Newer
Older
// Give time to the IUT to setup enrol state
tc_ac.start; // TDOD To refined, use altstep
alt {
[] utPort.receive(UtPkiTriggerInd: { state := 1 }) {
tc_ac.stop;
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: INFO: IUT is in enrolment state ***");
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: DBG: IUT state update not recieved ***");
//f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
if(p_delay > 0.0){
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: INFO: Wait for second enrolment trigger ***");
f_sleep(p_delay);
}
// Trigger the second enrolment
f_sendUtTriggerEnrolmentRequestPrimitive();
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: PASS: Re-enrolment trigger sent succesfully ***");
// Postamble
f_cfDown_itss();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_03_BV_itss
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_03_BV_pki() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variable
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_request;
var InnerEcRequest v_inner_ec_request;
var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
var HashedId8 v_ec_cert_digest;
var octetstring v_ec_cert_hash;
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Preamble
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_response", v_headers);
if(not f_await_ec_request_send_response( v_inner_ec_request, v_inner_ec_response, v_request)){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: First InnerEcRequest failed ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": v_request := ", v_request);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INFO: First InnerEcRequest received ***");
log(">>>>> v_inner_ec_response=", v_inner_ec_response);
var HashAlgorithm ha := f_getHashAlgorithmOfVerificationKeyIndicator(v_inner_ec_response.certificate.toBeSigned.verifyKeyIndicator);
if (ha == sha256) {
v_ec_cert_hash := f_hashWithSha256(bit2oct(encvalue(v_inner_ec_response.certificate)));
} else if (ha == sha384) {
v_ec_cert_hash := f_hashWithSha384(bit2oct(encvalue(v_inner_ec_response.certificate)));
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Unknown EC certificate hash alg=", ha);
v_ec_cert_digest := substr(v_ec_cert_hash, lengthof(v_ec_cert_hash) - 8, 8);
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INFO: First InnerEcRequest received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
[] a_await_ec_http_request_from_iut(mw_http_ec_request_generic, v_request)
{
var Oct16 v_request_hash, v_aes_enc_key;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_decrypted_message;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
f_send_500_Internal_Error(v_headers); // we don't care about response
if(not f_read_ec_request_from_iut_itss( v_request.request.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data,
v_request_hash, v_aes_enc_key,
v_decrypted_message,
v_etsi_ts_102941_data,
v_inner_ec_request))
{
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Can't parse enrolment request ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
if( not isvalue(v_inner_ec_request) ){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Can't parse enrolment request ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
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if(not match(v_inner_ec_request.itsId, v_ec_cert_digest)){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: ITS-S ID is not equal to the EC HashedId8 ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: ", match(v_inner_ec_request.itsId, v_ec_cert_digest));
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
if(not ischosen(v_decrypted_message.content.signedData)){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: EC request shall contain signed message ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: inner data content=", v_decrypted_message.content);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
if(not ischosen(v_decrypted_message.content.signedData.signer.digest)){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: re-keying EC request shall be signed by the previous EC certificate digest***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: signerInfo=", v_decrypted_message.content.signedData.signer);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
if (not f_verifyEcdsa(bit2oct(encvalue(v_decrypted_message.content.signedData.tbsData)),
v_ec_cert_hash,
v_decrypted_message.content.signedData.signature_,
v_inner_ec_response.certificate.toBeSigned.verifyKeyIndicator.verificationKey
)) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: EC request signature verification failed ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
// Set verdict
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcRequest received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_03_BV_pki
/**
* @desc If the EC is revoked, the IUT returns to the state 'initialized'.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT and PICS_SECPKI_CRL
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is informed about a revocation of its EC
* }
* then {
* the IUT returns to the "initialized" state
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v1.2.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_04_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.1.3, 6.2.3.2.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_04_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT or not PICS_SECPKI_CRL) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT and PICS_SECPKI_CRL required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
/**
* @desc If the EC expires, the IUT returns to the state 'initialized'.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* with
* the IUT being in the 'enrolled' state
* and the EC of the IUT expires
* ensure that
* when
* the IUT is requested to send an EnrollmentRequestMessage
* then
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
* containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
* containing EtsiTs102941Data
* containing InnerECRequestSignedForPOP
* containing InnerEcRequest
* containing itsId
* indicating the canonical identifier of the ITS-S
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v1.2.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_05_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.1.3, 6.2.3.2.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_05_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_key_x;
var Oct32 v_public_key_y;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
// Start components
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_05_BV_itss()); // wait 15 sec before the second enrolment
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_05_BV_pki());
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
f_cfMtcDown01(v_itss, v_ea);
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group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_05_BV {
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_05_BV_itss() runs on ItsPkiItss system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Test component configuration
// vc_hashedId8ToBeUsed := PX_IUT_DEFAULT_CERTIFICATE;
vc_hashedId8ToBeUsed := "";
f_cfUp_itss();
// Test adapter configuration
// Preamble
// Initial state: No CAM shall be emitted
geoNetworkingPort.clear;
tc_noac.start;
alt {
[] geoNetworkingPort.receive {
log("No CA message expected");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
[] tc_noac.timeout {
// Trigger the first enrolment
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: INFO: No CA message received ***");
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: INFO: Trigger 1st emrolment ***");
f_sendUtTriggerEnrolmentRequestPrimitive();
// wait a couple of seconds and run second enrolment to check re-enrolment procedure
f_sleep(PX_RE_ENROLMENT_DELAY);
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: INFO: Trigger 2nd emrolment ***");
f_sendUtTriggerEnrolmentRequestPrimitive();
// wait 5 seconds after expiration of EC cert
f_sleep(PX_CERT_EXPIRATION_DELAY + 5.0);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
// Trigger the 3rd enrolment
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: INFO: Trigger 3rd emrolment ***");
f_sendUtTriggerEnrolmentRequestPrimitive();
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: PASS: Re-enrolment trigger sent succesfully ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
// Postamble
f_cfDown_itss();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_03_BV_itss
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_05_BV_pki() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variable
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_request;
var InnerEcRequest v_inner_ec_request;
var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
var HashedId8 v_ec_cert_digest;
var EtsiTs103097Certificate v_ec_cert;
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_response", v_headers);
// Preamble
if(not f_await_ec_request_send_response( v_inner_ec_request, v_inner_ec_response, v_request,
ok,
m_certificateSubjectAttributes_id_omit(
-,
valueof(m_validityPeriod(f_getCurrentTime() / 1000, m_duration_in_seconds( float2int(PX_CERT_EXPIRATION_DELAY))))
)
)){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: First InnerEcRequest failed ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": v_request := ", v_request);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
log(">>>>> 1st v_inner_ec_response=", v_inner_ec_response);
v_ec_cert := v_inner_ec_response.certificate;
v_ec_cert_digest := f_calculateDigestFromCertificate(v_ec_cert);
if(not ischosen(v_ec_cert.toBeSigned.validityPeriod.duration.seconds)){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: wrong EC certificate validity period error");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INFO: First InnerEcRequest processed. EC = " & oct2str(v_ec_cert_digest) & "***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INFO: expires in "
& int2str(v_ec_cert.toBeSigned.validityPeriod.start_ + v_ec_cert.toBeSigned.validityPeriod.duration.seconds - (f_getCurrentTime()/1000))
& " seconds ***"
);
// wait for 2nd request with EC data
if(not f_await_ec_request_send_response( v_inner_ec_request, v_inner_ec_response, v_request, deniedrequest))
{
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: 2nd InnerEcRequest failed ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": v_request := ", v_request);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
log(">>>>> 2nd v_inner_ec_response=", v_inner_ec_response);
if(not match(v_inner_ec_request.itsId, v_ec_cert_digest)){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: ITS-S ID of 2nd request must be equal to the EC HashedId8 ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: ", match(v_inner_ec_request.itsId, v_ec_cert_digest));
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
if(not f_await_ec_request_send_response( v_inner_ec_request, v_inner_ec_response, v_request, deniedrequest))
{
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: 3rd InnerEcRequest failed ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": v_request := ", v_request);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
log(">>>>> 3rd v_inner_ec_response=", v_inner_ec_response);
if(match(v_inner_ec_request.itsId, v_ec_cert_digest)){
if(v_ec_cert.toBeSigned.validityPeriod.start_ + v_ec_cert.toBeSigned.validityPeriod.duration.seconds < (f_getCurrentTime()/1000)){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: EC certificate is not expired yet ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: ITS-S ID of 3rd request must NOT be equal to the expired EC HashedId8 ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: ", match(v_inner_ec_request.itsId, v_ec_cert_digest));
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_05_BV_pki
} // End of group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_05_BV
group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV {
/**
* @desc For each enrolment request, the ITS-S shall generate a new verification key pair
corresponding to an approved signature algorithm as specified in TS 103 097.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT and not PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send multiple EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* each EnrolmentRequestMessage
* contains a different and unique verification key pair within the InnerECRequest
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v1.2.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV
const charstring c_nextTry := "nextTry";
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_1() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_mtc(c_stInitial);
}
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_2() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_mtc(c_stEnrolled);
}
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_mtc(in charstring p_state) runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
// Test component configuration
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_itss(PX_RE_ENROLMENT_COUNTER, p_state));
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_pki(PX_RE_ENROLMENT_COUNTER, p_state));
f_serverSyncClientsTimed (2, c_prDone, PX_TSYNC_TIME_LIMIT);
for(var integer v_i := 0; v_i < PX_RE_ENROLMENT_COUNTER; v_i := v_i + 1){
f_serverSyncClientsTimed (2, c_nextTry, PX_TSYNC_TIME_LIMIT);
}
f_serverSyncClientsTimed (2, c_tbDone, PX_TSYNC_TIME_LIMIT);
f_serverWaitForAllClientsToStop();
} // End of f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_mtc
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_itss(
integer p_max_try,
charstring p_state)
runs on ItsPkiItss system ItsPkiItssSystem
{
// Local variables
var EtsiTs103097Certificate v_certificate;
vc_hashedId8ToBeUsed := "";
// Preamble
// Initial state: No CAM shall be emitted
geoNetworkingPort.clear;
tc_noac.start;
alt {
[] geoNetworkingPort.receive {
log("No CA message expected");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
[] tc_noac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: : INFO: No CA message received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Send first enrolment
for(var integer v_i := 0; v_i < p_max_try; v_i := v_i + 1){
f_sendUtTriggerEnrolmentRequestPrimitive();
f_clientSync(c_nextTry, e_success);
// Postamble
f_cfDown_itss();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_itss
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_pki(integer p_max_try, charstring p_state) runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variable
var Headers v_headers;
var ListOfPublicVerificationKey v_generated_keys;
// Preamble
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_response", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
for(var integer v_i := 0; v_i < p_max_try; v_i := v_i + 1){
var HttpMessage v_request;
var InnerEcRequest v_inner_ec_request;
var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
var PublicVerificationKey v_key;
var EnrolmentResponseCode v_response_code;
if(p_state == c_stInitial){
v_response_code := deniedrequest;
v_response_code := ok;
if(not f_await_ec_request_send_response( v_inner_ec_request, v_inner_ec_response, v_request, v_response_code)){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": ERROR: EC request receiving error ***");
setverdict(inconc);
f_clientSync(c_nextTry, e_error);
v_key := v_inner_ec_request.publicKeys.verificationKey;
if (isbound(v_generated_keys) and match(v_generated_keys, superset(v_key))) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": LOG: ", match(v_generated_keys, superset(v_key)), "***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Duplication of generated public keys ***");
setverdict(fail);
f_clientSync(c_nextTry, e_error);
v_generated_keys[v_i] := v_key;
f_clientSync(c_nextTry, e_success);
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: No identical verification keys received in " & int2str(p_max_try) & " messages ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_pki
group SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_07_BV {
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/**
* @desc Within the InnerECRequest, the requestedSubjectAttributes shall not contain a certIssuePermissions field.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
* containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
* containing EtsiTs103097Data
* containing InnerECRequestSignedForPOP
* containing InnerEcRequest
* containing requestedSubjectAttributes
* not containing certIssuePermissions
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v1.2.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_07_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.2.3.2.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_07_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_key_x;
var Oct32 v_public_key_y;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
// Start components
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_01_BV_itss());
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_07_BV_pki());
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
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function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_07_BV_pki() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variable
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_request;
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Test adapter configuration
// Preamble
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_response", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_request_from_iut(mw_http_ec_request_generic, v_request)
{
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_decrypted_message;
var InnerEcRequest v_inner_ec_request;
var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_response_message;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_pki_request;
var Oct16 v_request_hash, v_aes_enc_key;
var PublicVerificationKey v_canonical_key;
tc_ac.stop;
f_send_500_Internal_Error(v_headers); // we don't care about response
if( not f_read_ec_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data,
v_request_hash, v_aes_enc_key,
v_decrypted_message,
v_pki_request,
v_inner_ec_request))
{
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Can't parse enrolment request***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
if( not isvalue(v_inner_ec_request) ){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Can't parse enrolment request***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
if(ispresent(v_inner_ec_request.requestedSubjectAttributes.certIssuePermissions)){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: InnerEcRequest shall not contain certIssuePermissions attribute ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
// Set verdict
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcRequest received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_07_BV_pki
}// End of group SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_07_BV
group SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_08_BV {
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/**
* @desc In the headerInfo of the tbsData of the InnerECRequestSignedForPOP all other components
* of the component tbsdata.headerInfo except generationTime and psid are not used and absent.
* The psid shall be set to "secured certificate request" as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 and
* the generationTime shall be present.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
* containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
* containing EtsiTs103097Data
* containing InnerECRequestSignedForPOP
* containing tbsData
* containing headerInfo
* containing psid
* indicating AID_CERT_REQ
* and containing generationTime
* and not containing any other component of tbsdata.headerInfo
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v1.2.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_08_BV
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_08_BV_1() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_08_BV_mtc(c_stInitial);
}
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_08_BV_2() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_08_BV_mtc(c_stEnrolled);
}
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_08_BV_mtc(in charstring p_itss_state) runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
if(p_itss_state == c_stEnrolled){
}else{
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_03_BV_itss());
}
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_08_BV_pki(p_itss_state));
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
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function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_08_BV_pki(
in charstring p_itss_state
) runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variable
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_request;
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Test adapter configuration
// Preamble
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_response", v_headers);
if(p_itss_state == c_stEnrolled){
var InnerEcRequest v_inner_ec_request;
var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
if(not f_await_ec_request_send_response( v_inner_ec_request, v_inner_ec_response, v_request)){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INFO: First InnerEcRequest error ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INFO: First InnerEcRequest received ***");
}
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_request_from_iut(mw_http_ec_request_generic, v_request)
{
var Oct16 v_request_hash;
var Oct16 v_aes_enc_key;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_decrypted_message;
var InnerEcRequest v_inner_ec_request;
var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_response_message;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_pki_request;
tc_ac.stop;
f_send_500_Internal_Error(v_headers); // we dont care about response
f_read_ec_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data,
v_request_hash, v_aes_enc_key,
v_decrypted_message,
v_pki_request,
v_inner_ec_request);
if( not isvalue(v_pki_request)) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Can't parse enrolment request ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
if( not ischosen(v_pki_request.content.enrolmentRequest)) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Not an enrolment request ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": EtsiTs102941Data.content=", v_pki_request.content);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
if(not match( v_pki_request.content.enrolmentRequest,
mw_etsiTs103097Data_signed(
mw_signedData(
-,
mw_toBeSignedData(
-,
mw_headerInfo_inner_pki_request()
)))
)) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Wrong InnerECRequestSignedForPOP headers ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": ",
match( v_pki_request.content.enrolmentRequest,
m_etsiTs103097Data_signed(mw_signedData( -,mw_toBeSignedData(-,mw_headerInfo_inner_pki_request())))));
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
// Set verdict
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: EC Request received with proper InnerECRequestSignedForPOP headers ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_01_BV_pki
}
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/**
* @desc In the headerInfo of the tbsData of the outer EtsiTs102941Data-Signed all other components
* of the component tbsdata.headerInfo except generationTime and psid are not used and absent.
* The psid shall be set to "secured certificate request" as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 and
* the generationTime shall be present.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
* containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
* containing EtsiTs103097Data
* containing InnerECRequestSignedForPOP
* containing tbsData
* containing headerInfo
* containing psid
* indicating AID_CERT_REQ
* and containing generationTime
* and not containing any other component of tbsdata.headerInfo
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v1.2.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV
group g_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV {
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV_1() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV_mtc(c_stInitial);
}
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV_2() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV_mtc(c_stEnrolled);
}
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV_mtc(in charstring p_itss_state) runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
if(p_itss_state == c_stEnrolled){
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_03_BV_itss());
}else{
}
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV_pki(p_itss_state));
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
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} // End of f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV_mtc
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV_pki (
in charstring p_itss_state
) runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variable
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_request;
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Test adapter configuration
// Preamble
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_response", v_headers);
if(p_itss_state == c_stEnrolled){
var InnerEcRequest v_inner_ec_request;
var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
if(not f_await_ec_request_send_response( v_inner_ec_request, v_inner_ec_response, v_request)){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INFO: First InnerEcRequest error ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INFO: First InnerEcRequest received ***");
}
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_request_from_iut(mw_http_ec_request_generic, v_request)
{
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_decrypted_message;
var InnerEcRequest v_inner_ec_request;
var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_response_message;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_pki_request;
var Oct16 v_request_hash, v_aes_enc_key;
var PublicVerificationKey v_canonical_key;
tc_ac.stop;
f_send_500_Internal_Error(v_headers); // we don't care about response
if( not f_read_ec_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data,
v_request_hash, v_aes_enc_key,
v_decrypted_message,
v_pki_request,
v_inner_ec_request))
{
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Can't parse enrolment request***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
if ( not match( v_decrypted_message,
mw_etsiTs103097Data_signed(
mw_signedData(
-,
mw_toBeSignedData(
-,
mw_headerInfo_outer_pki_request()
)))
)){
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Invalid outer signed structure in EC request ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": ",
match(v_decrypted_message,m_etsiTs103097Data_signed(mw_signedData(-,mw_toBeSignedData(-,mw_headerInfo_outer_pki_request()))))
);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
// Set verdict
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: EC request contains valid outer signed structure ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV_pki
} // End of group g_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV
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/**
* @desc The EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted containing the correctly encrypted ciphertext and a recipients
* component containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice certRecipInfo containing the
* hashedId8 of the EA certificate in recipientId and the encrypted data encryption key in encKey.
* The data encryption key is encrypted using the public key found in the EA certificate referenced
* in the recipientId.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
* containing recipients
* containing exactly one instance of RecipientInfo of choice certRecipInfo
* containing recipientId
* indicating the hashedId8
* referencing to the EA certificate
* containing encryptionKey (KEY)
* and containing encKey
* being a symmetric key (SYMKEY) encrypted using the key KEY
* containing ciphertext
* which is encrypted using the symmetric key SYMKEY contained in encKey
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v1.2.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_10_BV
group g_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_10_BV {
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_10_BV_1() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_10_BV_mtc(c_stInitial);
}
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_10_BV_2() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_10_BV_mtc(c_stEnrolled);
}
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_10_BV_mtc(in charstring p_itss_state) runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");