Newer
Older
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
10004
10005
10006
10007
10008
10009
10010
10011
10012
10013
10014
10015
10016
10017
10018
10019
10020
10021
10022
10023
10024
// Test Body
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
10031
10032
10033
10034
10035
10036
10037
10038
10039
10040
10041
10042
10043
10044
10045
10046
10047
10048
10049
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, 1, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log(match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedrequest))));
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedrequest))) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Invalid InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse with deniedrequest received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
}
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
10051
10052
10053
10054
10055
10056
10057
10058
10059
10060
10061
10062
10063
10064
10065
10066
10067
10068
10069
10070
10071
10072
10073
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_09_BI
/**
* @desc Enroll the ITS-Station, but the expiring date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EA
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_10_BI() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct32 v_request_hash;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request_with_wrong_parameters({ valueof(m_appPermissions(c_its_aid_SCR, { bitmapSsp := PX_INNER_EC_CERTFICATE_BITMAP_SSP_SCR })) }, -, vc_eaCertificate.toBeSigned.validityPeriod.start_, valueof(m_duration_years(50)), -, v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
10092
10093
10094
10095
10096
10097
10098
10099
10100
10101
10102
10103
10104
10105
10106
10107
10108
10109
10110
10111
10112
// Test Body
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
10119
10120
10121
10122
10123
10124
10125
10126
10127
10128
10129
10130
10131
10132
10133
10134
10135
10136
10137
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, 1, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log(match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedrequest))));
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedrequest))) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Invalid InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse with deniedrequest received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
}
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
10139
10140
10141
10142
10143
10144
10145
10146
10147
10148
10149
10150
10151
10152
10153
10154
10155
10156
10157
10158
10159
10160
10161
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_10_BI
/**
* @desc Enroll the ITS-Station, but the start date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EA
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_11_BI() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct32 v_request_hash;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request_with_wrong_parameters({ valueof(m_appPermissions(c_its_aid_SCR, { bitmapSsp := PX_INNER_EC_CERTFICATE_BITMAP_SSP_SCR })) }, -, 3 * vc_eaCertificate.toBeSigned.validityPeriod.start_, valueof(m_duration_in_hours(PX_GENERATED_CERTIFICATE_DURATION)), -, v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
10180
10181
10182
10183
10184
10185
10186
10187
10188
10189
10190
10191
10192
10193
10194
10195
10196
10197
10198
10199
10200
// Test Body
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
10207
10208
10209
10210
10211
10212
10213
10214
10215
10216
10217
10218
10219
10220
10221
10222
10223
10224
10225
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, 1, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log(match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedrequest))));
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedrequest))) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Invalid InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse with deniedrequest received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
}
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
10227
10228
10229
10230
10231
10232
10233
10234
10235
10236
10237
10238
10239
10240
10241
10242
10243
10244
10245
10246
10247
10248
10249
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_11_BI
/**
* @desc Enroll the ITS-Station, but the lifetime of the EC would be grater than allowed (considering values in C-ITS CP)
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_12_BI() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct32 v_request_hash;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request_with_wrong_parameters({ valueof(m_appPermissions(c_its_aid_SCR, { bitmapSsp := PX_INNER_EC_CERTFICATE_BITMAP_SSP_SCR })) }, -, f_getCurrentTime() / 1000, valueof(m_duration_years(4)), -, v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
10268
10269
10270
10271
10272
10273
10274
10275
10276
10277
10278
10279
10280
10281
10282
10283
10284
10285
10286
10287
10288
// Test Body
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
10295
10296
10297
10298
10299
10300
10301
10302
10303
10304
10305
10306
10307
10308
10309
10310
10311
10312
10313
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, 1, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log(match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedrequest))));
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedrequest))) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Invalid InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse with deniedrequest received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
}
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
10315
10316
10317
10318
10319
10320
10321
10322
10323
10324
10325
10326
10327
10328
10329
10330
10331
10332
10333
10334
10335
10336
10337
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_12_BI
/**
* @desc Enroll the ITS-Station, but the inner PoP signature in the CSR, created with the EC private key, can not be verified with the provided public key
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_13_BI() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct32 v_request_hash;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request_with_wrong_parameters({ valueof(m_appPermissions(c_its_aid_SCR, { bitmapSsp := PX_INNER_EC_CERTFICATE_BITMAP_SSP_SCR })) }, -, f_getCurrentTime() / 1000, valueof(m_duration_in_hours(PX_GENERATED_CERTIFICATE_DURATION)), true, v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
10356
10357
10358
10359
10360
10361
10362
10363
10364
10365
10366
10367
10368
10369
10370
10371
10372
10373
10374
10375
10376
// Test Body
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
10383
10384
10385
10386
10387
10388
10389
10390
10391
10392
10393
10394
10395
10396
10397
10398
10399
10400
10401
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, 1, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log(match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), invalidsignature))));
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), invalidsignature))) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Invalid InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse with deniedrequest received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
}
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_13_BI
} // End of group ea_group enrolment_request_handling
// ETSI TS 103 525-2 V2.0.2 (2023-07) Clause 5.4.2 Enrollment response
group ea_enrolment_response {
10413
10414
10415
10416
10417
10418
10419
10420
10421
10422
10423
10424
10425
10426
10427
10428
10429
10430
10431
10432
10433
/**
* @desc The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved
* algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used
* by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* containing encKey
* containing an encrypted AES key (SYMKEY)
* }
* then {
* the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage
* containing cipherTex
* being encrypted using SYMKEY
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 TP SECPKI_EA_ENR_01_BV
10435
10436
10437
10438
10439
10440
10441
10442
10443
10444
10445
10446
10447
10448
10449
10450
10451
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.2.3.2.2
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_01_BV() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct32 v_request_hash;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request(v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
10470
10471
10472
10473
10474
10475
10476
10477
10478
10479
10480
10481
10482
10483
10484
10485
10486
10487
10488
10489
10490
// Test Body
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
10497
10498
10499
10500
10501
10502
10503
10504
10505
10506
10507
10508
10509
10510
10511
10512
10513
10514
10515
10516
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, -, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": LOG: Receive ", v_etsi_ts_102941_data, " ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": DEBUG: match ", match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data.content, mw_enrolmentResponse(mw_innerEcResponse_ok(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16)))), " ***"); // TODO In TITAN, this is the only way to get the unmatching in log
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data.content, mw_enrolmentResponse(mw_innerEcResponse_ok(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16))))) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Unexpected message received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
10523
10524
10525
10526
10527
10528
10529
10530
10531
10532
10533
10534
10535
10536
10537
10538
10539
10540
10541
10542
10543
10544
10545
10546
10547
10548
10549
10550
10551
10552
10553
10554
10555
10556
10557
10558
10559
10560
10561
10562
10563
/**
* @desc The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved
* algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used
* by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* containing encKey
* containing an encrypted AES key (SYMKEY)
* }
* then {
* the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage
* containing cipherTex
* being encrypted
* using SYMKEY
* and using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved algorithm
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 TP 22
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.2.3.2.2
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_02_BV() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct32 v_request_hash;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request(v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
10582
10583
10584
10585
10586
10587
10588
10589
10590
10591
10592
10593
10594
10595
10596
10597
10598
10599
10600
10601
10602
// Test Body
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
10609
10610
10611
10612
10613
10614
10615
10616
10617
10618
10619
10620
10621
10622
10623
10624
10625
10626
10627
10628
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, -, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": LOG: Receive ", v_etsi_ts_102941_data, " ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": DEBUG: match ", match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data.content, mw_enrolmentResponse(mw_innerEcResponse_ok(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16)))), " ***"); // TODO In TITAN, this is the only way to get the unmatching in log
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data.content, mw_enrolmentResponse(mw_innerEcResponse_ok(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16))))) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Unexpected message received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
10635
10636
10637
10638
10639
10640
10641
10642
10643
10644
10645
10646
10647
10648
10649
10650
10651
10652
10653
10654
10655
10656
10657
10658
10659
/**
* @desc The outermost structure is an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing
* the component recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice
* pskRecipInfo, which contains the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used by the
* ITS-S to encrypt the EnrolmentRequest message to which the response is built
* and containing the component ciphertext, once decrypted, contains an
* EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure
* containing recipients
* containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo
* containing the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used to encrypt the EnrolmentRequestMessage
* and containing cipherText
* being an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 TP SECPKI_EA_ENR_03_BV
10661
10662
10663
10664
10665
10666
10667
10668
10669
10670
10671
10672
10673
10674
10675
10676
10677
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.2.3.2.2
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_03_BV() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct32 v_request_hash;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request(v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
10723
10724
10725
10726
10727
10728
10729
10730
10731
10732
10733
10734
10735
10736
10737
10738
10739
10740
10741
10742
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, -, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": LOG: Receive ", v_etsi_ts_102941_data, " ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": DEBUG: match ", match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data.content, mw_enrolmentResponse(mw_innerEcResponse_ok(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16)))), " ***"); // TODO In TITAN, this is the only way to get the unmatching in log
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data.content, mw_enrolmentResponse(mw_innerEcResponse_ok(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16))))) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Unexpected message received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
10749
10750
10751
10752
10753
10754
10755
10756
10757
10758
10759
10760
10761
10762
10763
10764
10765
10766
10767
10768
10769
10770
10771
10772
10773
10774
10775
10776
10777
10778
/**
* @desc If the ITS-S has been able to decrypt the content, this expected EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure shall
* contain hashId, tbsData, signer and signature. The hashId shall indicate the hash algorithm to be used as
* specified in ETSI TS 103 097, the signer shall be declared as a digest, containing the HashedId8 of the
* EA certificate and the signature over tbsData shall be computed using the EA private key corresponding to
* its publicVerificationKey found in the referenced EA certificate.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure
* containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure
* containing hashId
* indicating the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097
* and containing tbsData
* and containing signer
* declared as a digest
* containing the HashedId8 of the EA certificate
* and containing signature
* computed over tbsData
* using the EA private key
* corresponding to the publicVerificationKey found in the referenced EA certificate
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 TP SECPKI_EA_ENR_04_BV
10780
10781
10782
10783
10784
10785
10786
10787
10788
10789
10790
10791
10792
10793
10794
10795
10796
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.2.3.2.2
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_04_BV() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct32 v_request_hash;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request(v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, -, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": LOG: Receive ", v_etsi_ts_102941_data, " ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": DEBUG: match ", match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data.content, mw_enrolmentResponse(mw_innerEcResponse_ok(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16)))), " ***"); // TODO In TITAN, this is the only way to get the unmatching in log
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data.content, mw_enrolmentResponse(mw_innerEcResponse_ok(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16))))) {
var HashedId8 v_ec_cert_hashed_id8;
if (f_verify_ec_certificate(v_etsi_ts_102941_data.content.enrolmentResponse.certificate, vc_eaCertificate, vc_eaHashedId8, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_ec_cert_hashed_id8) == false) {
10851
10852
10853
10854
10855
10856
10857
10858
10859
10860
10861
10862
10863
10864
10865
10866
10867
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Cannot verify EC certificate signature ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: Well-secured EA certificate received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
}
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Unexpected message received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
10874
10875
10876
10877
10878
10879
10880
10881
10882
10883
10884
10885
10886
10887
10888
10889
10890
10891
10892
10893
10894
10895
/**
* @desc Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, the psid shall be set to secured certificate request as assigned in
* ETSI TS 102 965 and the generationTime shall be present.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure
* containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure
* containing tbsData
* containing headerInfo
* containing psid
* indicating AID_CERT_REQ
* and containing generationTime
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 TP SECPKI_EA_ENR_05_BV
10897
10898
10899
10900
10901
10902
10903
10904
10905
10906
10907
10908
10909
10910
10911
10912
10913
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.2.3.2.2
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_05_BV() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct32 v_request_hash;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request(v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, -, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": LOG: Receive ", v_etsi_ts_102941_data, " ***");
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": DEBUG: match ", match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data.content, mw_enrolmentResponse(mw_innerEcResponse_ok(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16)))), " ***"); // TODO In TITAN, this is the only way to get the unmatching in log
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data.content, mw_enrolmentResponse(mw_innerEcResponse_ok(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16))))) {
var HashedId8 v_ec_cert_hashed_id8;
if (f_verify_ec_certificate(v_etsi_ts_102941_data.content.enrolmentResponse.certificate, vc_eaCertificate, vc_eaHashedId8, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_ec_cert_hashed_id8)) {
10968
10969
10970
10971
10972
10973
10974
10975
10976
10977
10978
10979
10980
10981
10982
10983
10984
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: Well-secured EC certificate received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Cannot verify EC certificate signature ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Unexpected message received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
/**
* @desc Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, aside from psid and generationTime,
* all other components of the component tbsData.headerInfo not used and absent.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }