Commit d139723b authored by Kurt Roeckx's avatar Kurt Roeckx
Browse files

session tickets: use more sizeof



Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

MR: #2153
parent 05df5c20
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+2 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -3396,8 +3396,8 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
        {
            unsigned char *keys = parg;
            long tlsext_tick_keylen = (sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name) +
                sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key) + (ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key));
            if (!keys)
                sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key) + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key));
            if (keys == NULL)
                return tlsext_tick_keylen;
            if (larg != tlsext_tick_keylen) {
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
+3 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ DEFINE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION);
/* Needed in ssl_cert.c */
DEFINE_LHASH_OF(X509_NAME);

#define TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH 16

struct ssl_ctx_st {
    const SSL_METHOD *method;
    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
@@ -857,7 +859,7 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st {
    int (*tlsext_servername_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *);
    void *tlsext_servername_arg;
    /* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */
    unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[16];
    unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
    unsigned char tlsext_tick_hmac_key[32];
    unsigned char tlsext_tick_aes_key[32];
    /* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */
+18 −12
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -2978,7 +2978,8 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
    unsigned int hlen;
    SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
    unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
    unsigned char key_name[16];
    unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
    int iv_len;

    /* get session encoding length */
    slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
@@ -3028,13 +3029,14 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
     * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
     * follows handshake_header_length +
     * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
     * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
     * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
     * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
     * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
     * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
     * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
     */
    if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
                      SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
                      EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
                      SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +
                      EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
                      EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
        goto err;

    p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
@@ -3045,10 +3047,14 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
    if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
        if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, hctx, 1) < 0)
            goto err;
        iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
    } else {
        if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
        const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();

        iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
        if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
            goto err;
        if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
        if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
                                tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
            goto err;
        if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
@@ -3070,11 +3076,11 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
    p += 2;
    /* Output key name */
    macstart = p;
    memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
    p += 16;
    memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));
    p += sizeof(key_name);
    /* output IV */
    memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
    p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
    memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);
    p += iv_len;
    /* Encrypt session data */
    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
        goto err;