- Verify that the IUT sends a REGISTRATION ACCEPT message indicating SMS over NAS not allowed when initial registration with SMS over NAS is requested and network does not support SMS service.
- Verify that the IUT sends a REGISTRATION ACCEPT message indicating SMS over NAS not allowed when initial registration with SMS over NAS is requested and network does not support SMS service.
# TP objective ideas reviewed
## Section 5.4.1.3.7 (FF)
## Section 5.4.1.3.7 (FF)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_ABN_01
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_ABN_01
- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message to obtain the SUCI from the UE upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #26 - non-5G authentication unacceptable. (FF)
- Verify that the IUT sends a new IDENTITY REQUEST message to obtain the SUCI from the UE upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #26 - non-5G authentication unacceptable. (FF)
- This case is also valid in cases where the UE send Auth Response, but the response parameters do not match.
- This case is also valid in cases where the UE send Auth Response, but the response parameters do not match.
- Please check Note 2: "... the network may also terminate the 5G AKA based primary authentication ..." Depends on ID used in Initial NAS message
- Please check Note 2: "... the network may also terminate the 5G AKA based primary authentication ..." Depends on ID used in Initial NAS message
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_ABN_02
- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message to re-initiate the 5G AKA based primary authentication upon receipt of an IDENTIFICATION RESPONSE message indicating an incorrect 5G-GUTI to SUPI mapping. (FF)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_ABN_03
- Verify that the IUT sends a AUTHENTICATION REJECT message to terminate the 5G AKA based primary authentication and key agreement authentication procedure upon receipt of an IDENTIFICATION RESPONSE message indicating an correct 5G-GUTI to SUPI mapping. (FF)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_ABN_04
- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message after a successful re-synchronisation procedure upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #21 (Synch failure) and including the AUTS parameter. (FF)
## Section 5.4.2: Security mode control procedure (FF)
## Section 5.4.2: Security mode control procedure (FF)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_SEC_ACC_01
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_SEC_ACC_01
- Verify that the IUT, upon receiving the NAS Security Mode Complete Message after completing the NAS Authentication and Security procedure, successfully completes the registration process by accepting the registration.
- Verify that the IUT, upon receiving the NAS Security Mode Complete Message after completing the NAS Authentication and Security procedure, successfully completes the registration process by accepting the registration.
@@ -59,30 +47,9 @@
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_SEC_REJ_01
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_SEC_REJ_01
- Verify that the IUT, upon receiving the NAS Security Mode Reject Message after a failed NAS Authentication and security procedure, successfully aborts the registration process by rejecting the registration.
- Verify that the IUT, upon receiving the NAS Security Mode Reject Message after a failed NAS Authentication and security procedure, successfully aborts the registration process by rejecting the registration.
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_SEC_ABN_01
- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message to re-initiate the 5G AKA based primary authentication upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #71 (ngKSI already in use). (FF) See above in Section 5.4.1.3.7
- Verify that the IUT sends an IDENTITY REQUEST message correctly upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #20. (already implemented as: TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_REQ_04)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_IDN_RES_01
- Verify that the IUT, upon receiving an IDENTITY RESPONSE message from the UE with an incorrect IMSI, correctly sends an AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message. The IDENTITY REQUEST message is triggered during an authentication procedure with a failed authentication (AUTHENTICATION FAILURE).
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_IDN_REJ_01
- Verify that the IUT, upon receiving an IDENTITY RESPONSE message from the UE with a correct IMSI, correctly sends an AUTHENTICATION REJECT message. The IDENTITY REQUEST message is triggered during an authentication procedure with a failed authentication (AUTHENTICATION FAILURE).
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_IDN_RES_02
- Verify that the IUT stops re-sending an Identity REQUEST message if no Identity RESPONSE message is received on the fifth expiry of timer T3519.
## Section 5.4.5: NAS transport procedure (FF) ( 8.2.10, 8.2.11)
## Section 5.4.5: NAS transport procedure (FF) ( 8.2.10, 8.2.11)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_DLN_ACC_01
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_DLN_ACC_01
- Verify that the IUT correctly handles a UL NAS transport message containing a PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST from the UE and responds with a DL NAS transport message containing a PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT ACCEPT.
- Verify that the IUT correctly handles a UL NAS transport message containing a PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST from the UE and responds with a DL NAS transport message containing a PDU SESSION ESTABLISHMENT ACCEPT.
**Note:** This test idea could be unnecessary. Since the messages DL and UL NAS transport are intrinsically linked to PDU Sessions, their functionality is already verified within the scope of sections 6.3 and 6.4.
[KSCH] PDU Session control is just one procedure using UL and DL TRANSFERs. Chapter 5.4.5.1 lists 9 different payload container types (a) to (i) most of them are not covered by the proposed TPs till now.
## Section 5.5.1.2.4: Initial registration accepted by the network (SINTESIO)
## Section 5.5.1.2.4: Initial registration accepted by the network (SINTESIO)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_REG_ACC_04
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_REG_ACC_04
@@ -109,6 +76,42 @@
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_DRG_REQ_03
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_DRG_REQ_03
- Verify that the IUT initiates network de-registration by sending DEREGISTRATION REQUEST message containing De-registration type IE with re-registration required and the access type based on the UE’s registration status (3GPP access only). **NOTE 1:** UE sends DEREGISTRATION ACCEPT and starts with re-registration procedure.(also used ref 5.5.2.3.2 1st paragraph) **NOTE 2:** explicit network deregistration triggered by O&M - UE deregistration
- Verify that the IUT initiates network de-registration by sending DEREGISTRATION REQUEST message containing De-registration type IE with re-registration required and the access type based on the UE’s registration status (3GPP access only). **NOTE 1:** UE sends DEREGISTRATION ACCEPT and starts with re-registration procedure.(also used ref 5.5.2.3.2 1st paragraph) **NOTE 2:** explicit network deregistration triggered by O&M - UE deregistration
# TP objective ideas reviewed
## Section 5.4.1.3.7 (FF)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_ABN_02
- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message to re-initiate the 5G AKA based primary authentication upon receipt of an IDENTIFICATION RESPONSE message indicating an incorrect 5G-GUTI to SUPI mapping. (FF)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_ABN_03
- Verify that the IUT sends a AUTHENTICATION REJECT message to terminate the 5G AKA based primary authentication and key agreement authentication procedure upon receipt of an IDENTIFICATION RESPONSE message indicating an correct 5G-GUTI to SUPI mapping. (FF)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_ABN_04
- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message after a successful re-synchronisation procedure upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #21 (Synch failure) and including the AUTS parameter. (FF)
## Section 5.4.2: Security mode control procedure (FF)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_SEC_ABN_01
- Verify that the IUT sends a new AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message to re-initiate the 5G AKA based primary authentication upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #71 (ngKSI already in use). (FF) See above in Section 5.4.1.3.7
- Verify that the IUT sends an IDENTITY REQUEST message correctly upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #20. (already implemented as: TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_REQ_04)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_IDN_RES_01
- Verify that the IUT, upon receiving an IDENTITY RESPONSE message from the UE with an incorrect IMSI, correctly sends an AUTHENTICATION REQUEST message. The IDENTITY REQUEST message is triggered during an authentication procedure with a failed authentication (AUTHENTICATION FAILURE).
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_IDN_REJ_01
- Verify that the IUT, upon receiving an IDENTITY RESPONSE message from the UE with a correct IMSI, correctly sends an AUTHENTICATION REJECT message. The IDENTITY REQUEST message is triggered during an authentication procedure with a failed authentication (AUTHENTICATION FAILURE).
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_IDN_RES_02
- Verify that the IUT stops re-sending an Identity REQUEST message if no Identity RESPONSE message is received on the fifth expiry of timer T3519.
- Verify that if de-registration is triggered due to IUT slice-specific authentication and authorization failure or revocation, the network sets the 5GMM cause value to #62 "No network slices available" and includes the rejected NSSAI IE in the DEREGISTRATION REQUEST message.
- Verify that if de-registration is triggered due to IUT slice-specific authentication and authorization failure or revocation, the network sets the 5GMM cause value to #62 "No network slices available" and includes the rejected NSSAI IE in the DEREGISTRATION REQUEST message.
@@ -220,9 +223,6 @@
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_UPR_ABN_01
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_UPR_ABN_01
- Verify that the IUT sends correctly a PDU SESSION RELEASE REJECT after receiving a PDU SESSION RELEASE REQUEST with a wrong PDU Sesiion ID by the UE and not accepts the session release with reason #43 (Invalid PDU session identity).
- Verify that the IUT sends correctly a PDU SESSION RELEASE REJECT after receiving a PDU SESSION RELEASE REQUEST with a wrong PDU Sesiion ID by the UE and not accepts the session release with reason #43 (Invalid PDU session identity).
# TP objectives ideas
## 5.6.1.1
## 5.6.1.1
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_SRP_ACC_01
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_SRP_ACC_01
- Verify that the IUT sends a SERVICE ACCEPT message after receiving a SERVICE REQUEST message by the UE, that was initated by a paging request to the UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode over 3GPP access.
- Verify that the IUT sends a SERVICE ACCEPT message after receiving a SERVICE REQUEST message by the UE, that was initated by a paging request to the UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode over 3GPP access.
@@ -259,21 +259,7 @@
## 6.4.3.2, 6.4.3.4 (FF)
## 6.4.3.2, 6.4.3.4 (FF)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_UPR_ACC_01
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_UPR_ACC_01
- Verify that the IUT handles correctly a PDU session release after receiving a PDU SESSION RELEASE REQUEST by the UE.
- Verify that the IUT handles correctly a PDU session release by sending a PDU SESSION RELEASE COMAND with cause #36 (regular deactivation) after receiving a PDU SESSION RELEASE REQUEST by the UE with cause #36 (regular deactivation).## 5.4.6 5GMM status procedure (SINTESIO)
Note: There is no message back to the UE after receiving the PDU SESSION RELEASE REJECT, the correct execution of Session Release can be tested with another message.
[KSCH] Hard to understand. Do you mean the fact that there is no "PDU SESSION RELEASE CONFIRM" to acknowledge a UE Initialted "PDU SESSION RELEASE REQUEST". Think SMF has to send PDU SESSION RELEASE COMMAND after reception of UE Initiated Release Request to complete the release procedure.
[stl] Answer: As far as i understand the PDU SESSION RELEASE COMMAND is only used in cases where the SMF initiates the PDU session release. This testcase deals with a UE initiated session release. My understanding from the base spec is: SMF will release the session without any further interaction with the UE. It should be possible to verify the correct session release by using another message that try to use this not longer existing PDU session. But I left that out on purpose for the TO (only as note) because i think the real check in the end should not be part of the TO.
[KSCH] What do you think about figure 6.4.3.2.1 or chapter 6.4.3.3 or the fact we have timer T3585 defined? All this are important hints that network has to initiate PDU Session Release commmand ater reception of PDU Session Release Request from the UE. Maybe you should check some real line logs for correct handling.
Note: possible to test? In this case the IUT can't be triggered with a (interface) message.
[KSCH] Potential Tigger is also the UE originateed PDU SESSION RELEASE REQUEST, besides others e.g. O&M Disable SMF
[KSCH] There are several procedures, which can't be triggered with an interfce message. We should not restrict the environment in that way, as the overall test coverage would be reduced drastically. As mentioned above an O&M Interface has to be supported for other reasons as well.
## 5.4.6 5GMM status procedure (SINTESIO)
## 5.4.6.2 5GMM status received in the UE
## 5.4.6.2 5GMM status received in the UE
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_EST_STA_01
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_EST_STA_01
- Verify that IUT is able to trigger 5GMM STATUS message with all mandatory IEs.
- Verify that IUT is able to trigger 5GMM STATUS message with all mandatory IEs.
@@ -281,11 +267,10 @@ Note: possible to test? In this case the IUT can't be triggered with a (interfac
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_EST_STA_02
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_EST_STA_02
- Verify that IUT is able to receive 5GMM STATUS message from UE and no state transition and no specific action shall be taken.
- Verify that IUT is able to receive 5GMM STATUS message from UE and no state transition and no specific action shall be taken.
## 6.5 5GSM status procedure (SINTESIO)
## 6.5.2 5GSM status received in the UE (SINTESIO)
## 6.5.2 5GSM status received in the UE
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_SST_STA_01
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_SST_STA_01
- Verify that IUT is able to trigger 5GSM STATUS message with all mandatory IEs.
- Verify that IUT is able to trigger 5GSM STATUS message with all mandatory IEs.
## 6.5.3 5GSM status received in the SMF
## 6.5.3 5GSM status received in the SMF (SINTESIO)
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_SST_STA_02
- TP_5GNAS_AMF_SST_STA_02
- Verify that IUT is able to receive 5GSM STATUS message from UE and no state transition and no specific action shall be taken.
- Verify that IUT is able to receive 5GSM STATUS message from UE and no state transition and no specific action shall be taken.
@@ -326,15 +311,26 @@ update procedure has been completed
- Verify that IUT proceeds with both procedures in case if the network receives a SERVICE REQUEST message before the ongoing generic UE configuration update
- Verify that IUT proceeds with both procedures in case if the network receives a SERVICE REQUEST message before the ongoing generic UE configuration update
procedure has been completed
procedure has been completed
# TP objectives ideas
[BPIN] TODOs for future TTFs
## Section 5.4.5: NAS transport procedure (FF) ( 8.2.10, 8.2.11)
[KSCH] PDU Session control is just one procedure using UL and DL TRANSFERs. Chapter 5.4.5.1 lists 9 different payload container types (a) to (i) most of them are not covered by the proposed TPs till now. [BPIN] Comment is related to "Section 5.4.5: NAS transport procedure" and need to be considered in future to prepare additional TOs
Note: possible to test? In this case the IUT can't be triggered with a (interface) message.
[KSCH] Potential Tigger is also the UE originateed PDU SESSION RELEASE REQUEST, besides others e.g. O&M Disable SMF
[KSCH] There are several procedures, which can't be triggered with an interfce message. We should not restrict the environment in that way, as the overall test coverage would be reduced drastically. As mentioned above an O&M Interface has to be supported for other reasons as well.
##
[KSCH] General Remark on Test Coverage
[KSCH] General Remark on Test Coverage
Potential Proedures to be tested - for the sake of total test coverage
Potential Procedures to be tested - for the sake of total test coverage
- PICS_A4/4_1 //Sending of CONFIGURATION UPDATE COMMAND messages to the UE?
- PICS_A4/5 //NAS transport procedures
- PICS_A4/5 //NAS transport procedures
- PICS_A4/5_1 //UE-initiated NAS transport procedures (receipt of UL NAS TRANSPORT messages)
- PICS_A4/5_1 //UE-initiated NAS transport procedures (receipt of UL NAS TRANSPORT messages)
- PICS_A4/5_1_1 //Sending back to the UE 5GSM messages which were not forwarded due to abnormal case on the network side
- PICS_A4/5_1_1 //Sending back to the UE 5GSM messages which were not forwarded due to abnormal case on the network side
@@ -65,6 +66,8 @@ Package Ngnas_Common {
- PICS_A4/8_1_2_2 //Inclusion of a list of equivalent PLMNs in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
- PICS_A4/8_1_2_2 //Inclusion of a list of equivalent PLMNs in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
- PICS_A4/8_1_2_3 //Inclusion of rejected NSSAI (S-NSSAIs which are included in the requested NSSAI in the REGISTRATION REQUEST message but rejected by the network) in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
- PICS_A4/8_1_2_3 //Inclusion of rejected NSSAI (S-NSSAIs which are included in the requested NSSAI in the REGISTRATION REQUEST message but rejected by the network) in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
- PICS_A4/8_1_2_4 //Inclusion of operator-defined access category definitions in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
- PICS_A4/8_1_2_4 //Inclusion of operator-defined access category definitions in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
- PICS_A4/8_1_3 //SMS over NAS in initial registration
- PICS_A4/8_1_4 //MICO mode in initial registration i.e., inclusion of the MICO indication IE in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
- PICS_A4/8_2 //Registration procedures for mobility and periodic registration update
- PICS_A4/8_2 //Registration procedures for mobility and periodic registration update
- PICS_A4/8_2_1_1 //Initiation of 5GMM common procedures during the mobility and periodic registration update procedure
- PICS_A4/8_2_1_1 //Initiation of 5GMM common procedures during the mobility and periodic registration update procedure
- PICS_A4/8_2_1_2 //Skipping of the authentication procedure during the registration procedure for mobility and periodic registration update for a UE that has only an emergency PDU session
- PICS_A4/8_2_1_2 //Skipping of the authentication procedure during the registration procedure for mobility and periodic registration update for a UE that has only an emergency PDU session
@@ -74,6 +77,8 @@ Package Ngnas_Common {
- PICS_A4/8_2_2_4 //Inclusion of rejected NSSAI (S-NSSAIs which are included in the requested NSSAI in the REGISTRATION REQUEST message but rejected by the network) in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
- PICS_A4/8_2_2_4 //Inclusion of rejected NSSAI (S-NSSAIs which are included in the requested NSSAI in the REGISTRATION REQUEST message but rejected by the network) in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
- PICS_A4/8_2_2_5 //Inclusion of the LADN information IE in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
- PICS_A4/8_2_2_5 //Inclusion of the LADN information IE in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
- PICS_A4/8_2_2_6 //Inclusion of operator-defined access category definitions in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
- PICS_A4/8_2_2_6 //Inclusion of operator-defined access category definitions in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
- PICS_A4/8_2_3 //SMS over NAS in mobility and periodic registration updates
- PICS_A4/8_2_4 //MICO mode in mobility and periodic registration updates i.e., inclusion of the MICO indication IE in the REGISTRATION ACCEPT message
authentication_request_message_identity set to AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST,
authentication_request_message_identity set to AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST,
ngKSI containing
ngKSI containing
nas_key_set_identifier set to "111"
nas_key_set_identifier set to "111"
;
;,
Authentication_parameter_RAND,
Authentication_parameter_RAND,
Authentication_parameter_AUTN
Authentication_parameter_AUTN
;
;
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ Package TP_AMF {
TP Id TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_ABN_01
TP Id TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_ABN_01
Test objective "Verify that the IUT sends a new IDENTIFICATION REQUEST message to obtain the SUCI from the UE upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #26 - non-5G authentication unacceptable."
Test objective "Verify that the IUT sends a new IDENTITY REQUEST message to obtain the SUCI from the UE upon receipt of an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message indicating a 5GMM cause value #26 - non-5G authentication unacceptable."
Reference
Reference
"ETSI TS 124 501 [1], Clauses 5.4.1.3.7 and 8.2.4"
"ETSI TS 124 501 [1], Clauses 5.4.1.3.7 and 8.2.4"
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ Package TP_AMF {
from the UE entity
from the UE entity
}
}
then {
then {
event IDENTIFICATION_REQUEST occurs with {
event IDENTITY_REQUEST occurs with {
argument replaced by the AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST containing
argument replaced by the AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST containing
5GS_identity_type_IEI set to "SUCI"
5GS_identity_type_IEI set to "SUCI"
;
;
@@ -297,7 +297,6 @@ Package TP_AMF {
} // end TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_ABN_01
} // end TP_5GNAS_AMF_AUT_ABN_01
} // end Group Primary authentication and key agreement procedure
} // end Group Primary authentication and key agreement procedure
Group "5.4.2 Security mode control procedure"
Group "5.4.2 Security mode control procedure"
@@ -371,10 +370,10 @@ Package TP_AMF {
PICS Selection NONE
PICS Selection NONE
Initial conditions with {
Initial conditions with {
// TODO
the UE entity isNotRegisteredTo the AMF
}
}
}
Expected behaviour
Expected behaviour
ensure that {
ensure that {
when {
when {
@@ -382,22 +381,43 @@ Package TP_AMF {
NAS_PDU containing
NAS_PDU containing
extended_protocol_discriminator set to 5GS_MOBILITY_MANAGEMENT_MESSAGE, //reference ts_124007v180200p: Table 11.2.3.1.1A.1: EPD values
extended_protocol_discriminator set to 5GS_MOBILITY_MANAGEMENT_MESSAGE, //reference ts_124007v180200p: Table 11.2.3.1.1A.1: EPD values
security_header_type set to INTEGRITY_PROTECTED_WITH_NEW_5G_NAS_SECURITY_CONTEXT,
security_header_type set to INTEGRITY_PROTECTED_WITH_NEW_5G_NAS_SECURITY_CONTEXT,
iMEISV, //9.11.3.4 5GS mobile identity // TODO
security_mode_complete_message_identity set to SECURITY_MODE_COMPLETE
;
;
;
;
from the UE entity
from the UE entity
}
}
then {
then {
// TODO: there is no responds message here, after receiving SECURITY_MODE_COMPLETE the AMF
the IUT entity sends a INITIAL_CONTEXT_SETUP_REQUEST containing
// shall stop timer T3560. From this time onward the AMF shall integrity protect and encipher
NAS_PDU containing
// all signalling messages with the selected 5GS integrity and ciphering algorithms.
extended_protocol_discriminator set to 5G_MOBILITY_MANAGEMENT_MESSAGES,
the IUT entity sends an DOWNLINK_NAS_TRANSPORT containing // TODO
security_header_type set to INTEGRITY_PROTECTED_AND_CIPHERED,
Registration_accept_message_identity set to REGISTRATION_ACCEPT,
5GS_registration_result containing
55GS_registration_result_value set to 3GPP_ACCESS;,
5G_GUTI containing
Type_of_identity set to 5G_GUTI,
MCC indicating value PX_MCC,
MNC indicating value PX_MNC,
AMF_Region_ID indicating value PX_AMF_REGION_ID,
AMF_Set_ID indicating value PX_AMF_SET_ID,
AMF_Pointer indicating value PX_AMF_POINTER,
5G_TMSI indicating value RV_5G_TMSI;,
TAI_list containing
Partial_tracking_area_list_1 containing
Type_of_list,
Number_of_elements,
MCC indicating value PX_MCC,
MNC indicating value PX_MNC,
TAC indicating value PX_TAC
;
;
to the UE entity
;,
T3512_value containing
Timer_value indicating value nonZeroValue;;;
to the GNB entity
}
}
// TODO
}
} // end TP_5GNAS_AMF_SEC_ACC_01
} // end TP_5GNAS_AMF_SEC_ACC_01
@@ -415,7 +435,7 @@ Package TP_AMF {
PICS Selection NONE
PICS Selection NONE
Initial conditions with {
Initial conditions with {
// TODO
the UE entity isNotRegisteredTo the AMF // TODO
}
}
Expected behaviour
Expected behaviour
@@ -429,18 +449,24 @@ Package TP_AMF {
from the UE entity
from the UE entity
}
}
then {
then {
// TODO: there is no responds message here, after receiving SECURITY_MODE_REJECT the AMF
the IUT entity sends a DOWNLINK_NAS_TRANSPORT containing
// shall shall stop timer T3560 and the AMF shall also abort
NAS_PDU containing
// the ongoing procedure that triggered the initiation of the NAS security mode control procedure.
extended_protocol_discriminator set to 5G_MOBILITY_MANAGEMENT_MESSAGES,
the IUT entity sends an DOWNLINK_NAS_TRANSPORT containing // TODO
security_header_type set to INTEGRITY_PROTECTED_AND_CIPHERED,
Registration_reject_message_identity set to REGISTRATION_REJECT,
5GMM_cause set to "UE security capabilities mismatch (23)",
T3346_value containing
Timer_value indicating value nonZeroValue;;;
to the GNB entity
}
;
to the UE entity
}
}
} // end TP_5GNAS_AMF_SEC_REJ_01
} // end TP_5GNAS_AMF_SEC_REJ_01
} // end Group Security mode control procedure
} // end Group Security mode control procedure
Group "5.4.5 NAS transport procedure"
Group "5.4.5 NAS transport procedure"
@@ -459,7 +485,7 @@ Package TP_AMF {
PICS Selection NONE
PICS Selection NONE
Initial conditions with {
Initial conditions with {
// TODO
the UE entity isNotRegisteredTo the AMF// TODO
}
}
Expected behaviour
Expected behaviour
@@ -491,9 +517,11 @@ Package TP_AMF {
;,
;,
pDU_session_ID
pDU_session_ID
;
;
;
to the UE entity
to the UE entity
}
}
}
}// end TP_5GNAS_AMF_DLN_ACC_01
}// end TP_5GNAS_AMF_DLN_ACC_01
} // end Group 5.4.5 NAS transport procedure
} // end Group 5.4.5 NAS transport procedure
@@ -565,7 +593,7 @@ Package TP_AMF {
Number_of_elements,
Number_of_elements,
MCC indicating value PX_MCC,
MCC indicating value PX_MCC,
MNC indicating value PX_MNC,
MNC indicating value PX_MNC,
TAC indicating value PX_TAC;;,
TAC indicating value PX_TAC;;
T3512_value containing
T3512_value containing
Timer_value indicating value nonZeroValue;;;
Timer_value indicating value nonZeroValue;;;
to the GNB entity
to the GNB entity
@@ -585,7 +613,7 @@ Package TP_AMF {
Config Id CF_AMF_N2N1
Config Id CF_AMF_N2N1
PICS Selection NONE //SMS over NAS supported on AMF
PICS Selection PICS_A4/8_1_3
Initial conditions with {
Initial conditions with {
the UE entity isNotRegisteredTo the AMF
the UE entity isNotRegisteredTo the AMF
@@ -658,7 +686,7 @@ Package TP_AMF {
Config Id CF_AMF_N2N1
Config Id CF_AMF_N2N1
PICS Selection NONE //SMS over NAS not supported on AMF
