Commit bc255687 authored by Konrad Schaupp's avatar Konrad Schaupp
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Update file TP_ideas_and_status.md

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    - Verify that the IUT sends an AUTHENTICATION REJECT message correctly upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE message indicating a wrong ARP IEI.

- TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_REQ_03 (FF)
    - 5.4.1.3.7.b)
    - Verify that the IUT stops re-sending an AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message if no AUTHENTICATION RESPONSE message is received on the fifth expiry of timer T3560.

- TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_REQ_04 (FF)
@@ -31,15 +32,17 @@

## Section 5.4.1.3.7

- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message to re-initiate the 5G AKA based primary authentication upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #71. (FF)
- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message with new ngKSI value to re-initiate the 5G AKA based primary authentication upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #71 - ngKSI already in use. (FF)

- Verify that the IUT sends a new IDENTIFICATION REQUEST message to obtain the SUCI from the UE upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #26. (FF)
- Verify that the IUT sends a new IDENTIFICATION REQUEST message to obtain the SUCI from the UE upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #26 - non-5G authentication unacceptable. (FF)
  - This case is also valid in cases where the UE send Auth Response, but the response parameters do not match.
  - Please check Note 2: "... the network may also terminate the 5G AKA based primary authentication ..." Depends on ID used in Initial NAS message

- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message to re-initiate the 5G AKA based primary authentication upon receipt of an IDENTIFICATION RESPONSE message indicating an incorrect 5G-GUTI to SUPI mapping. (FF)

- Verify that the IUT sends a AUTHENTICATION REJECT message to terminate the 5G AKA based primary authentication and key agreement authentication procedure upon receipt of an IDENTIFICATION RESPONSE message indicating an correct 5G-GUTI to SUPI mapping. (FF)

- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message after a successful re-synchronisation procedure upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #21 and including the AUTS parameter. (FF)
- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message after a successful re-synchronisation procedure upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #21 (Synch failure) and including the AUTS parameter. (FF)


## Section 5.4.2: Security mode control procedure
@@ -48,7 +51,7 @@

- Verify that the IUT, upon receiving the NAS Security Mode Reject Message after a failed NAS Authentication and security procedure, successfully aborts the registration process by rejecting the registration.

- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message to re-initiate the 5G AKA based primary authentication upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #71. (FF)
- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message to re-initiate the 5G AKA based primary authentication upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #71 (ngKSI already in use). (FF)    See above in Section 5.4.1.3.7


## ## Section 5.4.3: Identification procedure