicative inverse of `a` in the underlying field, storing the result in `r`. Three implementations are included, each including specific SCA countermeasures: - `ec_GFp_simple_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through blinding. - `ec_GFp_mont_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through Fermat's Little Theorem (FLT) inversion. - `ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv()`, that uses `BN_GF2m_mod_inv()` which already features SCA hardening through blinding. From a security point of view, this also helps addressing a leakage previously affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates. This commit also adds a new error reason code (i.e., `EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT`) to improve consistency between the three implementations as all of them could fail for the same reason but through different code paths resulting in inconsistent error stack states. Co-authored-by:Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit e0033efc ) Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 14, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
The original 1.1.1 design was to use SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal start/end of a post-handshake message exchange in TLSv1.3. Unfortunately experience has shown that this confuses some applications who mistake it for a TLSv1.2 renegotiation. This means that KeyUpdate messages are not handled properly. This commit removes the use of SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal the start/end of a post-handshake message exchange. Individual post-handshake messages are still signalled in the normal way. This is a potentially breaking change if there are any applications already written that expect to see these TLSv1.3 events. However, without it, KeyUpdate is not currently usable for many applications. Fixes #8069 Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 02, 2019
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Bernd Edlinger authored
The commit 5dc40a83c74be579575a512b30d9c1e0364e6a7b forgot to add a short description to the CHANGES file. Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 01, 2019
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Michael Tuexen authored
When computing the end-point shared secret, don't take the terminating NULL character into account. Please note that this fix breaks interoperability with older versions of OpenSSL, which are not fixed. Fixes #7956 Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by:
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- Dec 07, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
It turns out that the strictness that was implemented in EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() (see Github openssl/openssl#6880) was badly placed for some usages, and that it's better to do this check only when the method is getting registered. Fixes #7758 Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 24, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Also adds missing copyright boilerplate to util/mktar.sh Reviewed-by:
Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7696) (cherry picked from commit b42922ea2f605fd6c42faad1743fb27be5f7f1f3)
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- Nov 20, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Oct 17, 2018
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Antoine Salon authored
Replace ECDH_KDF_X9_62() with internal ecdh_KDF_X9_63() Signed-off-by:
Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com> Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 16, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed() was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer was limited to the size of 4096 bytes. When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG, the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code. As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively ignored. This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion. Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state, which forces a reinstantiation on next call. Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional randomness provided by the application. Fixes #7381 Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 11, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Sep 10, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by:
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Paul Yang authored
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- Aug 21, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Aug 15, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Aug 14, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Aug 07, 2018
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Patrick Steuer authored
Signed-off-by:
Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
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- Jul 26, 2018
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Billy Brumley authored
This commit leverages the Montgomery ladder scaffold introduced in #6690 (alongside a specialized Lopez-Dahab ladder for binary curves) to provide a specialized differential addition-and-double implementation to speedup prime curves, while keeping all the features of `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` against SCA attacks. The arithmetic in ladder_pre, ladder_step and ladder_post is auto generated with tooling, from the following formulae: - `ladder_pre`: Formula 3 for doubling from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel attacks", as described at https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#doubling-dbl-2002-it-2 - `ladder_step`: differential addition-and-doubling Eq. (8) and (10) from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel attacks", as described at https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-3 - `ladder_post`: y-coordinate recovery using Eq. (8) from Brier-Joye "Weierstrass Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks", modified to work in projective coordinates. Co-authored-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6772)
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Kurt Roeckx authored
The old numbers where all generated for an 80 bit security level. But the number should depend on security level you want to reach. For bigger primes we want a higher security level and so need to do more tests. Reviewed-by:
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Kurt Roeckx authored
This changes the security level from 100 to 128 bit. We only have 1 define, this sets it to the highest level supported for DSA, and needed for keys larger than 3072 bit. Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 23, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
The result is that we don't have to produce different names on different platforms, and we won't have confusion on Windows depending on if the script was built with mingw or with MSVC. Partial fix for #3254 Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 18, 2018
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by:
David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6664)
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- Jul 16, 2018
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Nicola Tuveri authored
This commit uses the new ladder scaffold to implement a specialized ladder step based on differential addition-and-doubling in mixed Lopez-Dahab projective coordinates, modified to independently blind the operands. The arithmetic in `ladder_pre`, `ladder_step` and `ladder_post` is auto generated with tooling: - see, e.g., "Guide to ECC" Alg 3.40 for reference about the `ladder_pre` implementation; - see https://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g12o/auto-code/shortw/xz/ladder/mladd-2003-s.op3 for the differential addition-and-doubling formulas implemented in `ladder_step`; - see, e.g., "Fast Multiplication on Elliptic Curves over GF(2**m) without Precomputation" (Lopez and Dahab, CHES 1999) Appendix Alg Mxy for the `ladder_post` implementation to recover the `(x,y)` result in affine coordinates. Co-authored-by:
Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Co-authored-by:
Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
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Nicola Tuveri authored
for specialized Montgomery ladder implementations PR #6009 and #6070 replaced the default EC point multiplication path for prime and binary curves with a unified Montgomery ladder implementation with various timing attack defenses (for the common paths when a secret scalar is feed to the point multiplication). The newly introduced default implementation directly used EC_POINT_add/dbl in the main loop. The scaffolding introduced by this commit allows EC_METHODs to define a specialized `ladder_step` function to improve performances by taking advantage of efficient formulas for differential addition-and-doubling and different coordinate systems. - `ladder_pre` is executed before the main loop of the ladder: by default it copies the input point P into S, and doubles it into R. Specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition to different coordinate systems before copying and doubling; - `ladder_step` is the core of the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it computes `S := R+S; R := 2R;`, but specific implementations could, e.g., implement a more efficient formula for differential addition-and-doubling; - `ladder_post` is executed after the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it's a noop, but specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition back from the coordinate system used for optimizing the differential addition-and-doubling or recover the y coordinate of the result point. This commit also renames `ec_mul_consttime` to `ec_scalar_mul_ladder`, as it better corresponds to what this function does: nothing can be truly said about the constant-timeness of the overall execution of this function, given that the underlying operations are not necessarily constant-time themselves. What this implementation ensures is that the same fixed sequence of operations is executed for each scalar multiplication (for a given EC_GROUP), with no dependency on the value of the input scalar. Co-authored-by:
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- Jul 08, 2018
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Kurt Roeckx authored
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- Jun 26, 2018
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Pauli authored
This allows operation inside a chroot environment without having the random device present. A new call, RAND_keep_random_devices_open(), has been introduced that can be used to control file descriptor use by the random seed sources. Some seed sources maintain open file descriptors by default, which allows such sources to operate in a chroot(2) jail without the associated device nodes being available. Reviewed-by:
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- Jun 22, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
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- Jun 21, 2018
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Nicola Tuveri authored
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