Update

  *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites

     match only those.  Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted

     as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too since we currently only

     as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got

     the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only

     have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap.

     That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as

     "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites --

     differing sizes.

     [Richard Levitte]

 Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l  [xx XXX xxxx]

  *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit

     ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA"

     will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar

     ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that

     "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the

     SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite).  This is a backport combining

     changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d.

     [Bodo Moeller]

 Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k  [05 Sep 2006]

  *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher