/* ssl/d1_srvr.c */ /* * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include #endif static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver); static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s); static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver) { if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION) return(DTLSv1_server_method()); else return(NULL); } IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method, dtls1_accept, ssl_undefined_function, dtls1_get_server_method) int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) { BUF_MEM *buf; unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; unsigned long alg_k; int ret= -1; int new_state,state,skip=0; int listen; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; #endif RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); ERR_clear_error(); clear_sys_error(); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->ctx->info_callback; listen = s->d1->listen; /* init things to blank */ s->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); s->d1->listen = listen; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake * mode and prevent stream identifier other * than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL); #endif if (s->cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); return(-1); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we * already got and don't await it anymore, because * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway. */ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { dtls1_stop_timer(s); s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; s->tlsext_hb_seq++; } #endif for (;;) { state=s->state; switch (s->state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->renegotiate=1; /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: s->server=1; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret= -1; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->init_buf=buf; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->init_num=0; if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) * ...but not with SCTP :-) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) #endif if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; } else { /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, * we will just send a HelloRequest */ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: s->shutdown=0; dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); dtls1_start_timer(s); ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num=0; ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: s->state=SSL_ST_OK; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: s->shutdown=0; ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->init_num=0; /* Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while listening */ if (listen) { memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); } /* If we're just listening, stop here */ if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { ret = 2; s->d1->listen = 0; /* Set expected sequence numbers * to continue the handshake. */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2; s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1; goto end; } break; case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s); if ( ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK: if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; s->rwstate=SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); ret = -1; goto end; } s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; break; case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK: ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s)); if (ret < 0) goto end; if (ret == 0) { if (s->d1->next_state != SSL_ST_OK) { s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; s->rwstate=SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); ret = -1; goto end; } } s->state=s->d1->next_state; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: s->renegotiate = 2; dtls1_start_timer(s); ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, * will be ignored if no SCTP used. */ snprintf((char*) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0); BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; #else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; #endif } else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { dtls1_start_timer(s); ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_status_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } #else } else skip=1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; #endif s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* clear this, it may get reset by * send_server_key_exchange */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ ) /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key * even when forbidden by protocol specs * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to * be able to handle this) */ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; else s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; /* only send if a DH key exchange or * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity * hint if provided */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) #endif || (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ) ) ) ) { dtls1_start_timer(s); ret=dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } else skip=1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ ((s->session->peer != NULL) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts * and in RFC 2246): */ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && /* ... except when the application insists on verification * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) /* With normal PSK Certificates and * Certificate Requests are omitted */ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { /* no cert request */ skip=1; s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK; } #endif } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; dtls1_start_timer(s); ret=dtls1_send_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK; } #endif #else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; s->s3->tmp.next_state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK; } #endif #endif s->init_num=0; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: dtls1_start_timer(s); ret=dtls1_send_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { /* If the write error was fatal, stop trying */ if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) { s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; } ret= -1; goto end; } s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) { dtls1_stop_timer(s); s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; } else { if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } s->init_num=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, * will be ignored if no SCTP used. */ snprintf((char *) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0); BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); #endif s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num=0; if (ret == 2) { /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when * the client sends its ECDH pub key in * a certificate, the CertificateVerify * message is not sent. */ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; } else { s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num=0; /* We need to get hashes here so if there is * a client cert, it can be verified */ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0])); s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); } break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; /* we should decide if we expected this one */ ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) && state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK; else #endif s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (s->hit) s->state=SSL_ST_OK; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; #endif else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret=dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num=0; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (!s->hit) { /* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, * will be ignored if no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); } #endif s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { ret= -1; goto end; } dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: ret=dtls1_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; if (s->hit) { s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, * will be ignored if no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); #endif } else { s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; s->s3->tmp.next_state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK; } #endif } s->init_num=0; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); #if 0 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf=NULL; #endif /* remove buffering on output */ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->init_num=0; if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ { s->renegotiate=0; s->new_session=0; ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; /* s->server=1; */ s->handshake_func=dtls1_accept; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); } ret = 1; /* done handshaking, next message is client hello */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; /* next message is server hello */ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; goto end; /* break; */ default: SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret= -1; goto end; /* break; */ } if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->debug) { if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; } if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { new_state=s->state; s->state=state; cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); s->state=new_state; } } skip=0; } end: /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ s->in_handshake--; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake * mode and prevent stream identifier other * than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL); #endif if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); return(ret); } int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off=0; /* no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit * requests for it */ } /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) { unsigned int msg_len; unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p; if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A) { buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); *(p++) = s->version >> 8; *(p++) = s->version & 0xFF; if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } *(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len; memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); p += s->d1->cookie_len; msg_len = p - msg; dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len); s->state=DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=p-buf; s->init_off=0; } /* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p,*d; int i; unsigned int sl; unsigned long l; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p=s->s3->server_random; ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); /* Do the message type and length last */ d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); *(p++)=s->version>>8; *(p++)=s->version&0xff; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length * session-id if we want it to be single use. * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff. */ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) s->session->session_id_length=0; sl=s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } *(p++)=sl; memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); p+=sl; /* put the cipher */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) return -1; i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); p+=i; /* put the compression method */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP *(p++)=0; #else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) *(p++)=0; else *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); return -1; } if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } #endif /* do the header */ l=(p-d); d=buf; d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=p-buf; s->init_off=0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* do the header */ p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off=0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; int j,num; RSA *rsa; unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned int u; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encodedlen = 0; int curve_id = 0; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif EVP_PKEY *pkey; unsigned char *p,*d; int al,i; unsigned long type; int n; CERT *cert; BIGNUM *r[4]; int nr[4],kn; BUF_MEM *buf; EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; cert=s->cert; buf=s->init_buf; r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; n=0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (type & SSL_kRSA) { rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); if(rsa == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } RSA_up_ref(rsa); cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; } if (rsa == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } r[0]=rsa->n; r[1]=rsa->e; s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (type & SSL_kEDH) { dhp=cert->dh_tmp; if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); if (dhp == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { DH_free(dh); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || dhp->priv_key == NULL || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } else { dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } r[0]=dh->p; r[1]=dh->g; r[2]=dh->pub_key; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { const EC_GROUP *group; ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); } if (ecdhp == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ if (ecdhp == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } } if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); goto err; } /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH * keys over named (not generic) curves. For * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. */ if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); goto err; } /* Encode the public key. * First check the size of encoding and * allocate memory accordingly. */ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); if (encodedlen == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. * In this situation, we need four additional bytes * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams * structure. */ n = 4 + encodedlen; /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs */ r[0]=NULL; r[1]=NULL; r[2]=NULL; r[3]=NULL; } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_kPSK) { /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/ n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); n+=2+nr[i]; } if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, NULL)) == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); } else { pkey=NULL; kn=0; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+kn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); goto err; } d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { s2n(nr[i],p); BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); p+=nr[i]; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by * the actual encoded point itself */ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; p += 1; *p = 0; p += 1; *p = curve_id; p += 1; *p = encodedlen; p += 1; memcpy((unsigned char*)p, (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); encodedPoint = NULL; p += encodedlen; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_kPSK) { /* copy PSK identity hint */ s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); } #endif /* not anonymous */ if (pkey != NULL) { /* n is the length of the params, they start at * &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space * at the end. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { q=md_buf; j=0; for (num=2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, (unsigned int *)&i); q+=i; j+=i; } if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); goto err; } s2n(u,p); n+=u+2; } else #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { /* lets do DSS */ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n); if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA); goto err; } s2n(i,p); n+=i+2; } else #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { /* let's do ECDSA */ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n); if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA); goto err; } s2n(i,p); n+=i+2; } else #endif { /* Is this error check actually needed? */ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); goto f_err; } } d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n); /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send * it off */ s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off=0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(-1); } int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p,*d; int i,j,nl,off,n; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; X509_NAME *name; BUF_MEM *buf; unsigned int msg_len; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { buf=s->init_buf; d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ p++; n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); d[0]=n; p+=n; n++; off=n; p+=2; n+=2; sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); nl=0; if (sk != NULL) { for (i=0; idata[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n]); if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { s2n(j,p); i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); n+=2+j; nl+=2+j; } else { d=p; i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; n+=j; nl+=j; } } } /* else no CA names */ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+off]); s2n(nl,p); d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; l2n3(n,d); s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d); s->d1->handshake_write_seq++; /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send * it off */ s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off=0; #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG /* XXX: what to do about this? */ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; /* do the header */ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; s->init_num += 4; #endif /* XDTLS: set message header ? */ msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len); /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: return(-1); } int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) { unsigned long l; X509 *x; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); if (x == NULL) { /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(0); } } l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; s->init_num=(int)l; s->init_off=0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; int len, slen; unsigned int hlen, msg_len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; HMAC_CTX hctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[16]; /* get session encoding length */ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is * too long */ if (slen > 0xFF00) return -1; /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows 12 (DTLS handshake message header) + * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) return -1; senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); if (!senc) return -1; p = senc; i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present * it does all the work otherwise use generated values * from parent ctx. */ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) { OPENSSL_free(senc); return -1; } } else { RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); } l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); /* Skip ticket length for now */ p += 2; /* Output key name */ macstart = p; memcpy(p, key_name, 16); p += 16; /* output IV */ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); /* Encrypt session data */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); p += len; EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); p += len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); p += hlen; /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ /* Total length */ len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data); /* Ticket length */ p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4; s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p); /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num= len; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; s->init_off=0; OPENSSL_free(senc); /* XDTLS: set message header ? */ msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0, msg_len); /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } #endif