Commit d65b8b21 authored by Ben Laurie's avatar Ben Laurie
Browse files

Backport OCSP fixes.

parent 5dca1e33

CHANGES

+10 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -4,6 +4,16 @@ 


 Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]



  *) Fix OCSP checking.

     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> and Ben Laurie]



  *) Backport support for partial chain verification: if an intermediate

     certificate is explicitly trusted (using -addtrust option to x509

     utility for example) the verification is sucessful even if the chain

     is not complete.

     The OCSP checking fix depends on this backport.

     [Steve Henson and Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]



  *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the

     trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.

     [Steve Henson]

apps/ocsp.c

+5 −5
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -866,6 +866,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) 
		goto end;

		}



	ret = 0;



	if (!noverify)

		{

		if (req && ((i = OCSP_check_nonce(req, bs)) <= 0))
@@ -875,17 +877,17 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) 
			else

				{

				BIO_printf(bio_err, "Nonce Verify error\n");

				ret = 1;

				goto end;

				}

			}



		i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, verify_other, store, verify_flags);

                if (i < 0) i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, NULL, store, 0);



		if(i <= 0)

			{

			BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response Verify Failure\n");

			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);

			ret = 1;

			}

		else

			BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response verify OK\n");
@@ -893,9 +895,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) 
		}



	if (!print_ocsp_summary(out, bs, req, reqnames, ids, nsec, maxage))

		goto end;



	ret = 0;

		ret = 1;



end:

	ERR_print_errors(bio_err);

crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c

+66 −7
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -77,8 +77,10 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, 
	{

	X509 *signer, *x;

	STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;

	STACK_OF(X509) *tmpchain = NULL;

	X509_STORE *tmpstore = NULL;

	X509_STORE_CTX ctx;

	int i, ret = 0;

	int i, ret;

	ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags);

	if (!ret)

		{
@@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, 
		goto end;

		}

	if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))

		flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;

		chain = certs;

	if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))

		{

		EVP_PKEY *skey;
@@ -102,6 +104,60 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, 
	if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))

		{

		int init_res;



		/* If we trust the signer, we don't need to build a chain.

		 * (If the signer is a root certificate, X509_verify_cert()

		 * would fail anyway!)

		 */

		if (chain == certs) goto verified_chain;



		/* If we trust some "other" certificates, mark them as

		 * explicitly trusted (because some of them might be

		 * Intermediate CA Certificates), put them in a store and

		 * attempt to build a trusted chain.

		 */

		if ((flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER) && (certs != NULL))

			{

			ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_OCSP_sign);

			tmpstore = X509_STORE_new();

			if (!tmpstore)

				{

				ret = -1;

				OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

				goto end;

				}

			for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)

				{

				X509 *xother = sk_X509_value(certs, i);

				X509_add1_trust_object(xother, objtmp);

				if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(tmpstore, xother))

					{

					ret = -1;

					goto end;

					}

				}



			init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, tmpstore, signer, NULL);

			if (!init_res)

				{

				ret = -1;

				OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);

				goto end;

				}

			X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);

			ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);

			if (ret == 1)

				{

				chain = tmpchain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx);

				X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);

				goto verified_chain;

				}

			X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);

			}



		/* Attempt to build a chain up to a Root Certificate in the

		 * trust store provided by the caller.

		 */

		if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)

			init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, NULL);

		else
@@ -115,7 +171,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, 


		X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);

		ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);

		chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx);

		chain = tmpchain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx);

		X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);

		if (ret <= 0)

			{
@@ -125,6 +181,8 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, 
					X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));

			goto end;

			}



	verified_chain:

		if(flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS)

			{

			ret = 1;
@@ -155,7 +213,8 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, 




	end:

	if(chain) sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);

	if(tmpchain) sk_X509_pop_free(tmpchain, X509_free);

	if(tmpstore) X509_STORE_free(tmpstore);

	return ret;

	}

crypto/x509/x509_trs.c

+9 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -114,6 +114,15 @@ int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags) 
	X509_TRUST *pt;

	int idx;

	if(id == -1) return 1;

	/* We get this as a default value */

	if (id == 0)

		{

		int rv;

		rv = obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x, 0);

		if (rv != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED)

			return rv;

		return trust_compat(NULL, x, 0);

		}

	idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);

	if(idx == -1) return default_trust(id, x, flags);

	pt = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);

crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

+33 −27
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -323,8 +323,13 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 


	/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */



	/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */

	if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))

	i = check_trust(ctx);



	/* If explicitly rejected error */

	if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)

		goto end;

	/* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */

	if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)

		{

		if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))

			{
@@ -362,12 +367,6 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 
	

	if (!ok) goto end;



	/* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */



	if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);



	if (!ok) goto end;



	/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */

	X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
@@ -658,28 +657,35 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 


static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

{

#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY

	return 1;

#else

	int i, ok;

	X509 *x;

	X509 *x = NULL;

	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);

	cb=ctx->verify_cb;

/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */

	i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;

	/* Check all trusted certificates in chain */

	for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)

		{

		x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);

		ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);

		/* If explicitly trusted return trusted */

		if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)

		return 1;

			return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;

		/* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if

		 * not overridden.

		 */

		if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)

			{

			ctx->error_depth = i;

			ctx->current_cert = x;

	if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)

			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;

	else

		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;

			ok = cb(0, ctx);

	return ok;

#endif

			if (!ok)

				return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;

			}

		}

	/* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and

	 * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.

	 */

	return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;

}



static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)