Loading crypto/rand/rand_win.c +13 −349 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -97,360 +97,24 @@ int RAND_poll(void) MEMORYSTATUS mst; HCRYPTPROV hProvider = 0; DWORD w; int good = 0; # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) # if defined(_WIN32_WCE) && _WIN32_WCE>=300 /* * Even though MSDN says _WIN32_WCE>=210, it doesn't seem to be available * in commonly available implementations prior 300... */ { BYTE buf[64]; /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */ /* The CryptoAPI returns sizeof(buf) bytes of randomness */ if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) { if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf)) RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf)); CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0); } } # endif # else /* OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */ /* * None of below libraries are present on Windows CE, which is * why we #ifndef the whole section. This also excuses us from * handling the GetProcAddress issue. The trouble is that in * real Win32 API GetProcAddress is available in ANSI flavor * only. In WinCE on the other hand GetProcAddress is a macro * most commonly defined as GetProcAddressW, which accepts * Unicode argument. If we were to call GetProcAddress under * WinCE, I'd recommend to either redefine GetProcAddress as * GetProcAddressA (there seem to be one in common CE spec) or * implement own shim routine, which would accept ANSI argument * and expand it to Unicode. */ { /* load functions dynamically - not available on all systems */ HMODULE advapi = LoadLibrary(TEXT("ADVAPI32.DLL")); HMODULE kernel = LoadLibrary(TEXT("KERNEL32.DLL")); HMODULE user = NULL; HMODULE netapi = LoadLibrary(TEXT("NETAPI32.DLL")); CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTW acquire = NULL; CRYPTGENRANDOM gen = NULL; CRYPTRELEASECONTEXT release = NULL; NETSTATGET netstatget = NULL; NETFREE netfree = NULL; BYTE buf[64]; if (netapi) { netstatget = (NETSTATGET) GetProcAddress(netapi, "NetStatisticsGet"); netfree = (NETFREE) GetProcAddress(netapi, "NetApiBufferFree"); } if (netstatget && netfree) { LPBYTE outbuf; /* * NetStatisticsGet() is a Unicode only function * STAT_WORKSTATION_0 contains 45 fields and STAT_SERVER_0 * contains 17 fields. We treat each field as a source of one * byte of entropy. */ if (netstatget(NULL, L"LanmanWorkstation", 0, 0, &outbuf) == 0) { RAND_add(outbuf, sizeof(STAT_WORKSTATION_0), 45); netfree(outbuf); } if (netstatget(NULL, L"LanmanServer", 0, 0, &outbuf) == 0) { RAND_add(outbuf, sizeof(STAT_SERVER_0), 17); netfree(outbuf); } } if (netapi) FreeLibrary(netapi); /* * It appears like this can cause an exception deep within * ADVAPI32.DLL at random times on Windows 2000. Reported by Jeffrey * Altman. Only use it on NT. */ if (advapi) { /* * If it's available, then it's available in both ANSI * and UNICODE flavors even in Win9x, documentation says. * We favor Unicode... */ acquire = (CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTW) GetProcAddress(advapi, "CryptAcquireContextW"); gen = (CRYPTGENRANDOM) GetProcAddress(advapi, "CryptGenRandom"); release = (CRYPTRELEASECONTEXT) GetProcAddress(advapi, "CryptReleaseContext"); } if (acquire && gen && release) { /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */ /* The CryptoAPI returns sizeof(buf) bytes of randomness */ if (acquire(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) { if (gen(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) { RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), 0); good = 1; if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) { if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) { RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf)); } release(hProvider, 0); CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0); } /* poll the Pentium PRG with CryptoAPI */ if (acquire(&hProvider, 0, INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC, 0)) { if (gen(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) { if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) { if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) { RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf)); good = 1; } release(hProvider, 0); } } if (advapi) FreeLibrary(advapi); if ((!check_winnt() || !OPENSSL_isservice()) && (user = LoadLibrary(TEXT("USER32.DLL")))) { GETCURSORINFO cursor; GETFOREGROUNDWINDOW win; GETQUEUESTATUS queue; win = (GETFOREGROUNDWINDOW) GetProcAddress(user, "GetForegroundWindow"); cursor = (GETCURSORINFO) GetProcAddress(user, "GetCursorInfo"); queue = (GETQUEUESTATUS) GetProcAddress(user, "GetQueueStatus"); if (win) { /* window handle */ HWND h = win(); RAND_add(&h, sizeof(h), 0); } if (cursor) { /* * unfortunately, its not safe to call GetCursorInfo() on NT4 * even though it exists in SP3 (or SP6) and higher. */ if (check_winnt() && !check_win_minplat(5)) cursor = 0; } if (cursor) { /* cursor position */ /* assume 2 bytes of entropy */ CURSORINFO ci; ci.cbSize = sizeof(CURSORINFO); if (cursor(&ci)) RAND_add(&ci, ci.cbSize, 2); } if (queue) { /* message queue status */ /* assume 1 byte of entropy */ w = queue(QS_ALLEVENTS); RAND_add(&w, sizeof(w), 1); } FreeLibrary(user); } /*- * Toolhelp32 snapshot: enumerate processes, threads, modules and heap * http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/psdk/winbase/toolhelp_5pfd.htm * (Win 9x and 2000 only, not available on NT) * * This seeding method was proposed in Peter Gutmann, Software * Generation of Practically Strong Random Numbers, * http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/sec98/gutmann.html * revised version at http://www.cryptoengines.com/~peter/06_random.pdf * (The assignment of entropy estimates below is arbitrary, but based * on Peter's analysis the full poll appears to be safe. Additional * interactive seeding is encouraged.) */ if (kernel) { CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT snap; CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT close_snap; HANDLE handle; HEAP32FIRST heap_first; HEAP32NEXT heap_next; HEAP32LIST heaplist_first, heaplist_next; PROCESS32 process_first, process_next; THREAD32 thread_first, thread_next; MODULE32 module_first, module_next; HEAPLIST32 hlist; HEAPENTRY32 hentry; PROCESSENTRY32 p; THREADENTRY32 t; MODULEENTRY32 m; DWORD starttime = 0; snap = (CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) GetProcAddress(kernel, "CreateToolhelp32Snapshot"); close_snap = (CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) GetProcAddress(kernel, "CloseToolhelp32Snapshot"); heap_first = (HEAP32FIRST) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32First"); heap_next = (HEAP32NEXT) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32Next"); heaplist_first = (HEAP32LIST) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32ListFirst"); heaplist_next = (HEAP32LIST) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32ListNext"); process_first = (PROCESS32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Process32First"); process_next = (PROCESS32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Process32Next"); thread_first = (THREAD32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Thread32First"); thread_next = (THREAD32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Thread32Next"); module_first = (MODULE32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Module32First"); module_next = (MODULE32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Module32Next"); if (snap && heap_first && heap_next && heaplist_first && heaplist_next && process_first && process_next && thread_first && thread_next && module_first && module_next && (handle = snap(TH32CS_SNAPALL, 0)) != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { /* heap list and heap walking */ /* * HEAPLIST32 contains 3 fields that will change with each * entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of entropy. * HEAPENTRY32 contains 5 fields that will change with each * entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of entropy. */ ZeroMemory(&hlist, sizeof(HEAPLIST32)); hlist.dwSize = sizeof(HEAPLIST32); if (good) starttime = GetTickCount(); # ifdef _MSC_VER if (heaplist_first(handle, &hlist)) { /* * following discussion on dev ML, exception on WinCE (or * other Win platform) is theoretically of unknown * origin; prevent infinite loop here when this * theoretical case occurs; otherwise cope with the * expected (MSDN documented) exception-throwing * behaviour of Heap32Next() on WinCE. * * based on patch in original message by Tanguy Fautré * (2009/03/02) Subject: RAND_poll() and * CreateToolhelp32Snapshot() stability */ int ex_cnt_limit = 42; do { RAND_add(&hlist, hlist.dwSize, 3); __try { ZeroMemory(&hentry, sizeof(HEAPENTRY32)); hentry.dwSize = sizeof(HEAPENTRY32); if (heap_first(&hentry, hlist.th32ProcessID, hlist.th32HeapID)) { int entrycnt = 80; do RAND_add(&hentry, hentry.dwSize, 5); while (heap_next(&hentry) && (!good || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY) && --entrycnt > 0); } } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { /* * ignore access violations when walking the heap * list */ ex_cnt_limit--; } } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist) && (!good || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY) && ex_cnt_limit > 0); } # else if (heaplist_first(handle, &hlist)) { do { RAND_add(&hlist, hlist.dwSize, 3); hentry.dwSize = sizeof(HEAPENTRY32); if (heap_first(&hentry, hlist.th32ProcessID, hlist.th32HeapID)) { int entrycnt = 80; do RAND_add(&hentry, hentry.dwSize, 5); while (heap_next(&hentry) && --entrycnt > 0); } } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist) && (!good || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)); } # endif /* process walking */ /* * PROCESSENTRY32 contains 9 fields that will change with * each entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of * entropy. */ p.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32); if (good) starttime = GetTickCount(); if (process_first(handle, &p)) do RAND_add(&p, p.dwSize, 9); while (process_next(handle, &p) && (!good || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)); /* thread walking */ /* * THREADENTRY32 contains 6 fields that will change with each * entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of entropy. */ t.dwSize = sizeof(THREADENTRY32); if (good) starttime = GetTickCount(); if (thread_first(handle, &t)) do RAND_add(&t, t.dwSize, 6); while (thread_next(handle, &t) && (!good || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)); /* module walking */ /* * MODULEENTRY32 contains 9 fields that will change with each * entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of entropy. */ m.dwSize = sizeof(MODULEENTRY32); if (good) starttime = GetTickCount(); if (module_first(handle, &m)) do RAND_add(&m, m.dwSize, 9); while (module_next(handle, &m) && (!good || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)); if (close_snap) close_snap(handle); else CloseHandle(handle); } FreeLibrary(kernel); } CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0); } # endif /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */ /* timer data */ readtimer(); Loading Loading
crypto/rand/rand_win.c +13 −349 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -97,360 +97,24 @@ int RAND_poll(void) MEMORYSTATUS mst; HCRYPTPROV hProvider = 0; DWORD w; int good = 0; # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) # if defined(_WIN32_WCE) && _WIN32_WCE>=300 /* * Even though MSDN says _WIN32_WCE>=210, it doesn't seem to be available * in commonly available implementations prior 300... */ { BYTE buf[64]; /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */ /* The CryptoAPI returns sizeof(buf) bytes of randomness */ if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) { if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf)) RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf)); CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0); } } # endif # else /* OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */ /* * None of below libraries are present on Windows CE, which is * why we #ifndef the whole section. This also excuses us from * handling the GetProcAddress issue. The trouble is that in * real Win32 API GetProcAddress is available in ANSI flavor * only. In WinCE on the other hand GetProcAddress is a macro * most commonly defined as GetProcAddressW, which accepts * Unicode argument. If we were to call GetProcAddress under * WinCE, I'd recommend to either redefine GetProcAddress as * GetProcAddressA (there seem to be one in common CE spec) or * implement own shim routine, which would accept ANSI argument * and expand it to Unicode. */ { /* load functions dynamically - not available on all systems */ HMODULE advapi = LoadLibrary(TEXT("ADVAPI32.DLL")); HMODULE kernel = LoadLibrary(TEXT("KERNEL32.DLL")); HMODULE user = NULL; HMODULE netapi = LoadLibrary(TEXT("NETAPI32.DLL")); CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTW acquire = NULL; CRYPTGENRANDOM gen = NULL; CRYPTRELEASECONTEXT release = NULL; NETSTATGET netstatget = NULL; NETFREE netfree = NULL; BYTE buf[64]; if (netapi) { netstatget = (NETSTATGET) GetProcAddress(netapi, "NetStatisticsGet"); netfree = (NETFREE) GetProcAddress(netapi, "NetApiBufferFree"); } if (netstatget && netfree) { LPBYTE outbuf; /* * NetStatisticsGet() is a Unicode only function * STAT_WORKSTATION_0 contains 45 fields and STAT_SERVER_0 * contains 17 fields. We treat each field as a source of one * byte of entropy. */ if (netstatget(NULL, L"LanmanWorkstation", 0, 0, &outbuf) == 0) { RAND_add(outbuf, sizeof(STAT_WORKSTATION_0), 45); netfree(outbuf); } if (netstatget(NULL, L"LanmanServer", 0, 0, &outbuf) == 0) { RAND_add(outbuf, sizeof(STAT_SERVER_0), 17); netfree(outbuf); } } if (netapi) FreeLibrary(netapi); /* * It appears like this can cause an exception deep within * ADVAPI32.DLL at random times on Windows 2000. Reported by Jeffrey * Altman. Only use it on NT. */ if (advapi) { /* * If it's available, then it's available in both ANSI * and UNICODE flavors even in Win9x, documentation says. * We favor Unicode... */ acquire = (CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTW) GetProcAddress(advapi, "CryptAcquireContextW"); gen = (CRYPTGENRANDOM) GetProcAddress(advapi, "CryptGenRandom"); release = (CRYPTRELEASECONTEXT) GetProcAddress(advapi, "CryptReleaseContext"); } if (acquire && gen && release) { /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */ /* The CryptoAPI returns sizeof(buf) bytes of randomness */ if (acquire(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) { if (gen(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) { RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), 0); good = 1; if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) { if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) { RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf)); } release(hProvider, 0); CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0); } /* poll the Pentium PRG with CryptoAPI */ if (acquire(&hProvider, 0, INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC, 0)) { if (gen(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) { if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) { if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) { RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf)); good = 1; } release(hProvider, 0); } } if (advapi) FreeLibrary(advapi); if ((!check_winnt() || !OPENSSL_isservice()) && (user = LoadLibrary(TEXT("USER32.DLL")))) { GETCURSORINFO cursor; GETFOREGROUNDWINDOW win; GETQUEUESTATUS queue; win = (GETFOREGROUNDWINDOW) GetProcAddress(user, "GetForegroundWindow"); cursor = (GETCURSORINFO) GetProcAddress(user, "GetCursorInfo"); queue = (GETQUEUESTATUS) GetProcAddress(user, "GetQueueStatus"); if (win) { /* window handle */ HWND h = win(); RAND_add(&h, sizeof(h), 0); } if (cursor) { /* * unfortunately, its not safe to call GetCursorInfo() on NT4 * even though it exists in SP3 (or SP6) and higher. */ if (check_winnt() && !check_win_minplat(5)) cursor = 0; } if (cursor) { /* cursor position */ /* assume 2 bytes of entropy */ CURSORINFO ci; ci.cbSize = sizeof(CURSORINFO); if (cursor(&ci)) RAND_add(&ci, ci.cbSize, 2); } if (queue) { /* message queue status */ /* assume 1 byte of entropy */ w = queue(QS_ALLEVENTS); RAND_add(&w, sizeof(w), 1); } FreeLibrary(user); } /*- * Toolhelp32 snapshot: enumerate processes, threads, modules and heap * http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/psdk/winbase/toolhelp_5pfd.htm * (Win 9x and 2000 only, not available on NT) * * This seeding method was proposed in Peter Gutmann, Software * Generation of Practically Strong Random Numbers, * http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/sec98/gutmann.html * revised version at http://www.cryptoengines.com/~peter/06_random.pdf * (The assignment of entropy estimates below is arbitrary, but based * on Peter's analysis the full poll appears to be safe. Additional * interactive seeding is encouraged.) */ if (kernel) { CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT snap; CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT close_snap; HANDLE handle; HEAP32FIRST heap_first; HEAP32NEXT heap_next; HEAP32LIST heaplist_first, heaplist_next; PROCESS32 process_first, process_next; THREAD32 thread_first, thread_next; MODULE32 module_first, module_next; HEAPLIST32 hlist; HEAPENTRY32 hentry; PROCESSENTRY32 p; THREADENTRY32 t; MODULEENTRY32 m; DWORD starttime = 0; snap = (CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) GetProcAddress(kernel, "CreateToolhelp32Snapshot"); close_snap = (CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) GetProcAddress(kernel, "CloseToolhelp32Snapshot"); heap_first = (HEAP32FIRST) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32First"); heap_next = (HEAP32NEXT) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32Next"); heaplist_first = (HEAP32LIST) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32ListFirst"); heaplist_next = (HEAP32LIST) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32ListNext"); process_first = (PROCESS32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Process32First"); process_next = (PROCESS32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Process32Next"); thread_first = (THREAD32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Thread32First"); thread_next = (THREAD32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Thread32Next"); module_first = (MODULE32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Module32First"); module_next = (MODULE32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Module32Next"); if (snap && heap_first && heap_next && heaplist_first && heaplist_next && process_first && process_next && thread_first && thread_next && module_first && module_next && (handle = snap(TH32CS_SNAPALL, 0)) != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { /* heap list and heap walking */ /* * HEAPLIST32 contains 3 fields that will change with each * entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of entropy. * HEAPENTRY32 contains 5 fields that will change with each * entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of entropy. */ ZeroMemory(&hlist, sizeof(HEAPLIST32)); hlist.dwSize = sizeof(HEAPLIST32); if (good) starttime = GetTickCount(); # ifdef _MSC_VER if (heaplist_first(handle, &hlist)) { /* * following discussion on dev ML, exception on WinCE (or * other Win platform) is theoretically of unknown * origin; prevent infinite loop here when this * theoretical case occurs; otherwise cope with the * expected (MSDN documented) exception-throwing * behaviour of Heap32Next() on WinCE. * * based on patch in original message by Tanguy Fautré * (2009/03/02) Subject: RAND_poll() and * CreateToolhelp32Snapshot() stability */ int ex_cnt_limit = 42; do { RAND_add(&hlist, hlist.dwSize, 3); __try { ZeroMemory(&hentry, sizeof(HEAPENTRY32)); hentry.dwSize = sizeof(HEAPENTRY32); if (heap_first(&hentry, hlist.th32ProcessID, hlist.th32HeapID)) { int entrycnt = 80; do RAND_add(&hentry, hentry.dwSize, 5); while (heap_next(&hentry) && (!good || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY) && --entrycnt > 0); } } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { /* * ignore access violations when walking the heap * list */ ex_cnt_limit--; } } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist) && (!good || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY) && ex_cnt_limit > 0); } # else if (heaplist_first(handle, &hlist)) { do { RAND_add(&hlist, hlist.dwSize, 3); hentry.dwSize = sizeof(HEAPENTRY32); if (heap_first(&hentry, hlist.th32ProcessID, hlist.th32HeapID)) { int entrycnt = 80; do RAND_add(&hentry, hentry.dwSize, 5); while (heap_next(&hentry) && --entrycnt > 0); } } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist) && (!good || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)); } # endif /* process walking */ /* * PROCESSENTRY32 contains 9 fields that will change with * each entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of * entropy. */ p.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32); if (good) starttime = GetTickCount(); if (process_first(handle, &p)) do RAND_add(&p, p.dwSize, 9); while (process_next(handle, &p) && (!good || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)); /* thread walking */ /* * THREADENTRY32 contains 6 fields that will change with each * entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of entropy. */ t.dwSize = sizeof(THREADENTRY32); if (good) starttime = GetTickCount(); if (thread_first(handle, &t)) do RAND_add(&t, t.dwSize, 6); while (thread_next(handle, &t) && (!good || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)); /* module walking */ /* * MODULEENTRY32 contains 9 fields that will change with each * entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of entropy. */ m.dwSize = sizeof(MODULEENTRY32); if (good) starttime = GetTickCount(); if (module_first(handle, &m)) do RAND_add(&m, m.dwSize, 9); while (module_next(handle, &m) && (!good || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)); if (close_snap) close_snap(handle); else CloseHandle(handle); } FreeLibrary(kernel); } CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0); } # endif /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */ /* timer data */ readtimer(); Loading