Newer
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// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
// Start component
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_itss());
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_pki());
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
// Cleanup
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} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_03_BV
/**
* @desc Check that the AuthorizationRequest message is never reused the same encryption key and nonce.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION
* Initial conditions:
* with {
* the IUT being in the "operational state"
* }
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is triggered to requested a new Authorization Ticket (AT)
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
* containing content.encryptedData
* containing ciphertext.aes128ccm.nonce
* indicating value not equal to the nonce in N previous messages
* and containing recipients[0].certRecipInfo.encKey
* containing encrypted symmetric key (S_KEY)
* indicating symmetric key not equal to the key was used in N previous messages
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
// Start component
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV_itss());
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV_pki());
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
// Cleanup
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV
group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV {
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV_itss() runs on ItsPkiItss system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
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// Local variables
var HashedId8 v_certificate_digest;
var EtsiTs103097Certificate v_certificate;
// Test component configuration
f_cfUp_itss();
// Test adapter configuration
// Preamble
// First enrolment
geoNetworkingPort.clear;
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_cam_with_current_cert(v_certificate_digest, v_certificate) {
tc_ac.stop;
if (PX_TRIGGER_EC_BEFORE_AT) {
f_sendUtTriggerEnrolmentRequestPrimitive();
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_success);
}
}
[] geoNetworkingPort.receive(
mw_geoNwInd(
mw_geoNwSecPdu(
mw_etsiTs103097Data_signed
))) {
repeat;
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected CA message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Test Body
// N authorization
for (var integer v_i := 0; v_i < PX_RE_AUTHORIZATION_COUNTER; v_i := v_i + 1) {
f_sendUtTriggerAuthorizationRequestPrimitive();
f_sleep(PX_RE_AUTHORIZATION_DELAY);
} // End of 'for' statement
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: Enrolment trigger sent succesfully ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
// Postamble
f_cfDown_itss();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV_itss
function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV_pki() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
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// Local variable
var integer v_counter := 0;
var HeaderLines v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_request;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var InnerAtRequest v_inner_at_request;
var ListOfPublicVerificationKey v_generated_keys;
var integer v_result;
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp();
// Test adapter configuration
// Preamble
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_at_response", v_headers);
// Wait for the first enrolment response
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_at_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_request(
mw_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
-,
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentRequestMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
{ *, mw_recipientInfo_pskRecipInfo(vc_aaHashedId8), * },
mw_SymmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
)))))),
v_request
) {
tc_ac.stop;
// Verify IUT response
f_verify_http_at_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request, v_headers, v_inner_at_request, v_response, v_result);
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// Send response
if (isvalue(v_response)) {
httpPort.send(v_response);
}
// Set verdict
if (v_result == 0) {
v_generated_keys[v_counter] := v_inner_at_request.publicKeys.verificationKey;
v_counter := v_counter + 1;
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_prDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify EA an EnrolmentRequestMessage ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Test Body
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_at_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_request(
mw_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_AT,
-,
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentRequestMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
{ *, mw_recipientInfo_pskRecipInfo(vc_aaHashedId8), * },
mw_SymmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
)))))),
v_request
) {
tc_ac.stop;
// Verify IUT response
f_verify_http_at_request_from_iut_itss(v_request.request, v_headers, v_inner_at_request, v_response, v_result);
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// Send response
if (isvalue(v_response)) {
httpPort.send(v_response);
}
// Set verdict
if (v_result == 0) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": LOG: ", match(v_generated_keys, superset(v_inner_at_request.publicKeys.verificationKey)), "***");
if (match(v_generated_keys, superset(v_inner_at_request.publicKeys.verificationKey))) {
v_generated_keys[v_counter] := v_inner_at_request.publicKeys.verificationKey;
v_counter := v_counter + 1;
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_prDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Duplication of generated public keys ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify EA an EnrolmentRequestMessage ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_prDone, e_error);
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
if (v_counter == PX_RE_AUTHORIZATION_COUNTER) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerAtRequest received with different key pairs ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdict(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of function f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV_pki
} // End of group f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_04_BV
/**
* @desc Check that the Authozation request protocol version is set to 1.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION
* Initial conditions:
* with {
* the IUT being in the "operational state"
* }
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT is triggered to requested a new Authorization Ticket (AT)
* }
* then {
* the IUT sends EtsiTs103097Data to the AA
* containing version
* indicating value 1
* and containing content
* containing autihorizationRequest
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [2], clause 6.2.3.3.1
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_05_BV() runs on ItsMtc system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var ItsPkiItss v_itss;
var ItsPkiHttp v_ea;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE or not PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_ITS_S_ROLE and PICS_SECPKI_AUTHORIZATION required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
// Start component
v_itss.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_itss());
v_ea.start(f_TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV_pki());
// Synchronization
f_serverSync2ClientsAndStop({c_prDone, c_tbDone});
// Cleanup
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_05_BV
} // End of group itss_authorization_request
group itss_authorization_response {
// TODO
} // End of group itss_authorization_response
group itss_ctl_handling {
// TODO
} // End of group itss_ctl_handling
group itss_crl_handling {
// TODO
} // End of group itss_crl_handling
} // End of group itss_behavior
group ea_behavior {
group ea_helpers {
} // End of group ea_helpers
group enrolment_request_handling {
/**
* @desc The EnrolmentResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the ITS-S across the interface at
* reference point S3 in response to a received EnrolmentRequest message.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
* Initial conditions:
* with {
* the IUT being in the "operational state"
* }
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage across the interface at the reference point S3
* }
* then {
* the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage across the interface at reference point S3
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 TP SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause 6.2.3.2.2
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct32 v_request_hash;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
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var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var HeaderLines v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Test adapter configuration
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request(v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
v_aes_sym_key_hashed_id8 := f_HashedId8FromSha256(f_hashWithSha256('80'O & v_aes_sym_key)); // Used to macth the response
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
{ *, mw_recipientInfo_pskRecipInfo(v_aes_sym_key_hashed_id8), * },
mw_SymmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
)))))),
v_response
) {
tc_ac.stop;
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, 1, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV
/**
* @desc Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted
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* by signing certificate.
* <pre>
* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
* Initial conditions:
* with {
* the IUT being in the "operational state"
* }
* Expected behaviour:
* ensure that {
* when {
* the IUT receives an EnrolmentRequestMessage
* containing an encrypted EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
* containing signer
* containing digest
* indicating HashedId8 of the certificate CERT
* containing appPermissions
* not containing an item of type PsidSsp
* containing psid
* indicating AID_CERT_REQ
* or containing an item of type PsidSsp
* containing psid
* indicating AID_CERT_REQ
* and containing ssp
* containing opaque[0] (version)
* indicating other value than 1
* or containing opaque[1] (value)
* indicating "Enrolment Request" (bit 1) set to 0
* }
* then {
* the IUT answers with an EnrolmentResponseMessage
* containing InnerECResponse
* containing responseCode
* indicating "deniedpermissions"
* }
* }
* </pre>
*
* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 TP SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI
* @reference ETSI TS 102 941, clause B.5
*/
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_01() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
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// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct32 v_request_hash;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var HeaderLines v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// f_cfHttpUp("CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_01", PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Test adapter configuration
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request_with_wrong_parameters({ valueof(m_appPermissions(c_its_aid_CAM, { bitmapSsp := PX_INNER_EC_CERTFICATE_BITMAP_SSP_SCR })) }, -, f_getCurrentTime() / 1000, valueof(m_duration_in_hours(PX_GENERATED_CERTIFICATE_DURATION)), -, v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
// f_http_build_inner_ec_request(v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_SymmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
)))))),
v_response
) {
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, 1, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log(match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedpermissions))));
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedpermissions))) == true) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse error code received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Invalid InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
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}
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_01
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_02() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct32 v_request_hash;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var HeaderLines v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// f_cfHttpUp("CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_01", PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Test adapter configuration
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request_with_wrong_parameters({ valueof(m_appPermissions(c_its_aid_SCR, { bitmapSsp := PX_INNER_EC_CERTFICATE_INCORRECT_BITMAP_SSP_SCR_WRONG_VERSION })) }, -, f_getCurrentTime() / 1000, valueof(m_duration_in_hours(PX_GENERATED_CERTIFICATE_DURATION)), -, v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
// f_http_build_inner_ec_request(v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_SymmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
)))))),
v_response
) {
tc_ac.stop;
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, 1, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log(match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedpermissions))));
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedpermissions))) == true) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse error code received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
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log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Invalid InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_02
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_03() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables
var Oct32 v_private_key;
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct32 v_request_hash;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var HeaderLines v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
// Test component configuration
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// f_cfHttpUp("CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_01", PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Test adapter configuration
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request_with_wrong_parameters({ valueof(m_appPermissions(c_its_aid_SCR, { bitmapSsp := PX_INNER_EC_CERTFICATE_INCORRECT_BITMAP_SSP_SCR_WRONG_SSP_BIT })) }, -, f_getCurrentTime() / 1000, valueof(m_duration_in_hours(PX_GENERATED_CERTIFICATE_DURATION)), -, v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
// f_http_build_inner_ec_request(v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
tc_ac.start;
alt {
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_SymmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
)))))),
v_response
) {
tc_ac.stop;
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, 1, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log(match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedpermissions))));
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedpermissions))) == true) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse error code received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Invalid InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_03
* @desc Enroll an ITS-Station, but with a canonical-ID, that is not registered.
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_05_BI() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var HeaderLines v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
// Test adapter configuration
// Preamble
f_http_build_inner_ec_request_with_wrong_parameters({ valueof(m_appPermissions(c_its_aid_SCR, { bitmapSsp := PX_INNER_EC_CERTFICATE_BITMAP_SSP_SCR })) }, PICS_INVALID_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID, f_getCurrentTime() / 1000, valueof(m_duration_in_hours(PX_GENERATED_CERTIFICATE_DURATION)), -, v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
// Test Body
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_SymmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
)))))),
v_response
) {
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, 1, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log(match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedpermissions))));
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedpermissions))) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Invalid InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse with deniedrequest received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_05_BI
* @desc Enroll the ITS-Station, but the CSR re-quests more permissions than the issuer allows,
* i.e. request for security management SSP bit which is not set in the EA SSP
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_06_BI() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct16 v_encrypted_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_aes_sym_key;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var HeaderLines v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
f_http_build_inner_ec_request_with_wrong_parameters({ valueof(m_appPermissions(c_its_aid_SCR, { bitmapSsp := PX_INNER_EC_CERTFICATE_INCORRECT_BITMAP_SSP_SCR })) }, -, f_getCurrentTime() / 1000, valueof(m_duration_in_hours(PX_GENERATED_CERTIFICATE_DURATION)), -, v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_SymmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
)))))),
v_response
) {
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, 1, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log(match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedpermissions))));
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedpermissions))) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Invalid InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse with deniedpermissions received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
}
}
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_06_BI
* @desc Enroll the ITS-Station, but the CSR requests a AID permission that the issuer does not allow, i.e. request for CAM AID
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_07_BI() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
var Oct32 v_public_compressed_key;
var integer v_compressed_mode;
var Oct16 v_authentication_vector;
var Oct12 v_nonce;
var octetstring v_salt;
var Ieee1609Dot2Data v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data;
var HeaderLines v_headers;
var HttpMessage v_response;
var EtsiTs102941Data v_etsi_ts_102941_data;
// Test control
if (not PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE required for executing the TC ***");
setverdict(inconc);
stop;
}
f_cfHttpUp(PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID, PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID);
f_http_build_inner_ec_request_with_wrong_parameters({ valueof(m_appPermissions(c_its_aid_SCR, { bitmapSsp := PX_INNER_EC_CERTFICATE_BITMAP_SSP_SCR })), valueof(m_appPermissions(c_its_aid_CAM, { bitmapSsp := PX_INNER_EC_CERTFICATE_BITMAP_SSP_CAM })) }, -, f_getCurrentTime() / 1000, valueof(m_duration_in_hours(PX_GENERATED_CERTIFICATE_DURATION)), -, v_private_key, v_public_compressed_key, v_compressed_mode, v_aes_sym_key, v_encrypted_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, v_nonce, v_salt, v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data, v_request_hash);
f_init_default_headers_list(-, "inner_ec_request", v_headers);
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictPreamble(c_prDone, e_success);
f_http_send(
v_headers,
m_http_request(
m_http_request_post(
PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC,
v_headers,
m_http_message_body_binary(
m_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
v_ieee1609dot2_signed_and_encrypted_data
)))));
[] a_await_ec_http_response_from_iut(
mw_http_response(
mw_http_response_ok(
mw_http_message_body_binary(
mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
mw_enrolmentResponseMessage(
mw_encryptedData(
-,
mw_SymmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
)))))),
v_response
) {
if (f_verify_pki_response_message(v_private_key, v_aes_sym_key, v_authentication_vector, vc_eaWholeHash, v_response.response.body.binary_body.ieee1609dot2_data, true, 1, v_etsi_ts_102941_data) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log(match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedpermissions))));
if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_inner_ec_response(mw_innerEcResponse_ko(substr(v_request_hash, 0, 16), deniedpermissions))) == false) {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Invalid InnerEcResponse received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
} else {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": PASS: InnerEcResponse with deniedpermissions received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
[] tc_ac.timeout {
log("*** " & testcasename() & ": INCONC: Expected message not received ***");
f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_timeout);
}
} // End of 'alt' statement
// Postamble
f_cfHttpDown();
} // End of testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_07_BI
* @desc Enroll the ITS-Station, but the expiring date of the CSR is before the start date of the EA
testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_08_BI() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
// Local variables