Commit a74333f9 authored by Lutz Jänicke's avatar Lutz Jänicke
Browse files

Fix initialization sequence to prevent freeing of unitialized objects. 

Submitted by: Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>

PR: 459
parent 365e1462

CHANGES

+12 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -4,6 +4,12 @@ 


 Changes between 0.9.7 and 0.9.8  [xx XXX xxxx]



  *) ECDSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects

     could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early

     enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>

     via PR#459)

     [Lutz Jaenicke]



  *) Key-generation can now be implemented in RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD

     and DH_METHOD (eg. by ENGINE implementations) to override the normal

     software implementations. For DSA and DH, parameter generation can
@@ -375,6 +381,12 @@ TODO: bug: pad x with leading zeros if necessary 
 

 Changes between 0.9.7 and 0.9.7a  [XX xxx 2003]



  *) DSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects

     could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early

     enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Ivan D Nestlerode <nestler@MIT.EDU>,

     Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de> via PR#459)

     [Lutz Jaenicke]



  *) Another fix for SSLv2 session ID handling: the session ID was incorrectly

     checked on reconnect on the client side, therefore session resumption

     could still fail with a "ssl session id is different" error. This

crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c

+9 −4
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -108,13 +108,15 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) 
	int i,reason=ERR_R_BN_LIB;

	DSA_SIG *ret=NULL;



	BN_init(&m);

	BN_init(&xr);



	if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g)

		{

		reason=DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;

		goto err;

		}

	BN_init(&m);

	BN_init(&xr);



	s=BN_new();

	if (s == NULL) goto err;
@@ -180,6 +182,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) 
		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP,DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);

		return 0;

		}



	BN_init(&k);



	if (ctx_in == NULL)

		{

		if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
@@ -187,7 +192,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) 
	else

		ctx=ctx_in;



	BN_init(&k);

	if ((r=BN_new()) == NULL) goto err;

	kinv=NULL;
@@ -243,11 +247,12 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, 
		return -1;

		}



	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;

	BN_init(&u1);

	BN_init(&u2);

	BN_init(&t1);



	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;



	if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_get_sign(sig->r) ||

	    BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)

		{

crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c

+5 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, 
		ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);

		return 0;

	}



	BN_init(&k);



	if (ctx_in == NULL) 

	{

		if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
@@ -134,7 +137,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, 
	do

	{

		/* get random k */	

		BN_init(&k);

		do

			if (!BN_rand_range(&k,order))

			{
@@ -223,6 +225,8 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, 
	ECDSA_SIG *ret=NULL;

	ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa;



	BN_init(&xr);



	ecdsa = ecdsa_check(eckey);



	if (!eckey || !eckey->group || !eckey->pub_key || !eckey->priv_key
@@ -231,7 +235,6 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, 
		ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);

		goto err;

	}

	BN_init(&xr);



	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL ||

		(tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL ||