Commit c46ecc3a authored by Dr. Stephen Henson's avatar Dr. Stephen Henson
Browse files

Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS 1.2, 1.1 and 

DTLS to fix DoS attack.

Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
parent 7388b43c

CHANGES

+8 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -292,6 +292,14 @@ 
 

 Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [xx XXX xxxx]



  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS

     1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to avoid DoS attack.



     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic

     fuzzing as a service testing platform.

     (CVE-2012-2333)

     [Steve Henson]



  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.

     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.

     [Steve Henson]

ssl/d1_enc.c

+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) 
				}

			/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.

			 * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */

			if (i > (int)rec->length)

			if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)

				{

				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done

				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is

ssl/t1_enc.c

+2 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -889,6 +889,8 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) 
			if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION

				&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ds) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)

				{

				if (bs > (int)rec->length)

					return -1;

				rec->data += bs;    /* skip the explicit IV */

				rec->input += bs;

				rec->length -= bs;