v2025

Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)

  standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609)

  dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-6(6)}

  dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-7(7)}

DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN

 * ToBeSignedData, concatenated with the hash of the omitted payload. The hash

 * of the omitted payload is calculated with the same hash algorithm that is 

 * used to calculate the hash of the data input for signing or verification. 

 * The data input to the hash operation is simply the COER enocding of the 

 * The data input to the hash operation is simply the COER encoding of the 

 * ToBeSignedData, concatenated with the hash of the omitted payload: there is

 * no additional wrapping or length indication. As noted in 5.2.4.3.4, the 

 * means by which the signer and verifier establish the contents of the 

 * omitted payload are out of scope for this standard.

 * omitted payload are outside the scope of this standard.

 *

 * @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization 

 * for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization 

 * structure contains at least one of the optional elements, and may contain 

 * more than one. See 5.2.4.3.4 for more details.

 * The security profile in Annex C allows an implementation of this standard 

 * to state which forms of Signed¬Data¬Payload are supported by that 

 * to state which forms of SignedDataPayload are supported by that 

 * implementation, and also how the signer and verifier are intended to obtain

 * the external data for hashing. The specification of an SDEE that uses 

 * external data is expected to be explicit and unambiguous about how this 

 * transported within the structure, and which the creator of the structure 

 * wishes to cryptographically bind to the signature. 

 *

 * @param omitted: indicates that there is external data to be included in the

 * hash calculation for the signature.The mechanism for including the external

 * @param omitted: indicates that there is data to be included in the hash

 * calculation for the signature that is not included in the SPDU, either in

 * data or by use of the extDataHash. The mechanism for including the omitted

 * data in the hash calculation is specified in 6.3.6.

 *

 * @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization 

}

/**

 * @brief This structure contains information that is used to establish

 * @brief This structure contains the following information that is used to establish

 * validity by the criteria of 5.2.

 *

 * @param psid: indicates the application area with which the sender is

 * contributing organization. In this version of this standard two values are

 * defined: 

 *   - ieee1609OriginatingExtensionId indicating extensions originating with 

 * IEEE 1609.

 * IEEE Std 1609.

 *   - etsiOriginatingExtensionId indicating extensions originating with 

 * ETSI TC ITS.

 */

 * @param certificate: If the choice indicated is certificate:

 *   - The structure contains one or more Certificate structures, in order

 * such that the first certificate is the authorization certificate and each

 * subsequent certificate is the issuer of the one before it.

 * subsequent certificate is the issuer of the one before it. The certificate

 * chain may be of any length. It should not include the root CA certificate

 * (as the receiving SDS is assumed to know all valid root CAs already).

 *   - The verification type is certificate and the certificate data

 * passed to the hash function as specified in 5.3.1 is the authorization

 * certificate.

      tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {..., 

        payload (WITH COMPONENTS {..., 

          data ABSENT,

          extDataHash PRESENT

          extDataHash PRESENT,

          omitted ABSENT

        }),

        headerInfo(WITH COMPONENTS {..., 

          generationTime PRESENT,

 * selected if the EncryptedData was encrypted using the static encryption

 * key approach specified in 5.3.4. The other options are selected if the

 * EncryptedData was encrypted using the ephemeral encryption key approach

 * specified in 5.3.4. The meanings of the choices are:

 *

 * See Annex C.7 for guidance on when it may be appropriate to use

 * each of these approaches.

 * specified in 5.3.4. The meanings of the choices are as follows:

 *

 * @param pskRecipInfo: The data was encrypted directly using a pre-shared 

 * symmetric key.

 * parameter P1 and so no input to the encryption process that uses the hash 

 * of the empty string.

 *

 * See C.8 for guidance on when it may be appropriate to use each of these

 * approaches.

 *

 * @note The material input to encryption is the bytes of the encryption key 

 * with no headers, encapsulation, or length indication. Contrast this to 

 * encryption of data, where the data is encapsulated in an Ieee1609Dot2Data.

--***************************************************************************--

/**

 * @brief This structure is a profile of the structure CertificateBase which

 * @brief This structure is a profile of the structure CertificateBase, which

 * specifies the valid combinations of fields to transmit implicit and

 * explicit certificates.

 *

 * @param signature: is included in an ExplicitCertificate. It is the

 * signature, calculated by the signer identified in the issuer field, over

 * the hash of toBeSigned. The hash is calculated as specified in 5.3.1, where:

 *   - Data input is the encoding of toBeSigned following the COER.

 *   - Data input is the encoding of toBeSigned, canonicalized as described

 * next.

 *   - Signer identifier input depends on the verification type, which in

 * turn depends on the choice indicated by issuer. If the choice indicated by

 * issuer is self, the verification type is self-signed and the signer

 * @brief The fields in the ToBeSignedCertificate structure have the

 * following meaning:

 *

 * For both implicit and explicit certificates, when the certificate

 * is hashed to create or recover the public key (in the case of an implicit

 * certificate) or to generate or verify the signature (in the case of an

 * explicit certificate), the hash is Hash (Data input) || Hash (

 * Signer identifier input), where:

 *   - Data input is the COER encoding of toBeSigned, canonicalized

 * as described above.

 *   - Signer identifier input depends on the verification type,

 * which in turn depends on the choice indicated by issuer. If the choice

 * indicated by issuer is self, the verification type is self-signed and the

 * signer identifier input is the empty string. If the choice indicated by

 * issuer is not self, the verification type is certificate and the signer

 * identifier input is the COER encoding of the canonicalization per 6.4.3 of

 * the certificate indicated by issuer.

 *

 * In other words, for implicit certificates, the value H (CertU) in SEC 4,

 * section 3, is for purposes of this standard taken to be H [H

 * (canonicalized ToBeSignedCertificate from the subordinate certificate) ||

 * @param validityPeriod: contains the validity period of the certificate.

 *

 * @param region: if present, indicates the validity region of the

 * certificate. If it is omitted the validity region is indicated as follows:

 *   - If enclosing certificate is self-signed, i.e., the choice indicated

 * certificate. If it is omitted the validity region is determined as follows:

 *   - If the enclosing certificate is self-signed, i.e., the choice indicated

 * by the issuer field in the enclosing certificate structure is self, the

 * certificate is valid worldwide.

 *   - Otherwise, the certificate has the same validity region as the

 * certificate that issued it.

 *

 * The above algorithm is applied recursively, i.e. if region is omitted from

 * the issuing certificate, then the issuing certificate of that certificate is

 * inspected to determine if region is present, and so on. A certificate,

 * therefore, has global geographic validity as defined in 5.2.6.6.3.1 if

 * region is not present in the certificate or in any certificate in its chain.

 * Otherwise, i.e., if region is present in the certificate or in at least one

 * certificate in its chain, the certificate has area validity as defined in

 * 5.2.6.6.3.1.

 *

 * The use of the validity region to determine geographic consistency of an

 * SPDU is specified in 5.2.6.6.3.1. The use of the validity region to

 * determine geographic consistency of a subordinate certificate with an

 * issuing certificate is specified in 5.1.2.4.

 *

 * @param assuranceLevel: indicates the assurance level of the certificate

 * holder.

 *

 * Further material about the compact unified butterfly key response can be 

 * found in IEEE Std 1609.2.1.

 *

 * If this field is present, at least one of the bits in the field shall be

 * non-zero.

 *

 * @note usesCubk is only relevant for CA certificates, and the only 

 * functionality defined associated with this field is associated with 

 * consistency checks on received certificate responses. No functionality 

 * to application activities that the certificate holder is carrying out. 

 *

 * @param certIssueExtensions: indicates additional permissions to issue 

 * certificates containing endEntityExtensions. 

 * certificates containing appExtensions. 

 *

 * @param certRequestExtensions: indicates additional permissions to request 

 * certificates containing endEntityExtensions.

 *

 * @note In IEEE Std 1609.2-2022 these were not marked optional; they are in

 * this version of the standard; this is technically not backwards compatible

 * but in practice there are no scenarios in which a legacy system will break

 * (because it would have to be the case that Issue or Request was included and

 * App wasn't, but no issue or request extension values are currently defined).

 * 

 * @note Issue and Request extensions are specified in this version of this

 * standard for future use but do not currently have any values defined. The

 * only certificate extension defined is OperatingOrganizationId and that can

 * be issued by any CA. It can be taken as likely that future appExtensions

 * will also be issuable by any CA, as otherwise consistency rules will differ

 * between appExtensions, and so in practice these certIssueExtensions and

 * certRequestExtensions fields will never be use. See Annex G for discussion

 * of how the standard could in principle be extended to include extensions

 * that do have a need to be validated up the chain.

 *

 * @note Calculating the hash of a certificate:

 * For both implicit and explicit certificates, when the certificate

 * is hashed to create or recover the public key (in the case of an implicit

 * certificate) or to generate or verify the signature (in the case of an

 * explicit certificate), the hash is Hash (Data input) || Hash (

 * Signer identifier input), where:

 *   - Data input is the COER encoding of toBeSigned, canonicalized

 * as described above.

 *   - Signer identifier input depends on the verification type,

 * which in turn depends on the choice indicated by issuer. If the choice

 * indicated by issuer is self, the verification type is self-signed and the

 * signer identifier input is the empty string. If the choice indicated by

 * issuer is not self, the verification type is certificate and the signer

 * identifier input is the COER encoding of the canonicalization per 6.4.3 of

 * the certificate indicated by issuer.

 *

 *

 * @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization 

 * for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization 

 * applies to the PublicEncryptionKey and to the VerificationKeyIndicator.

  verifyKeyIndicator     VerificationKeyIndicator,

  ...,

  flags                  BIT STRING {usesCubk (0)} (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL,

  appExtensions          SequenceOfAppExtensions,

  certIssueExtensions    SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions,

  certRequestExtension   SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions

  appExtensions          SequenceOfAppExtensions OPTIONAL,

  certIssueExtensions    SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions OPTIONAL,

  certRequestExtension   SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions OPTIONAL

}

(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., appPermissions PRESENT} |

 WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certIssuePermissions PRESENT} |

 * Different instances of PsidGroupPermissions within a ToBeSignedCertificate

 * may have different values for eeType.

 *   - If this field indicates app, the chain is allowed to end in an 

 * authorization certificate, i.e., a certficate in which these permissions 

 * authorization certificate, i.e., a certificate in which these permissions 

 * appear in an appPermissions field (in other words, if the field does not 

 * indicate app and the chain ends in an authorization certificate, the 

 * chain shall be considered invalid).

 *   - If this field indicates enroll, the chain is allowed to end in an 

 * enrollment certificate, i.e., a certificate in which these permissions 

 * appear in a certReqPermissions permissions field (in other words, if the 

 * appear in a certRequestPermissions permissions field (in other words, if the 

 * field does not indicate enroll and the chain ends in an enrollment 

 * certificate, the chain shall be considered invalid).

 */

p2pcd8ByteLearningRequestId Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= 1

/**

 * @brief This is the ASN.1 Information Object Class that associates IEEE 

 * @brief This is the ASN.1 Information Object Set that associates IEEE 

 * 1609 HeaderInfo contributed extensions with the appropriate 

 * Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId value.

 *

 * In this Information Object Set:

 * 

 *   - p2pcd8ByteLearningRequestId identifies that the extension is an 8-byte

 * peer-to-peer certificate distribution request as specified in 8.4.2.

 */

Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensions EXT-TYPE ::= {

  {HashedId8 IDENTIFIED BY p2pcd8ByteLearningRequestId},

/**

 * @brief This type is the AppExtension used to identify an operating 

 * organization. The associated CertIssueExtension and CertRequestExtension 

 * are both of type OperatingOrganizationId.

 * To determine consistency between this type and an SPDU, the SDEE 

 * specification for that SPDU is required to specify how the SPDU can be 

 * used to determine an OBJECT IDENTIFIER (for example, by including the 

 * full OBJECT IDENTIFIER in the SPDU, or by including a RELATIVE-OID with 

 * clear instructions about how a full OBJECT IDENTIFIER can be obtained from

 * the RELATIVE-OID). The SPDU is then consistent with this type if the 

 * OBJECT IDENTIFIER determined from the SPDU is identical to the OBJECT 

 * organization. See 5.2.6.6.7.2 for discussion of how the

 * OperatingOrganizationId can be integrated into the SPDU payload by an

 * SDEE specifier.

 *

 * A certificate may have an OperatingOrganizationId associated with it even if

 * the certificate does not contain an OperatingOrganizationId field. If the

 * certificate does not contain an OperatingOrganizationId field, the

 * associated OperatingOrganizationId is determined as follows:

 *

 *   - If the certificate is self-signed, that is, the choice indicated by the

 * issuer field in the enclosing certificate structure is self, the

 * certificate has no OperatingOrganizationId associated with it.

 *

 *   -  Otherwise, the certificate has the same OperatingOrganizationId as

 * the certificate that issued it.

 *

 * The above algorithm is applied recursively, i.e. if

 * OperatingOrganizationId is omitted from the issuing certificate, then

 * the issuing certificate of that certificate is inspected to determine if

 * OperatingOrganizationId is present, and so on.

 *

 * Consistency with SPDU payload. As discussed in 5.2.6.6.7.2, the SPDU payload

 * design might or might not include OperatingOrganizationId material. 

 *

 * If OperatingOrganizationId material appears in the SPDU payload, then the

 * SDEE specification is expected to state that consistency is required between

 * the payload and the certificate (although, as discussed in 5.2.6.6.7.2, this

 * approach is not recommended).

 *

 * If consistency is required between the OperatingOrganizationID

 * and operating organization information represented by an OBJECT

 * IDENTIFIER in the SPDU payload, then the SDEE specification for that SPDU is

 * required to specify how the SPDU can be used to determine an OBJECT

 * IDENTIFIER of the same length as the OperatingOrganizationId in the

 * certificate (e.g., by including the full OBJECT IDENTIFIER in the SPDU, or

 * by including a RELATIVE-OID with clear instructions about how a full OBJECT

 * IDENTIFIER can be obtained from the RELATIVE-OID, or by truncating an

 * OBJECT IDENTIFIER from the message to be the same length as the OBJECT

 * IDENTIFIER in the certificate). The SPDU is then consistent with this type

 * if the OBJECT IDENTIFIER determined from the SPDU is identical to the OBJECT

 * IDENTIFIER contained in this field.

 * This AppExtension does not have consistency conditions with a 

 * corresponding CertIssueExtension. It can appear in a certificate issued 

 * by any CA.

 *

 * Consistency with issuing certificate. This AppExtension does not have

 * consistency conditions with a corresponding CertIssueExtension. It can

 * appear in a certificate issued by any CA.

 *

 * Consistency with certificate request signing certificate. This AppExtension

 * does not have consistency conditions with a corresponding

 * CertRequestExtension. It can appear in a certificate request signed by any

 * certificate containing certRequestPermissions, i.e. by any enrollment

 * certificate.

 */

OperatingOrganizationId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

 * @brief This Information Object is an instance of the Information Object 

 * Class CERT-EXT-TYPE. It is defined to bind together the AppExtension, 

 * CertIssueExtension, and CertRequestExtension types associated with the 

 * use of an operating organization identifier, and to assocaute them all 

 * use of an operating organization identifier, and to associate them all 

 * with the extension identifier value certExtId-OperatingOrganization.

 *

 * Although the ISSUE and REQUEST entries in this Information Object are

 * denoted as NULL, this is simply to create a complete instance of the

 * Information Object. As stated in the definition of

 * OperatingOrganizationId, there are no consistency conditions between the

 * OperatingOrganizationId in the appExtensions field and an issuing CA

 * certificate. As such, a certificate shall not contain a CertIssueExtension

 * or a CertRequestExtension where the id field is equal to

 * certExtId-OperatingOrganization. 

 */

instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= {

  ID      certExtId-OperatingOrganization