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Yann Garcia's avatar
Add support of splitted ATSs (e,g, make ATS=ATsPki.Itss or make ATS=AtsPki.Pki)
Yann Garcia committed
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       *         the IUT being in the "operational state"
       *             authorized with CERT_AA certificate
       *     }
       * Expected behaviour:
       *     ensure that {
       *         when {
       *             the IUT is triggered to requested a new Authorization Ticket (AT)
       *         }
       *         then {
       *             the IUT sends EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
       *                 containing content.encryptedData.recipients
       *                     indicating size 1
       *                     and containing the instance of RecipientInfo
       *                         containing certRecipInfo
       *                             containing recipientId
       *                                 indicating HashedId8 of the CERT_AA
       *         }
       *     }
       * </pre>
       * 
       * @see       ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_02_BV
       * @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3.1
       */
      testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_02_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
        // Local variables
        var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
        var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;

        // Test control
        if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION) {
          log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION required for executing the TC ***");
          setverdict(inconc);
          stop;
        }

        // Test component configuration
        f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);

        // Start component
        v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_itss());
        v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_pki());

        // Synchronization
        f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});

        // Cleanup
        f_cfMtcDown01(v_itss, v_ea);

      } // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_02_BV

      /**
       * @desc Check that the AuthorizationRequest message is encrypted using the encryptionKey found in the AA certificate referenced in recipientId.
       * <pre>
       * Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION
       * Initial conditions: 
       *     with {
       *         the IUT being in the "operational state"
       *             authorized with AA certificate
       *                 containing encryptionKey (AA_ENC_PUB_KEY)
       *     }
       * Expected behaviour:
       *     ensure that {
       *         when {
       *             the IUT is triggered to requested a new Authorization Ticket (AT)
       *         }
       *         then {
       *             the IUT sends EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
       *                 containing content.encryptedData
       *                     containing ciphertext
       *                         containing data
       *                             encrypted using AA_ENC_PUB_KEY
       *         }
       *     }
       * </pre>
       * 
       * @see       ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_03_BV
       * @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3.1
       */
      testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_03_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
        // Local variables
        var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
        var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;

        // Test control
        if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION) {
          log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION required for executing the TC ***");
          setverdict(inconc);
          stop;
        }

        // Test component configuration
        f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);

        // Start component
        v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_itss());
        v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_pki());

        // Synchronization
        f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});

        // Cleanup
        f_cfMtcDown01(v_itss, v_ea);

      } // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_03_BV

      /**
       * @desc Check that the AuthorizationRequest message is never reused the same encryption key and nonce.
       * <pre>
       * Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION
       * Initial conditions: 
       *     with {
       *         the IUT being in the "operational state"
       *     }
       * Expected behaviour:
       *     ensure that {
       *         when {
       *             the IUT is triggered to requested a new Authorization Ticket (AT)
       *         }
       *         then {
       *             the IUT sends EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
       *                 containing content.encryptedData
       *                     containing ciphertext.aes128Ccm.nonce
       *                         indicating value not equal to the nonce in N previous messages
       *                 and containing recipients[0].certRecipInfo.encKey
       *                     containing encrypted symmetric key (S_KEY)
       *                         indicating symmetric key not equal to the key was used in N previous messages
       *         }
       *     }
       * </pre>
       * 
       * @see       ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV
       * @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3.1
       */
      testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
        // Local variables
        var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
        var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;

        // Test control
        if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION) {
          log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION required for executing the TC ***");
          setverdict(inconc);
          stop;
        }

        // Test component configuration
        f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);

        // Start component
        v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV_itss());
        v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV_pki());

        // Synchronization
        f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});

        // Cleanup
        f_cfMtcDown01(v_itss, v_ea);

      } // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV

      group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV {

        function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV_itss() runs on ItsPkiItss system ItsPkiItssSystem {
          // Local variables
          var HashedId8               v_certificate_digest := int2oct(0, 8);
          var EtsiTs103097Certificate v_certificate;

          // Test component configuration
          f_cfUp_itss();

          // Test adapter configuration

          // Preamble
          // First enrolment
          geoNetworkingPort.clear;
          tc_ac.start;
          alt {
            [] a_await_cam_with_current_cert(v_certificate) {
              tc_ac.stop;

              if (PX_TRIGGER_EC_BEFORE_AT) {
                f_sendUtTriggerEnrolmentRequestPrimitive();
                f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
              }
            }
            [] geoNetworkingPort.receive(
                                         mw_geoNwInd(
                                                     mw_geoNwSecPdu(
                                                                    mw_etsiTs103097Data_signed
                                                                    ))) {
              repeat;
            }
            [] tc_ac.timeout {
              log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected CA message not received ***");
              f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_timeout);
            }
          } // End of 'alt' statement

          // Test Body
          // N authorization
          for (var integer v_i := 0; v_i < PX_RE_AUTHORIZATION_COUNTER; v_i := v_i + 1) {
            f_sendUtTriggerAuthorizationRequestPrimitive();
            f_sleep(PX_RE_AUTHORIZATION_DELAY);
          } // End of 'for' statement
          log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: Enrolment trigger sent succesfully ***");
          f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);

          // Postamble
          f_cfDown_itss();
        } // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV_itss

        function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV_pki() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiItssSystem {
          // Local variable
          var integer v_counter := 0;
          var Headers v_headers;
          var HttpMessage v_request;
          var HttpMessage v_response;
          var InnerAtRequest v_inner_at_request;
          var ListOfPublicVerificationKey v_generated_keys;
          var integer v_result;

          // Test component configuration
          f_cfHttpUp();

          // Test adapter configuration

          // Preamble
          /*f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_at_response", v_headers);
          // Wait for the first enrolment response
          tc_ac.start;
          alt {
            [] a_await_at_http_response_from_iut(
                                                 mw_http_request(
                                                                 mw_http_request_post(
                                                                                      PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
                                                                                      -,
                                                                                      mw_http_message_body_binary(
                                                                                                                  mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
                                                                                                                                                   mw_enrolmentRequestMessage(
                                                                                                                                                                              mw_encryptedData(
                                                                                                                                                                                               { *, mw_recipientInfo_pskRecipInfo(vc_aaHashedId8), * },
                                                                                                                                                                                               mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
                                                                                                                                                                                               )))))),
                                                 v_request
                                                 ) {
              tc_ac.stop;

              // Verify IUT response
              f_verify_http_at_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request, v_request.headers, v_inner_at_request, v_response, v_result);
              // Send response
              if (isvalue(v_response)) {
                httpPort.send(v_response);
              }
              // Set verdict
              if (v_result == 0) {
                v_generated_keys[v_counter] := v_inner_at_request.publicKeys.verificationKey;
                v_counter := v_counter + 1;
                f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_prDone, e_success);
              } else {
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify EA an EnrolmentRequestMessage ***");
                f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
              }
            }
            [] tc_ac.timeout {
              log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
              f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_timeout);
            }
          } // End of 'alt' statement

          // Test Body
          tc_ac.start;
          alt {
            [] a_await_at_http_response_from_iut(
                                                 mw_http_request(
                                                                 mw_http_request_post(
                                                                                      PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_AT,
                                                                                      -,
                                                                                      mw_http_message_body_binary(
                                                                                                                  mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
                                                                                                                                                   mw_enrolmentRequestMessage(
                                                                                                                                                                              mw_encryptedData(
                                                                                                                                                                                               { *, mw_recipientInfo_pskRecipInfo(vc_aaHashedId8), * },
                                                                                                                                                                                               mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
                                                                                                                                                                                               )))))),
                                                 v_request
                                                 ) {
              tc_ac.stop;

              // Verify IUT response
              f_verify_http_at_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request, v_request.headers, v_inner_at_request, v_response, v_result);
              // Send response
              if (isvalue(v_response)) {
                httpPort.send(v_response);
              }
              // Set verdict
              if (v_result == 0) {
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": LOG: ", match(v_generated_keys, superset(v_inner_at_request.publicKeys.verificationKey)), "***");
                if (match(v_generated_keys, superset(v_inner_at_request.publicKeys.verificationKey))) {
                  v_generated_keys[v_counter] := v_inner_at_request.publicKeys.verificationKey;
                  v_counter := v_counter + 1;
                  f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_prDone, e_success);
                } else {
                  log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Duplication of generated public keys ***");
                  f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
                }
              } else {
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify EA an EnrolmentRequestMessage ***");
                f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
              }
            }
            [] tc_ac.timeout {
              if (v_counter == PX_RE_AUTHORIZATION_COUNTER) {
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerAtRequest received with different key pairs ***");
                f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
              } else {
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
                f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
              }
            }
          } // End of 'alt' statement
          */
          // Postamble
          f_cfHttpDown();
        } // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV_pki

      } // End of group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV

      /**
       * @desc Check that the Authozation request protocol version is set to 1.
       * <pre>
       * Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION
       * Initial conditions: 
       *     with {
       *         the IUT being in the "operational state"
       *     }
       * Expected behaviour:
       *     ensure that {
       *         when {
       *             the IUT is triggered to requested a new Authorization Ticket (AT)
       *         }
       *         then {
       *             the IUT sends EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
       *                 containing version
       *                     indicating value 1
       *                 and containing content
       *                     containing autihorizationRequest
       *         }
       *     }
       * </pre>
       * 
       * @see       ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_05_BV
       * @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3.1
       */
      testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_05_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
        // Local variables
        var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
        var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;

        // Test control
        if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION) {
          log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION required for executing the TC ***");
          setverdict(inconc);
          stop;
        }

        // Test component configuration
        f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);

        // Start component
        v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_itss());
        v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_pki());

        // Synchronization
        f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});

        // Cleanup
        f_cfMtcDown01(v_itss, v_ea);

      } // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_05_BV

      /**
       * @desc Check that for each authorization request the ITS-S generates a new verification key pair
       *       Check that for each authorization request the ITS-S generates a new encryption key pair
       *       Check that for each authorization request the ITS-S generates a new hmac-key
       * <pre>
       * Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION
       * Initial conditions: 
       *     with {
       *         the IUT in 'enrolled' state
       *         the IUT being in the "operational state"
       *     }
       * Expected behaviour:
       *     ensure that {
       *         when {
       *             the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT)
       *         }
       *         then {
       *             the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
	     *	            containing EtsiTs102941Data
	     *		            containing authorizationRequest
	     *			            containing publicKeys
       *                    containing verificationKey
	     *					            indicating value not equal to the field verificationKey of N previous messages
	     *				            and not containing encryptionKey
	     *				            or containing encryptionKey
	     *					            indicating value not equal to the field encryptionKey of N previous messages
	     *			            and containing hmacKey
	     *				            indicating value not equal to the field hmacKey of N previous messages
       *         }
       *     }
       * </pre>
       * 
       * @see       ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_06_BV
       * @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3.1
       */
      testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_06_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
        // Local variables
        var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
        var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;

        // Test control
        if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION) {
          log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION required for executing the TC ***");
          setverdict(inconc);
          stop;
        }

        // Test component configuration
        f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);

        // Start component
        v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_06_BV_itss());
        v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_06_BV_pki());

        // Synchronization
        f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});

        // Cleanup
        f_cfMtcDown01(v_itss, v_ea);

      } // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_06_BV

      group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_06_BV {

        function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_06_BV_itss() runs on ItsPkiItss system ItsPkiItssSystem {
          // Local variables
          var HashedId8               v_certificate_digest := int2oct(0, 8);
          var EtsiTs103097Certificate v_certificate;

          // Test component configuration
          f_cfUp_itss();

          // Test adapter configuration

          // Preamble
          // First enrolment
          geoNetworkingPort.clear;
          tc_ac.start;
          alt {
            [] a_await_cam_with_current_cert(v_certificate) {
              tc_ac.stop;

              if (PX_TRIGGER_EC_BEFORE_AT) {
                f_sendUtTriggerEnrolmentRequestPrimitive();
                f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
              }
            }
            [] geoNetworkingPort.receive(
                                         mw_geoNwInd(
                                                     mw_geoNwSecPdu(
                                                                    mw_etsiTs103097Data_signed
                                                                    ))) {
              repeat;
            }
            [] tc_ac.timeout {
              log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected CA message not received ***");
              f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_timeout);
            }
          } // End of 'alt' statement

          // Test Body
          // N authorization
          for (var integer v_i := 0; v_i < PX_RE_AUTHORIZATION_COUNTER; v_i := v_i + 1) {
            f_sendUtTriggerAuthorizationRequestPrimitive();
            f_sleep(PX_RE_AUTHORIZATION_DELAY);
          } // End of 'for' statement
          log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: Enrolment trigger sent succesfully ***");
          f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);

          // Postamble
          f_cfDown_itss();
        } // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV_itss

        function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_06_BV_pki() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiItssSystem {
          // Local variable
          var Headers v_headers;

          // Test component configuration
          f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);

          // Test adapter configuration

          // Preamble
          f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_at_response", v_headers);
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Implement TPs SECPKI_AA_AUTH_11..13_BV  
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          f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
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Add support of splitted ATSs (e,g, make ATS=ATsPki.Itss or make ATS=AtsPki.Pki)
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          // Test body
          // Wait for the first authorization response
          
          for (var integer v_i := 0; v_i < PX_RE_AUTHORIZATION_COUNTER; v_i := v_i + 1) {
            var HttpMessage v_request;
            var HttpMessage v_response;
            var InnerAtResponse v_inner_at_response;
            var ListOfPublicVerificationKey v_generated_keys;
            var ListOfPublicEncryptionKey v_enc_keys;
            var ListofHmacKey v_hmac_keys;
            var InnerAtRequest v_inner_at_request;
            var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
            var integer v_result;
            var PublicVerificationKey v_key;
            var PublicEncryptionKey v_enc_key;
            var Oct32 v_hmac_key;
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Add support of splitted ATSs (e,g, make ATS=ATsPki.Itss or make ATS=AtsPki.Pki)
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            // Verify IUT response
            f_verify_http_at_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request, v_headers, v_inner_ec_response.certificate, v_inner_at_request, v_inner_at_response, v_response, v_result);
            if(v_result != 0){
              log("*** " & testcasename() & ": ERROR: AT request receiving error ***");
              setverdict(inconc);
              f_clientSync(c_nextTry, e_error);
            }
            
            v_key := v_inner_at_request.publicKeys.verificationKey;
Yann Garcia's avatar
Add support of splitted ATSs (e,g, make ATS=ATsPki.Itss or make ATS=AtsPki.Pki)
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            if (isbound(v_generated_keys) and match(v_generated_keys, superset(v_key))) {
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": LOG: ", match(v_generated_keys, superset(v_key)), "***");
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Duplication of generated verification keys ***");
                setverdict(fail);
                f_clientSync(c_nextTry, e_error);
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              }
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            v_generated_keys[v_i] := v_key;
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            v_enc_key := v_inner_at_request.publicKeys.encryptionKey;
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            if (isbound(v_enc_key) and match(v_enc_keys, superset(v_enc_key))) {
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": LOG: ", match(v_enc_keys, superset(v_enc_key)), "***");
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Duplication of generated encryption keys ***");
                setverdict(fail);
                f_clientSync(c_nextTry, e_error);
              }
            v_enc_keys[v_i] := v_enc_key;
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            v_hmac_key := v_inner_at_request.hmacKey;
  
            if (isbound(v_hmac_keys) and match(v_hmac_keys, superset(v_hmac_key))) {
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": LOG: ", match(v_hmac_keys, superset(v_hmac_key)), "***");
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Duplication of generated hmac keys ***");
                setverdict(fail);
                f_clientSync(c_nextTry, e_error);
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              }
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            v_hmac_keys[v_i] := v_hmac_key;
            f_clientSync(c_nextTry, e_success);
          }
          log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: No identical keys received in " & int2str(PX_RE_AUTHORIZATION_COUNTER) & " messages ***");
          f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
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          // Postamble
          f_cfHttpDown();
        } // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_06_BV_pki

      } // End of group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_06_BV

      /**
       * @desc Check that ITS-S sends Authorization request with a keyTag field computed as described in ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.3.1
       * <pre>
       * Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION
       * Initial conditions: 
       *     with {
       *         the IUT in 'enrolled' state
       *         the IUT being in the "operational state"
       *     }
       * Expected behaviour:
       *     ensure that {
       *         when {
       *             the IUT is triggered to request a new Authorization Ticket (AT)
       *         }
       *         then {
       *             the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
       *	            containing EtsiTs102941Data
       *		            containing authorizationRequest
       *			            containing sharedAtRequest
       *                    containing keyTag
       *					            indicating properly calculated value
       *         }
       *     }
       * </pre>
       * 
       * @see       ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_07_BV
       * @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3.1
       */
      testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_07_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
        // Local variables
        var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
        var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;

        // Test control
        if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION) {
          log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION required for executing the TC ***");
          setverdict(inconc);
          stop;
        }

        // Test component configuration
        f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);

        // Start component
        v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_itss());
        v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_pki());

        // Synchronization
        f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});

        // Cleanup
        f_cfMtcDown01(v_itss, v_ea);

      } // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_07_BV

      /**
       * @desc Check that ITS-S sends Authorization request with eaId of EA certificate
       * <pre>
       * Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION
       * Initial conditions: 
       *     with {
       *         the IUT is enrolled by the EC, signed with the CERT EA certificate
       *         the IUT being in the "operational" state
       *     }
       * Expected behaviour:
       *     ensure that {
       *         when {
       *             the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT)
       *         }
       *         then {
       *             the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
       *	                containing EtsiTs102941Data
       *		                 containing authorizationRequest
       *			                  containing sharedAtRequest
       *                          containing eaId
       *					                  indicating HashedId8 of CERT_ EA certificate
       *         }
       *     }
       * </pre>
       * 
       * @see       ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_08_BV
       * @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3.1
       */
      testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_08_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
        // Local variables
        var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
        var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;

        // Test control
        if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION) {
          log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION required for executing the TC ***");
          setverdict(inconc);
          stop;
        }

        // Test component configuration
        f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);

        // Start component
        v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_itss());
        v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_08_BV_pki());

        // Synchronization
        f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});

        // Cleanup
        f_cfMtcDown01(v_itss, v_ea);

      } // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_08_BV

      group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_08_BV {

        function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_08_BV_pki() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiItssSystem {
          // Local variable
          var Headers v_headers;
          var HttpMessage v_request;
          var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
          var InnerEcRequest v_inner_ec_request;

          // Test component configuration
          f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);

          // Test adapter configuration

          // Preamble
          f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_at_response", v_headers);
          if (PX_TRIGGER_EC_BEFORE_AT) {
            if (f_await_ec_request_send_response(v_inner_ec_request, v_inner_ec_response, v_request) == true) {
              log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INFO: Enrolment succeed ***");
              f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
            } else {
              log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Enrolment failed ***");
              f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_timeout);
            }
          } else {
            f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
          }

          // Test Body
          tc_ac.start;
          alt {
            [] a_await_at_http_request_from_iut(
                                                mw_http_request(
                                                                mw_http_request_post(
                                                                                      PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_AT,
                                                                                      -,
                                                                                      mw_http_message_body_binary(
                                                                                                                  mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
                                                                                                                                                  mw_enrolmentRequestMessage(
                                                                                                                                                                              mw_encryptedData(
                                                                                                                                                                                              { *, mw_recipientInfo_certRecipInfo(mw_pKRecipientInfo(vc_aaHashedId8)), * },
                                                                                                                                                                                              mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
                                                                                                                                                                                              )))))),
                                                v_request
                                                ) {
              var HttpMessage v_response;
              var integer v_result;
              var InnerAtRequest v_inner_at_request;
              var InnerAtResponse v_inner_at_response;

              tc_ac.stop;

              // Verify IUT response
              f_verify_http_at_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request, v_headers, v_inner_ec_response.certificate, v_inner_at_request, v_inner_at_response, v_response, v_result);
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              log("f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_08_BV_pki: v_result: ", v_result);
              log("f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_08_BV_pki: v_response: ", v_response);
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              var charstring v_ea_certificate_id := "CERT_TS_A_EA";
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              var octetstring v_hash;
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              var HashedId8 v_ea_certificate_hashed_id8;
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              var EtsiTs103097Certificate v_ea_certificate;

              // Calculate the HashedId8 of CERT_ EA certificate
              var HashAlgorithm hash := f_getHashAlgorithm(v_ea_certificate.issuer)

              if (hash == sha256){
                f_getCertificateHash256(v_ea_certificate_id, v_hash);
                v_ea_certificate_hashed_id8 := f_hashedId8FromSha256(v_hash);
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": DEBUG: v_ea_certificate_hashed_id8= ", v_ea_certificate_hashed_id8);
              } else if (hash == sha384) {
                v_hash := f_hashWithSha384(bit2oct(encvalue(v_ea_certificate)));
                v_ea_certificate_hashed_id8 := f_hashedId8FromSha384(v_hash);
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": DEBUG: v_ea_certificate_hashed_id8= ", v_ea_certificate_hashed_id8);
              }
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              // Set verdict
              if (v_result == 0) {
                var octetstring v_msg;
                var octetstring v_hashed_id8;
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                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerAtResponse received ***");
                if(ispresent(v_inner_at_request.sharedAtRequest.eaId)){
                  if (match(v_inner_at_request.sharedAtRequest.eaId, v_ea_certificate_hashed_id8) == true) {
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                    v_msg := bit2oct(encvalue(v_inner_at_response.certificate));
                    if (ischosen(v_inner_at_response.certificate.toBeSigned.verifyKeyIndicator.verificationKey.ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1)) {
                      v_hashed_id8 := f_hashedId8FromSha384(f_hashWithSha384(v_msg));
                    } else {
                      v_hashed_id8 := f_hashedId8FromSha256(f_hashWithSha256(v_msg));
                    }
                    infoPort.send(InfoPortData : { hashed_id8 := v_hashed_id8, at_certificate := v_inner_at_response.certificate });
                    f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
                  } else {
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                    log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: eaId is not equal to the EA_CERT HashedId8 ***");
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                    f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
                  }
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              } else {
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Can't parse authorization request ***");
                f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
              }}}
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            [] tc_ac.timeout {
              log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
              f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
            }
          } // End of 'alt' statement

          // Postamble
          f_cfHttpDown();
        } // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_08_BV_pki

      } // End of group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_08_BV  

      /**
       * @desc Check that ITS-S sends Authorization request with the certificateFormat equal to 1
       * <pre>
       * Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION
       * Initial conditions: 
       *     with {
       *         the IUT in 'enrolled' state
       *         and the AA in 'operational' state
       *     }
       * Expected behaviour:
       *     ensure that {
       *         when {
       *             the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT)
       *         }
       *         then {
       *             the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
       *	                containing EtsiTs102941Data
       *		                 containing authorizationRequest
       *			                  containing sharedAtRequest
       *                          containing certificateFormat
       *					                     indicating 1
       *         }
       *     }
       * </pre>
       * 
       * @see       ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_09_BV
       * @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3.1
       */
      testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_09_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
        // Local variables
        var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
        var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;

        // Test control
        if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION) {
          log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION required for executing the TC ***");
          setverdict(inconc);
          stop;
        }

        // Test component configuration
        f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);

        // Start component
        v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_itss());
        v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_09_BV_pki());

        // Synchronization
        f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});

        // Cleanup
        f_cfMtcDown01(v_itss, v_ea);
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      } // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_09_BV
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      group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_09_BV {

        function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_09_BV_pki() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiItssSystem {
          // Local variable
          var Headers v_headers;
          var HttpMessage v_request;
          var InnerEcResponse v_inner_ec_response;
          var InnerEcRequest v_inner_ec_request;

          // Test component configuration
          f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);

          // Test adapter configuration

          // Preamble
          f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_at_response", v_headers);
          if (PX_TRIGGER_EC_BEFORE_AT) {
            if (f_await_ec_request_send_response(v_inner_ec_request, v_inner_ec_response, v_request) == true) {
              log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INFO: Enrolment succeed ***");
              f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
            } else {
              log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Enrolment failed ***");
              f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_timeout);
            }
          } else {
            f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
          }

          // Test Body
          tc_ac.start;
          alt {
            [] a_await_at_http_request_from_iut(
                                                mw_http_request(
                                                                mw_http_request_post(
                                                                                      PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_AT,
                                                                                      -,
                                                                                      mw_http_message_body_binary(
                                                                                                                  mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
                                                                                                                                                  mw_enrolmentRequestMessage(
                                                                                                                                                                              mw_encryptedData(
                                                                                                                                                                                              { *, mw_recipientInfo_certRecipInfo(mw_pKRecipientInfo(vc_aaHashedId8)), * },
                                                                                                                                                                                              mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
                                                                                                                                                                                              )))))),
                                                v_request
                                                ) {
              var HttpMessage v_response;
              var integer v_result;
              var InnerAtRequest v_inner_at_request;
              var InnerAtResponse v_inner_at_response;

              tc_ac.stop;

              // Verify IUT response
              f_verify_http_at_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request, v_headers, v_inner_ec_response.certificate, v_inner_at_request, v_inner_at_response, v_response, v_result);
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              log("f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_09_BV_pki: v_result: ", v_result);
              log("f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_09_BV_pki: v_response: ", v_response);
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              // Set verdict
              if (v_result == 0) {
                var octetstring v_msg;
                var octetstring v_hashed_id8;
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                if(ispresent(v_inner_at_request.sharedAtRequest.certificateFormat)){
                  if (v_inner_at_request.sharedAtRequest.certificateFormat == 1) {
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                    log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerAtResponse received ***");
                    v_msg := bit2oct(encvalue(v_inner_at_response.certificate));
                    if (ischosen(v_inner_at_response.certificate.toBeSigned.verifyKeyIndicator.verificationKey.ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1)) {
                      v_hashed_id8 := f_hashedId8FromSha384(f_hashWithSha384(v_msg));
                    } else {
                      v_hashed_id8 := f_hashedId8FromSha256(f_hashWithSha256(v_msg));
                    }
                    infoPort.send(InfoPortData : { hashed_id8 := v_hashed_id8, at_certificate := v_inner_at_response.certificate });
                    f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
                  } else {
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                  log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: certificateFormat is not equal to 1 ***");
                  f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
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                  }
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              } else {
                log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Can't parse authorization request ***");
                f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_error);
              }}}
Yann Garcia's avatar
Add support of splitted ATSs (e,g, make ATS=ATsPki.Itss or make ATS=AtsPki.Pki)
Yann Garcia committed
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            [] tc_ac.timeout {
              log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
              f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
            }
          } // End of 'alt' statement

          // Postamble
          f_cfHttpDown();
        } // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_09_BV_pki

      } // End of group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_09_BV  

      /**
       * @desc Check that ITS-S sends Authorization request certificate attributes are properly set
       * <pre>
       * Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION
       * Initial conditions: 
       *     with {
       *         the IUT in 'enrolled' state
       *         and the AA in 'operational' state
       *     }
       * Expected behaviour:
       *     ensure that {
       *         when {
       *             the IUT is triggered to request new Authorization Ticket (AT)
       *         }
       *         then {
       *             the IUT sends a EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
       *	              containing EtsiTs102941Data
       *		               containing authorizationRequest
       *			                containing sharedAtRequest
       *                          containing requestedSubjectAttributes
       *					                   containing appPermissions
       *                             and not containing certIssuePermissions
       *         }
       *     }
       * </pre>
       * 
       * @see       ETSI TS 103 525-2 v2.0.1 SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_10_BV
       * @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3.1
       */
      testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_10_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiItssSystem {
        // Local variables
        var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
        var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;

        // Test control
        if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION) {
          log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION required for executing the TC ***");
          setverdict(inconc);
          stop;
        }

        // Test component configuration
        f_cfMtcUp01(v_itss, v_ea);

        // Start component
        v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_itss());
        v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_10_BV_pki());

        // Synchronization
        f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});

        // Cleanup
        f_cfMtcDown01(v_itss, v_ea);

      } // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_08_BV

      group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_10_BV {
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