Commit d51204f1 authored by Andy Polyakov's avatar Andy Polyakov
Browse files

PSS update [from 0.9.7].

parent b3f63259
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+2 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING			 113
#define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q			 127
#define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR			 121
#define RSA_R_ONE_CHECK_FAILED				 135
#define RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED			 135
#define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED			 114
#define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME				 128
#define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME				 129
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE			 117
#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE			 118
#define RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH			 119
#define RSA_R_ZERO_CHECK_FAILED				 136
#define RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED				 136

#ifdef  __cplusplus
}
+2 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),"null before block missing"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q)  ,"n does not equal p q"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR)   ,"oaep decoding error"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ONE_CHECK_FAILED)      ,"one check failed"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED)  ,"salt length recovery failed"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED)  ,"padding check failed"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME)           ,"p not prime"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME)           ,"q not prime"},
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE),"unknown algorithm type"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE)  ,"unknown padding type"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH),"wrong signature length"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ZERO_CHECK_FAILED)     ,"zero check failed"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED)     ,"salt length check failed"},
{0,NULL}
	};

+57 −28
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -76,29 +76,44 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
	unsigned char *DB = NULL;
	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
	unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
	emLen = RSA_size(rsa);

	hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
	if (emLen < (hLen + sLen + 2))
		{
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
		goto err;
		}
	if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc)
	/*
	 * Negative sLen has special meanings:
	 *	-1	sLen == hLen
	 *	-2	salt length is autorecovered from signature
	 *	-N	reserved
	 */
	if      (sLen == -1)	sLen = hLen;
	else if (sLen == -2)	sLen = -2;
	else if (sLen < -2)
		{
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID);
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
		goto err;
		}

	MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
	emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
	if (EM[0] & (0xFF << MSBits))
		{
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID);
		goto err;
		}
	if (!MSBits)
	if (MSBits == 0)
		{
		EM++;
		emLen--;
		}
	if (emLen < (hLen + sLen + 2)) /* sLen can be small negative */
		{
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
		goto err;
		}
	if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc)
		{
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID);
		goto err;
		}
	maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
	H = EM + maskedDBLen;
	DB = OPENSSL_malloc(maskedDBLen);
@@ -112,26 +127,23 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
		DB[i] ^= EM[i];
	if (MSBits)
		DB[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
	for (i = 0; i < (emLen - hLen - sLen - 2); i++)
		{
		if (DB[i] != 0)	
	for (i = 0; DB[i] == 0 && i < (maskedDBLen-1); i++) ;
	if (DB[i++] != 0x1)
		{
			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS,
						RSA_R_ZERO_CHECK_FAILED);
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
		goto err;
		}
		}
	if (DB[i] != 0x1)
	if (sLen >= 0 && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen)
		{
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_ONE_CHECK_FAILED);
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
		goto err;
		}
	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
	EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL);
	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes);
	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen);
	if (sLen)
		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, DB + maskedDBLen - sLen, sLen);
	if (maskedDBLen - i)
		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, DB + i, maskedDBLen - i);
	EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, H_, NULL);
	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
	if (memcmp(H_, H, hLen))
@@ -159,22 +171,39 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
	int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
	unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p;
	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
	MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
	emLen = RSA_size(rsa);

	hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
	if (sLen < 0)
		sLen = 0;
	if (emLen < (hLen + sLen + 2))
	/*
	 * Negative sLen has special meanings:
	 *	-1	sLen == hLen
	 *	-2	salt length is maximized
	 *	-N	reserved
	 */
	if      (sLen == -1)	sLen = hLen;
	else if (sLen == -2)	sLen = -2;
	else if (sLen < -2)
		{
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS,
		   RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
		goto err;
		}

	MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
	emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
	if (MSBits == 0)
		{
		*EM++ = 0;
		emLen--;
		}
	if (sLen == -2)
		{
		sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
		}
	else if (emLen < (hLen + sLen + 2))
		{
		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS,
		   RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
		goto err;
		}
	if (sLen > 0)
		{
		salt = OPENSSL_malloc(sLen);