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/**
* @desc If the EC expires, the IUT returns to the state 'initialized'.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the EC of the IUT expires
* }
* then {
* the IUT returns to the "initialized" state
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_05_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.1.3, 6.2.3.2.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_05_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_key_x;
var Oct32 v_public_key_y;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
/**
* @desc For each enrolment request, the ITS-S shall generate a new verification key pair
corresponding to an approved signature algorithm as specified in TS 103 097.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT and not PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send multiple EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* each EnrolmentRequestMessage
* contains a different and unique verification key pair within the InnerECRequest
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.1.3
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT or PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT and not PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
// Start components
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_itss());
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_pki());
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_itss() runs on ItsPkiItss system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var HashedId8 v_certificate_digest := int2oct(0, 8);
var EtsiTs103097Certificate v_certificate;
// Preamble
// Initial state: No CAM shall be emitted
geoNetworkingPort.clear;
tc_noac.start;
alt {
[] geoNetworkingPort.receive {
log("No CA message expected");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
[] tc_noac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: : INFO: No CA message received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Test Body
// Re-enrolment
for (var integer v_i := 0; v_i < PX_RE_ENROLMENT_COUNTER; v_i := v_i + 1) {
f_sendUtTriggerEnrolmentRequestPrimitive();
f_sleep(PX_RE_ENROLMENT_DELAY);
} // End of 'for' statement
tc_noac.start;
alt {
[] geoNetworkingPort.receive {
log("No CA message expected");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
[] tc_noac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: Enrolment trigger sent succesfully ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfDown_itss();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_itss
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_pki() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variable
var integer v_counter := 0;
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_request;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var InnerEcRequest v_inner_ec_request;
var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
var ListOfPublicVerificationKey v_generated_keys;
var integer v_result;
// Preamble
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_response", v_headers);
// Wait for the first enrolment response
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_at_http_request_from_iut(
mw_http_request(
mw_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
-,
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentRequestMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
{ *, mw_recipientInfo_certRecipInfo(mw_pKRecipientInfo(vc_eaHashedId8)), * },
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
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tc_ac.stop;
// Verify IUT response
f_verify_http_ec_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request, v_headers, v_inner_ec_request, v_inner_ec_response, v_response, v_result);
// Send response
if (isvalue(v_response)) {
httpPort.send(v_response);
}
// Set verdict
if (v_result == 0) {
v_generated_keys[v_counter] := v_inner_ec_request.publicKeys.verificationKey;
v_counter := v_counter + 1;
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_prDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify EA an EnrolmentRequestMessage ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
[] a_await_at_http_request_from_iut(
mw_http_request(
mw_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
-,
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentRequestMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
{ *, mw_recipientInfo_certRecipInfo(mw_pKRecipientInfo(vc_eaHashedId8)), * },
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
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tc_ac.stop;
// Verify IUT response
f_verify_http_ec_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request, v_headers, v_inner_ec_request, v_inner_ec_response, v_response, v_result);
// Send response
if (isvalue(v_response)) {
httpPort.send(v_response);
}
// Set verdict
if (v_result == 0) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": LOG: ", match(v_generated_keys, superset(v_inner_ec_request.publicKeys.verificationKey)), "***");
if (match(v_generated_keys, superset(v_inner_ec_request.publicKeys.verificationKey)) == true) {
v_generated_keys[v_counter] := v_inner_ec_request.publicKeys.verificationKey;
v_counter := v_counter + 1;
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_prDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Duplication of generated public keys ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify EA an EnrolmentRequestMessage ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
if (v_counter == PX_RE_ENROLMENT_COUNTER) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcRequest received with different key pairs ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_06_BV_pki
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/**
* @desc Within the InnerECRequest, the requestedSubjectAttributes shall not contain a certIssuePermissions field.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
* containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
* containing EtsiTs103097Data
* containing InnerECRequestSignedForPOP
* containing InnerEcRequest
* containing requestedSubjectAttributes
* not containing certIssuePermissions
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_07_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.2.3.2.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_07_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_key_x;
var Oct32 v_public_key_y;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
// Start components
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_01_BV_itss());
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_01_BV_pki());
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
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/**
* @desc In the headerInfo of the tbsData of the InnerECRequestSignedForPOP all other components
* of the component tbsdata.headerInfo except generationTime and psid are not used and absent.
* The psid shall be set to "secured certificate request" as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 and
* the generationTime shall be present.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
* containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
* containing EtsiTs103097Data
* containing InnerECRequestSignedForPOP
* containing tbsData
* containing headerInfo
* containing psid
* indicating AID_CERT_REQ
* and containing generationTime
* and not containing any other component of tbsdata.headerInfo
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_08_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.2.3.2.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_08_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
// Start components
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_01_BV_itss());
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_01_BV_pki());
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
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/**
* @desc In the headerInfo of the tbsData of the outer EtsiTs102941Data-Signed all other components
* of the component tbsdata.headerInfo except generationTime and psid are not used and absent.
* The psid shall be set to "secured certificate request" as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 and
* the generationTime shall be present.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
* containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
* containing EtsiTs103097Data
* containing InnerECRequestSignedForPOP
* containing tbsData
* containing headerInfo
* containing psid
* indicating AID_CERT_REQ
* and containing generationTime
* and not containing any other component of tbsdata.headerInfo
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.2.3.2.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_09_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
// Start components
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_01_BV_itss());
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_01_BV_pki());
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
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/**
* @desc The EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted containing the correctly encrypted ciphertext and a recipients
* component containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice certRecipInfo containing the
* hashedId8 of the EA certificate in recipientId and the encrypted data encryption key in encKey.
* The data encryption key is encrypted using the public key found in the EA certificate referenced
* in the recipientId.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
* containing recipients
* containing exactly one instance of RecipientInfo of choice certRecipInfo
* containing recipientId
* indicating the hashedId8
* referencing to the EA certificate
* containing encryptionKey (KEY)
* and containing encKey
* being a symmetric key (SYMKEY) encrypted using the key KEY
* containing ciphertext
* which is encrypted using the symmetric key SYMKEY contained in encKey
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_10_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.2.3.2.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_10_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
// Start components
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_01_BV_itss());
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_01_BV_pki());
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
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/**
* @desc In the inner signed data structure (InnerECRequestSignedForPOP), the signature is computed
* on InnerECRequest with the private key corresponding to the new verificationKey to prove
* possession of the generated verification key pair.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
* containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
* containing EtsiTs103097Data
* containing InnerECRequestSignedForPOP
* containing tbsData
* containing InnerEcRequest
* containing verificationKey (VKEY)
* containing signature
* computed on InnerECRequest
* using the private key corresponding to VKEY
* contained in InnerECRequest
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_11_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.2.3.2.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_11_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
// Start components
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_01_BV_itss());
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_01_BV_pki());
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
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/**
* @desc Check that signing of Enrolment HttpRequest message is permitted by the EC certificate.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT and PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted
* containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
* containing signer
* containing digest
* indicating HashedId8 of the EC certificate
* containing appPermissions
* containing an item of type PsidSsp
* containing psid
* indicating AID_CERT_REQ
* and containing ssp
* containing opaque[0] (version)
* indicating 1
* containing opaque[1] (value)
* indicating "Enrolment Request" (bit 1) set to 1
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_12_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.1.3, 6.2.3.2.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_12_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT or not PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT ) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT and PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
// Start components
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_03_BV_itss());
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_03_BV_pki());
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
* @desc If an enrolment request fails, the IUT returns to the state 'initialized'.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* and the EnrolmentResponseMessage is received
* containing a responseCode different than 0
* }
* then {
* the IUT returns to the "initialized" state
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_01_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.1.3, 6.2.3.2.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_01_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
// Start components
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_01_BV_itss());
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_01_BV_pki());
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_01_BV_itss() runs on ItsPkiItss system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var HashedId8 v_certificate_digest;
var EtsiTs103097Certificate v_certificate;
var boolean v_iut_state_ok := false;
// Test component configuration
vc_hashedId8ToBeUsed := PX_IUT_DEFAULT_CERTIFICATE;
f_cfUp_itss();
// Preamble
// Initial state: No CAM shall be emitted
geoNetworkingPort.clear;
tc_noac.start;
alt {
[] geoNetworkingPort.receive {
log("No CA message expected");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
[] tc_noac.timeout {
f_sendUtTriggerEnrolmentRequestPrimitive();
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: : INFO: No CA message received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
tc_ac.start; // TDOD To refined, use altstep
alt {
[] utPort.receive(UtPkiTriggerInd: { state := 0 }) {
tc_ac.stop;
v_iut_state_ok := true;
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: INFO: IUT is in initialized state ***");
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: DBG: IUT state update not recieved ***");
//f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
tc_noac.start;
alt {
[] geoNetworkingPort.receive {
log("No CA message expected");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
[] tc_noac.timeout {
if (v_iut_state_ok == true) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: : PASS: Enrolment trigger processed succesfully ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
} else {
log("Did not receive IUT state update");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
// Postamble
f_cfDown_itss();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_01_BV_itss
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_01_BV_pki() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variable
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Preamble
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_response", v_headers);
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_request_from_iut(
mw_http_request(
mw_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
-,
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentRequestMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
{ *, mw_recipientInfo_certRecipInfo(mw_pKRecipientInfo(vc_eaHashedId8)), * },
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
var HttpMessage v_response;
var integer v_result;
var InnerEcRequest v_inner_ec_request;
var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
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tc_ac.stop;
// Verify IUT response
f_verify_http_ec_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request, v_headers, v_inner_ec_request, v_inner_ec_response, v_response, v_result, -, -, cantparse);
// Send response forcing error code
if (isvalue(v_response)) {
httpPort.send(v_response);
}
// Set verdict
if (v_result == 0) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INFO: InnerEcRequest received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify EA an EnrolmentRequestMessage ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Test Body
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_01_BV_pki
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/**
* @desc The IUT is capable of parsing and handling of positive EnrolmentResponse messages
* containing the requested EC. In case of a successful enrolment, the IUT switches
* to the state 'enrolled'.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is requested to send an initial EnrolmentRequestMessage
* and when the IUT receives a subsequent EnrolmentResponseMessage as an answer of the EA
* containing a responseCode
* indicating 0
* and containing an enrolment certificate
* }
* then {
* the IUT switches to the "enrolled" state
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_02_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.1.3, 6.2.3.2.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_02_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_ENROLMENT required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_02_BV_itss());
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
// Cleanup
f_cfMtcDown01(v_itss, v_ea);
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_02_BV
group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_02_BV {
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_02_BV_itss() runs on ItsPkiItss system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var HashedId8 v_certificate_digest;
var EtsiTs103097Certificate v_certificate;
var boolean v_iut_state_ok := false;
// Test component configuration
vc_hashedId8ToBeUsed := PX_IUT_DEFAULT_CERTIFICATE;
f_cfUp_itss();
// Preamble
// Initial state: No CAM shall be emitted
geoNetworkingPort.clear;
tc_noac.start;
alt {
[] geoNetworkingPort.receive {
log("No CA message expected");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
[] tc_noac.timeout {
f_sendUtTriggerEnrolmentRequestPrimitive();
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: : INFO: No CA message received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
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// Test Body
tc_ac.start; // TDOD To refined, use altstep
alt {
[] utPort.receive(UtPkiTriggerInd: { state := 1 }) {
tc_ac.stop;
v_iut_state_ok := true;
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: INFO: IUT is in enrol state ***");
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: DBG: IUT state update not recieved ***");
//f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
tc_noac.start;
alt {
[] geoNetworkingPort.receive {
log("No CA message expected");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
[] tc_noac.timeout {
if (v_iut_state_ok == true) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & "_itss: : PASS: Enrolment trigger processed succesfully ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
} else {
log("Did not receive IUT state update");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfDown_itss();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_02_BV_itss
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_02_BV_pki() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variable
var Headers v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_request;
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Preamble
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_response", v_headers);
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_request_from_iut(
mw_http_request(
mw_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
-,
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentRequestMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
{ *, mw_recipientInfo_certRecipInfo(mw_pKRecipientInfo(vc_eaHashedId8)), * },
mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
var HttpMessage v_response;
var integer v_result;
var InnerEcRequest v_inner_ec_request;
var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
tc_ac.stop;
// Verify IUT response
f_verify_http_ec_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request, v_headers, v_inner_ec_request, v_inner_ec_response, v_response, v_result);
// Send response forcing error code
if (isvalue(v_response)) {
httpPort.send(v_response);
}
// Set verdict
if (v_result == 0) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INFO: InnerEcRequest received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify EA an EnrolmentRequestMessage ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Test Body
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_02_BV_pki
} // End of group itss_enrolment_response
group itss_authorization_request {
/**
* @desc Check that the ITS-S send the Authorization HttpRequest message to the Authorization Authority (AA) to request an authorization ticket.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION
* Initial conditions:
* with {
* the IUT being in the "operational state"
* }
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is triggered to requested a new Authorization Ticket (AT)
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3.0
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION required for executing the TC ***");