DTLS fixes from 0.9.8-stable. (90acf770) · Commits · CYBER - Cyber Security / TS 103 523 MSP / TLMSP / TLMSP OpenSSL

ssl/d1_both.c

+228 −303

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -139,7 +139,6 @@ static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
		static int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
		static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn,
		long max, int *ok);
		static void dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int frag_len);

		static hm_fragment *
		dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
		@@ -151,14 +150,17 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
		if ( frag == NULL)
		return NULL;

		buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len
		+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
		if (frag_len)
		{
		buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
		if ( buf == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(frag);
		return NULL;
		}
		}

		/* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
		frag->fragment = buf;

		return frag;
		@@ -167,7 +169,7 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
		static void
		dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
		if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
		OPENSSL_free(frag);
		}

		@@ -292,11 +294,33 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
		OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);

		if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
		{
		/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
		* we'll ignore the result anyway */
		ssl3_finish_mac(s,
		(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off +
		DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH], ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
		unsigned char *p = &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
		const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
		int len;

		if (frag_off == 0)
		{
		/* reconstruct message header is if it
		* is being sent in single fragment */
		*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
		l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
		s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
		l2n3(0,p);
		l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
		p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
		len = ret;
		}
		else
		{
		p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
		len = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
		}

		ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, len);
		}

		if (ret == s->init_num)
		{
		@@ -327,6 +351,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
		long dtls1_get_message(SSL s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int ok)
		{
		int i, al;
		struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;

		/* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
		* by the absence of an optional handshake message */
		@@ -345,12 +370,13 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int ok)
		return s->init_num;
		}

		msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
		do
		{
		if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
		if ( msg_hdr->frag_off == 0)
		{
		/* s->d1->r_message_header.msg_len = 0; */
		memset(&(s->d1->r_msg_hdr), 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
		memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
		}

		i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
		@@ -360,9 +386,38 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int ok)
		else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
		return i;

		if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len == (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
		{
		memset(&(s->d1->r_msg_hdr), 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
		/* Note that s->init_sum is used as a counter summing
		* up fragments' lengths: as soon as they sum up to
		* handshake packet length, we assume we have got all
		* the fragments. Overlapping fragments would cause
		* premature termination, so we don't expect overlaps.
		* Well, handling overlaps would require something more
		* drastic. Indeed, as it is now there is no way to
		* tell if out-of-order fragment from the middle was
		* the last. '>=' is the best/least we can do to control
		* the potential damage caused by malformed overlaps. */
		if ((unsigned int)s->init_num >= msg_hdr->msg_len)
		{
		unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data;
		unsigned long msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;

		/* reconstruct message header as if it was
		* sent in single fragment */
		*(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
		l2n3(msg_len,p);
		s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
		l2n3(0,p);
		l2n3(msg_len,p);
		p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
		msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;

		ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
		if (s->msg_callback)
		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
		p, msg_len,
		s, s->msg_callback_arg);

		memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));

		s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
		/* we just read a handshake message from the other side:
		@@ -380,10 +435,10 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int ok)
		dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);

		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
		return s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
		return s->init_num;
		}
		else
		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off = i;
		msg_hdr->frag_off = i;
		} while(1) ;

		f_err:
		@@ -393,8 +448,57 @@ f_err:
		}


		static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL s,struct hm_header_st msg_hdr,int max)
		{
		size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;

		msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
		frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
		frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;

		/* sanity checking */
		if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		}

		if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		}

		if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
		{
		/* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
		* against max above */
		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
		return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
		}

		s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
		s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
		}
		else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
		{
		/* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
		* upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		}

		return 0; /* no error */
		}


		static int
		dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL s, unsigned long copied)
		dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL s, long max, int ok)
		{
		/* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
		* if so:
		@@ -403,34 +507,41 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL s, unsigned long copied)
		*/
		pitem *item;
		hm_fragment *frag;
		unsigned long overlap;
		unsigned char *p;
		int al;

		*ok = 0;
		item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
		if ( item == NULL)
		return 0;

		frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;

		if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq &&
		frag->msg_header.frag_off <= (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
		if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
		{
		pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
		overlap = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
		- frag->msg_header.frag_off;

		p = frag->fragment;
		al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);

		memcpy(&s->init_buf->data[s->init_num],
		p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + overlap,
		frag->msg_header.frag_len - overlap);
		if (al==0) /* no alert */
		{
		unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
		memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
		frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
		}

		OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
		OPENSSL_free(frag);
		dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
		pitem_free(item);

		*copied = frag->msg_header.frag_len - overlap;
		return *copied;
		if (al==0)
		{
		*ok = 1;
		return frag->msg_header.frag_len;
		}

		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
		s->init_num = 0;
		*ok = 0;
		return -1;
		}
		else
		return 0;
		@@ -438,21 +549,46 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL s, unsigned long copied)


		static int
		dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(SSL s, struct hm_header_st msg_hdr)
		dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL s, struct hm_header_st msg_hdr, int *ok)
		{
		int i=-1;
		hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
		pitem *item = NULL;
		unsigned char seq64be[8];
		unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;

		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->frag_len);
		if ( frag == NULL)
		if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
		goto err;

		memcpy(frag->fragment, &(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num]),
		msg_hdr->frag_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
		if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
		{
		unsigned char devnull [256];

		while (frag_len)
		{
		i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
		devnull,
		frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
		if (i<=0) goto err;
		frag_len -= i;
		}
		}

		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
		if ( frag == NULL)
		goto err;

		memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));

		if (frag_len)
		{
		/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
		i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
		frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
		if (i<=0 \|\| (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
		goto err;
		}

		memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
		seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
		seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
		@@ -462,91 +598,33 @@ dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(SSL s, struct hm_header_st msg_hdr)
		goto err;

		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
		return 1;
		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;

		err:
		if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
		if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
		return 0;
		}


		static void
		dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int frag_len)
		{
		unsigned char *p;

		p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

		ssl3_finish_mac(s, &p[s->init_num - frag_len], frag_len);
		}


		static int
		dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL s, struct hm_header_st msg_hdr, int *ok)
		{
		int i;
		unsigned char *p;

		/* make sure there's enough room to read this fragment */
		if ( (int)msg_hdr->frag_len && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
		(int)msg_hdr->frag_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
		goto err;
		}

		p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

		/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
		if ( msg_hdr->frag_len > 0)
		{
		i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
		&p[s->init_num],
		msg_hdr->frag_len,0);
		if (i <= 0)
		{
		*ok = 0;
		return i;
		}
		}

		if ( msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
		dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(s, msg_hdr);
		else
		OPENSSL_assert(msg_hdr->seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq);

		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
		err:
		*ok = 0;
		return -1;
		}


		static long
		dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL s, int st1, int stn, long max, int ok)
		{
		unsigned char *p;
		unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
		unsigned long l, frag_off, frag_len;
		int i,al;
		struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
		unsigned long overlap;

		/* see if we have the required fragment already */
		if (dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, &l))
		if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) \|\| *ok)
		{
		/* compute MAC, remove fragment headers */
		dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(s, l);
		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
		s->state = stn;
		return 1;
		if (*ok) s->init_num += frag_len;
		return frag_len;
		}

		/* get a handshake fragment from the record layer */
		p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

		/* read handshake message header */
		i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],
		i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
		DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
		if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */
		{
		@@ -554,13 +632,10 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL s, int st1, int stn, long max, int ok)
		*ok = 0;
		return i;
		}

		OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);

		p += s->init_num;
		/* parse the message fragment header */

		dtls1_get_message_header(p, &msg_hdr);
		dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);

		/*
		* if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
		@@ -573,26 +648,18 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL s, int st1, int stn, long max, int ok)
		frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
		frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;

		/* sanity checking */
		if ( frag_off + frag_len > l)
		{
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
		goto f_err;
		}

		if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
		p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
		wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
		{
		/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
		* we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
		* if their format is correct. Does not count for
		* 'Finished' MAC. */
		if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0)
		if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
		{
		if (s->msg_callback)
		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
		p, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
		wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
		s->msg_callback_arg);

		s->init_num = 0;
		@@ -607,76 +674,18 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL s, int st1, int stn, long max, int ok)
		}
		}

		/* XDTLS: do a sanity check on the fragment */

		s->init_num += i;

		if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
		{
		/* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
		if (l > (INT_MAX-DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
		{
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
		goto f_err;
		}
		if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l
		+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
		goto err;
		}
		/* Only do this test when we're reading the expected message.
		* Stale messages will be dropped and future messages will be buffered */
		if ( l > (unsigned long)max)
		{
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
		goto f_err;
		}

		s->s3->tmp.message_size=l;
		}

		if ( frag_len > (unsigned long)max)
		{
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
		if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
		goto f_err;
		}
		if ( frag_len + s->init_num > (INT_MAX - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
		{
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
		goto f_err;
		}

		if ( frag_len & !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)frag_len
		+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
		goto err;
		}

		if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
		{
		s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr.type;
		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr.type;
		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = l;
		/* s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = seq_num; */
		}

		/* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */
		s->state=stn;

		/* next state (stn) */
		p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

		if ( frag_len > 0)
		{
		unsigned char *p=s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;

		i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
		&p[s->init_num],
		frag_len,0);
		&p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
		/* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
		if (i <= 0)
		{
		@@ -692,66 +701,19 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL s, int st1, int stn, long max, int ok)
		* handshake to fail */
		OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);

		#if 0
		/* Successfully read a fragment.
		* It may be (1) out of order, or
		* (2) it's a repeat, in which case we dump it
		* (3) the one we are expecting next (maybe with overlap)
		* If it is next one, it may overlap with previously read bytes
		*/

		/* case (1): buffer the future fragment
		* (we can treat fragments from a future message the same
		* as future fragments from the message being currently read, since
		* they are sematically simply out of order.
		*/
		if ( msg_hdr.seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq \|\|
		frag_off > s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
		{
		dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(s, &msg_hdr);
		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
		}

		/* case (2): drop the entire fragment, and try again */
		if ( msg_hdr.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq \|\|
		frag_off + frag_len < s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
		{
		s->init_num -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
		}
		#endif

		/* case (3): received a immediately useful fragment. Determine the
		* possible overlap and copy the fragment.
		*/
		overlap = (s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) - frag_off;

		/* retain the header for the first fragment */
		if ( s->init_num > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
		{
		memmove(&(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num]),
		&(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + overlap]),
		frag_len - overlap);

		s->init_num += frag_len - overlap;
		}
		else
		s->init_num += frag_len;

		dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(s, frag_len - overlap);

		if (s->msg_callback)
		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
		(size_t)s->init_num, s,
		s->msg_callback_arg);
		*ok = 1;

		return s->init_num;
		/* Note that s->init_num is not used as current offset in
		* s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
		* lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
		* length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
		s->init_num += frag_len;
		return frag_len;

		f_err:
		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
		s->init_num = 0;
		err:

		*ok=0;
		return(-1);
		}
		@@ -857,7 +819,7 @@ unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL s, X509 x)
		for (;;)
		{
		n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(n+l+3)))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
		return(0);
		@@ -887,7 +849,7 @@ unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL s, X509 x)
		{
		x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
		n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(n+l+3)))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
		return(0);
		@@ -997,43 +959,6 @@ dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
		return 1;
		}

		#if 0
		static dtls1_message_buffer *
		dtls1_message_buffer_new(unsigned int len)
		{
		dtls1_message_buffer *msg_buf;

		msg_buf = (dtls1_message_buffer *)
		OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(dtls1_message_buffer));
		if ( msg_buf == NULL)
		return NULL;

		memset(msg_buf, 0x00, sizeof(dtls1_message_buffer));

		msg_buf->data = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len);
		if ( msg_buf->data == NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(msg_buf);
		return NULL;
		}

		memset(msg_buf->data, 0x00, len);
		return msg_buf;
		}
		#endif

		#if 0
		static void
		dtls1_message_buffer_free(dtls1_message_buffer *msg_buf)
		{
		if (msg_buf != NULL)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(msg_buf->data);
		OPENSSL_free(msg_buf);
		}
		}
		#endif

		int
		dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
		{

ssl/ssl.h

+1 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -1739,6 +1739,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
		#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT 253
		#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD 254
		#define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255
		#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 288
		#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256
		#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257
		#define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258

ssl/ssl_err.c

+1 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
		{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT"},
		{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD), "DTLS1_GET_RECORD"},
		{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN), "DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN"},
		{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT), "DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT"},
		{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE), "DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE"},
		{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD), "DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD"},
		{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES), "DTLS1_READ_BYTES"},