- Aug 30, 2019
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Pauli authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9738)
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- Aug 29, 2019
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Pauli authored
Reviewed-by:
Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9734) (cherry picked from commit 46a9cc9451213039fd53f62733b2ccd04e853bb2)
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- Aug 20, 2019
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Pauli authored
Improve handling of low entropy at start up from /dev/urandom by waiting for a read(2) call on /dev/random to succeed. Once one such call has succeeded, a shared memory segment is created and persisted as an indicator to other processes that /dev/urandom is properly seeded. This does not fully prevent against attacks weakening the entropy source. An attacker who has control of the machine early in its boot sequence could create the shared memory segment preventing detection of low entropy conditions. However, this is no worse than the current situation. An attacker would also be capable of removing the shared memory segment and causing seeding to reoccur resulting in a denial of service attack. This is partially mitigated by keeping the shared memory alive for the duration of the process's existence. Thus, an attacker would not only need to have called call shmctl(2) with the IPC_RMID command but the system must subsequently enter a state where no instances of libcrypto exist in any process. Even one long running process will prevent this attack. The System V shared memory calls used here go back at least as far as Linux kernel 2.0. Linux kernels 4.8 and later, don't have a reliable way to detect that /dev/urandom has been properly seeded, so a failure is raised for this case (i.e. the getentropy(2) call has already failed). Reviewed-by:
Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9595) [manual merge]
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- Aug 06, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
The macro TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST is supposed to hold the ascii string "extended master secret". On EBCDIC machines it actually contained the value "extecded master secret" Reviewed-by:
Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9430) (cherry picked from commit c1a3f16f735057b45df1803d58f40e4e17b233e5)
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- Jul 31, 2019
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Antoine Cœur authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 25, 2019
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Richard Levitte authored
Mingw config targets assumed that resulting programs and libraries are installed in a Unix-like environment and the default installation prefix was therefore set to '/usr/local'. However, mingw programs are installed in a Windows environment, and the installation directories should therefore have Windows defaults, i.e. the same kind of defaults as the VC config targets. A difficulty is, however, that a "cross compiled" build can't figure out the system defaults from environment the same way it's done when building "natively", so we have to fall back to hard coded defaults in that case. Tests can still be performed when cross compiled on a non-Windows platform, since all tests only depend on the source and build directory, and otherwise relies on normal local paths. CVE-2019-1552 Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 23, 2019
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Pauli authored
The rand pool support allocates maximal sized buffers -- this is typically 12288 bytes in size. These pools are allocated in secure memory which is a scarse resource. They are also allocated per DRBG of which there are up to two per thread. This change allocates 64 byte pools and grows them dynamically if required. 64 is chosen to be sufficiently large so that pools do not normally need to grow. Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 24, 2019
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Bernd Edlinger authored
This avoids leaking bit 0 of the private key. Backport-of: #9363 Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9435)
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- Jun 30, 2019
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Antoine Cœur authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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- Jun 09, 2019
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9118)
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- May 28, 2019
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: -
Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
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- May 27, 2019
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Richard Levitte authored
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Richard Levitte authored
Disabled by default Fixes #8360 Reviewed-by:
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- May 21, 2019
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Fixes: #8737 Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 26, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Feb 20, 2019
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Billy Brumley authored
This commit adds a dedicated function in `EC_METHOD` to access a modular field inversion implementation suitable for the specifics of the implemented curve, featuring SCA countermeasures. The new pointer is defined as: `int (*field_inv)(const EC_GROUP*, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX*)` and computes the multiplicative inverse of `a` in the underlying field, storing the result in `r`. Three implementations are included, each including specific SCA countermeasures: - `ec_GFp_simple_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through blinding. - `ec_GFp_mont_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through Fermat's Little Theorem (FLT) inversion. - `ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv()`, that uses `BN_GF2m_mod_inv()` which already features SCA hardening through blinding. From a security point of view, this also helps addressing a leakage previously affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates. This commit also adds a new error reason code (i.e., `EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT`) to improve consistency between the three implementations as all of them could fail for the same reason but through different code paths resulting in inconsistent error stack states. Co-authored-by:Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit e0033efc30b0f00476bba8f0fa5512be5dc8a3f1) Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 14, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
The original 1.1.1 design was to use SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal start/end of a post-handshake message exchange in TLSv1.3. Unfortunately experience has shown that this confuses some applications who mistake it for a TLSv1.2 renegotiation. This means that KeyUpdate messages are not handled properly. This commit removes the use of SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal the start/end of a post-handshake message exchange. Individual post-handshake messages are still signalled in the normal way. This is a potentially breaking change if there are any applications already written that expect to see these TLSv1.3 events. However, without it, KeyUpdate is not currently usable for many applications. Fixes #8069 Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 02, 2019
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Bernd Edlinger authored
The commit 5dc40a83c74be579575a512b30d9c1e0364e6a7b forgot to add a short description to the CHANGES file. Reviewed-by:
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- Feb 01, 2019
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Michael Tuexen authored
When computing the end-point shared secret, don't take the terminating NULL character into account. Please note that this fix breaks interoperability with older versions of OpenSSL, which are not fixed. Fixes #7956 Reviewed-by:
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- Dec 07, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
It turns out that the strictness that was implemented in EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() (see Github openssl/openssl#6880) was badly placed for some usages, and that it's better to do this check only when the method is getting registered. Fixes #7758 Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 24, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Also adds missing copyright boilerplate to util/mktar.sh Reviewed-by:
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- Nov 20, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Oct 17, 2018
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Antoine Salon authored
Replace ECDH_KDF_X9_62() with internal ecdh_KDF_X9_63() Signed-off-by:
Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com> Reviewed-by:
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- Oct 16, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed() was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer was limited to the size of 4096 bytes. When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG, the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code. As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively ignored. This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion. Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state, which forces a reinstantiation on next call. Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional randomness provided by the application. Fixes #7381 Reviewed-by:
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- Sep 11, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Sep 10, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by:
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Paul Yang authored
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- Aug 21, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Aug 15, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Aug 14, 2018
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Aug 07, 2018
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Patrick Steuer authored
Signed-off-by:
Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
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- Jul 26, 2018
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Billy Brumley authored
This commit leverages the Montgomery ladder scaffold introduced in #6690 (alongside a specialized Lopez-Dahab ladder for binary curves) to provide a specialized differential addition-and-double implementation to speedup prime curves, while keeping all the features of `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` against SCA attacks. The arithmetic in ladder_pre, ladder_step and ladder_post is auto generated with tooling, from the following formulae: - `ladder_pre`: Formula 3 for doubling from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel attacks", as described at https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#doubling-dbl-2002-it-2 - `ladder_step`: differential addition-and-doubling Eq. (8) and (10) from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel attacks", as described at https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-3 - `ladder_post`: y-coordinate recovery using Eq. (8) from Brier-Joye "Weierstrass Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks", modified to work in projective coordinates. Co-authored-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6772)
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Kurt Roeckx authored
The old numbers where all generated for an 80 bit security level. But the number should depend on security level you want to reach. For bigger primes we want a higher security level and so need to do more tests. Reviewed-by:
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Kurt Roeckx authored
This changes the security level from 100 to 128 bit. We only have 1 define, this sets it to the highest level supported for DSA, and needed for keys larger than 3072 bit. Reviewed-by:
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