Loading crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c +13 −13 Original line number Diff line number Diff line /* * Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy Loading Loading @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly, * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of * |num| >= 2 * |mdlen| + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2. * This does not leak any side-channel information. */ Loading Loading @@ -179,17 +179,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, from -= 1 & mask; *--em = *from & mask; } from = em; /* * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001). */ good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]); good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); maskedseed = from + 1; maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen; maskedseed = em + 1; maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen; if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md)) goto cleanup; Loading Loading @@ -230,7 +229,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, mlen = dblen - msg_index; /* * For good measure, do this check in constant tine as well. * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well. */ good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen); Loading @@ -244,15 +243,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol. */ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen, tlen), dblen, tlen); tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen), dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen); msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, dblen - tlen); mlen = dblen - msg_index; for (from = db + msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen); for (mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(msg_index, dblen); from -= dblen & equals; /* if (i == dblen) rewind */ mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == dblen) mask = 0 */ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]); msg_index -= tlen & equals; /* rewind at EOF */ mask &= ~equals; /* mask = 0 at EOF */ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[msg_index++], to[i]); } /* Loading crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c +12 −12 Original line number Diff line number Diff line /* * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy Loading Loading @@ -192,15 +192,14 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, from -= 1 & mask; *--em = *from & mask; } from = em; good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]); good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2); good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2); /* scan over padding data */ found_zero_byte = 0; for (i = 2; i < num; i++) { unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]); unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]); zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index); Loading @@ -208,7 +207,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, } /* * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|. * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|. * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check * also fails. */ Loading Loading @@ -236,15 +235,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol. */ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen); tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen), num - 11, tlen); msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen); mlen = num - msg_index; for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen); for (mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(msg_index, num); from -= tlen & equals; /* if (i == mlen) rewind */ mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]); msg_index -= tlen & equals; /* rewind at EOF */ mask &= ~equals; /* mask = 0 at EOF */ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[msg_index++], to[i]); } OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num); Loading crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c +19 −16 Original line number Diff line number Diff line /* * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy Loading Loading @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, /* * Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding * if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also * if nul delimiter is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also * preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility. */ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, Loading @@ -67,7 +67,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row; int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err; if (flen < 10) { if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) return -1; if (flen > num || num < 11) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL); return -1; } Loading @@ -89,10 +92,9 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, from -= 1 & mask; *--em = *from & mask; } from = em; good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]); good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2); good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2); err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02); mask = ~good; Loading @@ -100,18 +102,18 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, found_zero_byte = 0; threes_in_row = 0; for (i = 2; i < num; i++) { unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]); unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]); zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index); found_zero_byte |= equals0; threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte; threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(from[i], 3); threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(em[i], 3); } /* * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|. * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|. * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check * also fails. */ Loading @@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING); mask = ~good; good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8); good &= constant_time_ge(threes_in_row, 8); err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK); mask = ~good; Loading Loading @@ -148,15 +150,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol. */ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen); tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen), num - 11, tlen); msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen); mlen = num - msg_index; for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen); for (mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(msg_index, num); from -= tlen & equals; /* if (i == mlen) rewind */ mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]); msg_index -= tlen & equals; /* rewind at EOF */ mask &= ~equals; /* mask = 0 at EOF */ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[msg_index++], to[i]); } OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num); Loading Loading
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c +13 −13 Original line number Diff line number Diff line /* * Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy Loading Loading @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly, * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of * |num| >= 2 * |mdlen| + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2. * This does not leak any side-channel information. */ Loading Loading @@ -179,17 +179,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, from -= 1 & mask; *--em = *from & mask; } from = em; /* * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001). */ good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]); good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); maskedseed = from + 1; maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen; maskedseed = em + 1; maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen; if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md)) goto cleanup; Loading Loading @@ -230,7 +229,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, mlen = dblen - msg_index; /* * For good measure, do this check in constant tine as well. * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well. */ good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen); Loading @@ -244,15 +243,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol. */ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen, tlen), dblen, tlen); tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen), dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen); msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, dblen - tlen); mlen = dblen - msg_index; for (from = db + msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen); for (mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(msg_index, dblen); from -= dblen & equals; /* if (i == dblen) rewind */ mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == dblen) mask = 0 */ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]); msg_index -= tlen & equals; /* rewind at EOF */ mask &= ~equals; /* mask = 0 at EOF */ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[msg_index++], to[i]); } /* Loading
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c +12 −12 Original line number Diff line number Diff line /* * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy Loading Loading @@ -192,15 +192,14 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, from -= 1 & mask; *--em = *from & mask; } from = em; good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]); good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2); good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2); /* scan over padding data */ found_zero_byte = 0; for (i = 2; i < num; i++) { unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]); unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]); zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index); Loading @@ -208,7 +207,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, } /* * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|. * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|. * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check * also fails. */ Loading Loading @@ -236,15 +235,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol. */ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen); tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen), num - 11, tlen); msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen); mlen = num - msg_index; for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen); for (mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(msg_index, num); from -= tlen & equals; /* if (i == mlen) rewind */ mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]); msg_index -= tlen & equals; /* rewind at EOF */ mask &= ~equals; /* mask = 0 at EOF */ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[msg_index++], to[i]); } OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num); Loading
crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c +19 −16 Original line number Diff line number Diff line /* * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy Loading Loading @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, /* * Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding * if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also * if nul delimiter is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also * preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility. */ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, Loading @@ -67,7 +67,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row; int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err; if (flen < 10) { if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) return -1; if (flen > num || num < 11) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL); return -1; } Loading @@ -89,10 +92,9 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, from -= 1 & mask; *--em = *from & mask; } from = em; good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]); good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2); good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2); err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02); mask = ~good; Loading @@ -100,18 +102,18 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, found_zero_byte = 0; threes_in_row = 0; for (i = 2; i < num; i++) { unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]); unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]); zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index); found_zero_byte |= equals0; threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte; threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(from[i], 3); threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(em[i], 3); } /* * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|. * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|. * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check * also fails. */ Loading @@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING); mask = ~good; good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8); good &= constant_time_ge(threes_in_row, 8); err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK); mask = ~good; Loading Loading @@ -148,15 +150,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol. */ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen); tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen), num - 11, tlen); msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen); mlen = num - msg_index; for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen); for (mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(msg_index, num); from -= tlen & equals; /* if (i == mlen) rewind */ mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]); msg_index -= tlen & equals; /* rewind at EOF */ mask &= ~equals; /* mask = 0 at EOF */ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[msg_index++], to[i]); } OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num); Loading