Suggested by John Foley <foleyj@cisco.com>.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Configure would load the glob "Configurations*".  The problem with
this is that it also loads all kinds of backups of those
configurations that some editors do, like emacs' classic
'Configurations~'.  The solution is to give them an extension, such as
'.conf', and make sure to end the glob with that.

Also, because 'Configurations.conf' makes for a silly name, and
because a possibly large number of configurations will become clutter,
move them to a subdirectory 'Configurations/', and rename them to
something more expressive, as well as something that sets up some form
of sorting order.  Thus:

    Configurations	->	Configurations/10-main.conf
    Configurations.team	->	Configurations/90-team.conf

Finally, make sure that Configure sorts the list of files that 'glob'
produces, and adapt Makefile.org.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Cleanse various intermediate buffers used by the PRF.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Ensure all malloc failures return -1.

Reported by Adam Langley (Google).

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

BIO_debug_callback() no longer assumes the hexadecimal representation of
a pointer fits in 8 characters.

Signed-off-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Fix security issue where under certain conditions a client can complete a
handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
- Client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded, and the
user has not seeded manually
- A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
SSL_client_methodv23)
- A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data
from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random
(e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA)

If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore
the output may be predictable.

For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
succeed on an unpatched platform:

openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA

CVE-2015-0285

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Since commit 741c9959 ("DTLS revision."), we put the wrong protocol
version into our ClientHello for DTLS1_BAD_VER. The old DTLS
code which used ssl->version was replaced by the more generic SSL3 code
which uses ssl->client_version. The Cisco ASA no longer likes our
ClientHello.

RT#3711

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Commit 9cf0f187

 in HEAD, and 68039af3 in 1.0.2, removed a version check
from dtls1_buffer_message() which was needed to distinguish between DTLS
1.x and Cisco's pre-standard version of DTLS (DTLS1_BAD_VER).

Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
RT#3703

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

New function ASN1_STRING_clear_free which cleanses an ASN1_STRING
structure before freeing it.

Call ASN1_STRING_clear_free on PKCS#8 private key components.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Run make errors on master

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Make the output from mkerr.pl consistent with the newly reformatted code.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

crypto/crypto-lib.com - catch up with the OCSP changes
test/maketest.com and test/tests.com - catch up with the addition of test_evp_extra

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

This patch uses warning/fatal constants instead of numbers with comments for
warning/alerts in d1_pkt.c and s3_pkt.c

RT#3725

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Miscellaneous unchecked malloc fixes. Also fixed some mem leaks on error
paths as I spotted them along the way.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Add RIPEMD160 and whirlpool test data.
Add Count keyword to repeatedly call EVP_DigestUpate.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

CVE-2015-0288
PR#3708

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The format script didn't correctly recognise some ASN.1 macros and
didn't reformat some files as a result. Fix script and reformat
affected files.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS is now spelled correctly :)
README.ASN1 talked about 0.9.6, so it's deleted.
I turned doc/standards.txt into a set of one-line summaries of RFCs, and
also updated the pointers to original sources (to be web links)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

These ciphers are removed:
    TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5
    TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5
    TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
    TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
    TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA
    TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA
    TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
They were defined in a long-expired IETF internet-draft:
draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Some Cisco appliances use a pre-standard version number for DTLS. We support
this as DTLS1_BAD_VER within the code.

This change fixes d2i_SSL_SESSION for that DTLS version.

Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

RT#3704

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Added various missing return value checks in tls1_change_cipher_state.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Fixed various missing return value checks in ssl3_send_newsession_ticket.
Also a mem leak on error.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Add support for skipping disabled algorithms: if an attempt to load a
public or private key results in an unknown algorithm error then any
test using that key is automatically skipped.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>