Commit 8dee9f84 authored by Bodo Möller's avatar Bodo Möller
Browse files

deFUDify: don't require OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP

parent 963ba100
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+5 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@

 Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.9  [xx XXX xxxx]

  *) Move code previously exiled into file crypto/ec/ec2_smpt.c
     to ec2_smpl.c, and no longer require the OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
     macro.
     [Bodo Moeller]

  *) New candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation, bn_mul_mont,
     dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure, is introduced.
     BN_MONT_CTX is modified to allow bn_mul_mont to reach for higher
+2 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ APPS=
LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
LIBSRC=	ec_lib.c ecp_smpl.c ecp_mont.c ecp_nist.c ec_cvt.c ec_mult.c\
	ec_err.c ec_curve.c ec_check.c ec_print.c ec_asn1.c ec_key.c\
	ec2_smpl.c ec2_smpt.c ec2_mult.c
	ec2_smpl.c ec2_mult.c

LIBOBJ=	ec_lib.o ecp_smpl.o ecp_mont.o ecp_nist.o ec_cvt.o ec_mult.o\
	ec_err.o ec_curve.o ec_check.o ec_print.o ec_asn1.o ec_key.o\
@@ -94,8 +94,7 @@ ec2_smpl.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
ec2_smpl.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
ec2_smpl.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
ec2_smpl.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
ec2_smpl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ec2_smpl.c ec2_smpt.c ec_lcl.h
ec2_smpt.o: ec2_smpt.c
ec2_smpl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ec2_smpl.c ec_lcl.h
ec_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h
ec_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
ec_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+84 −18
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 *
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -403,18 +403,94 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_
	}


/* Include patented algorithms. */
#include "ec2_smpt.c"
/* Calculates and sets the affine coordinates of an EC_POINT from the given
 * compressed coordinates.  Uses algorithm 2.3.4 of SEC 1. 
 * Note that the simple implementation only uses affine coordinates.
 *
 * The method is from the following publication:
 * 
 *     Harper, Menezes, Vanstone:
 *     "Public-Key Cryptosystems with Very Small Key Lengths",
 *     EUROCRYPT '92, Springer-Verlag LNCS 658,
 *     published February 1993
 *
 * US Patents 6,141,420 and 6,618,483 (Vanstone, Mullin, Agnew) describe
 * the same method, but claim no priority date earlier than July 29, 1994
 * (and additionally fail to cite the EUROCRYPT '92 publication as prior art).
 */
int ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
	const BIGNUM *x_, int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx)
	{
	BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
	BIGNUM *tmp, *x, *y, *z;
	int ret = 0, z0;

	/* clear error queue */
	ERR_clear_error();

	if (ctx == NULL)
		{
		ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
		if (ctx == NULL)
			return 0;
		}

	y_bit = (y_bit != 0) ? 1 : 0;

	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
	tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
	if (z == NULL) goto err;

	if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x, x_, group->poly)) goto err;
	if (BN_is_zero(x))
		{
		if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr(y, &group->b, group->poly, ctx)) goto err;
		}
	else
		{
		if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp, x, ctx)) goto err;
		if (!group->meth->field_div(group, tmp, &group->b, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
		if (!BN_GF2m_add(tmp, &group->a, tmp)) goto err;
		if (!BN_GF2m_add(tmp, x, tmp)) goto err;
		if (!BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(z, tmp, group->poly, ctx))
			{
			unsigned long err = ERR_peek_last_error();
			
			if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_BN && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == BN_R_NO_SOLUTION)
				{
				ERR_clear_error();
				ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES, EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT);
				}
			else
				ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		z0 = (BN_is_odd(z)) ? 1 : 0;
		if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, y, x, z, ctx)) goto err;
		if (z0 != y_bit)
			{
			if (!BN_GF2m_add(y, y, x)) goto err;
			}
		}

	if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx)) goto err;

	ret = 1;

 err:
	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
	if (new_ctx != NULL)
		BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
	return ret;
	}


/* Converts an EC_POINT to an octet string.  
 * If buf is NULL, the encoded length will be returned.
 * If the length len of buf is smaller than required an error will be returned.
 *
 * The point compression section of this function is patented by Certicom Corp. 
 * under US Patent 6,141,420.  Point compression is disabled by default and can 
 * be enabled by defining the preprocessor macro OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP at 
 * Configure-time.
 */
size_t ec_GF2m_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, point_conversion_form_t form,
	unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -425,14 +501,6 @@ size_t ec_GF2m_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, po
	BIGNUM *x, *y, *yxi;
	size_t field_len, i, skip;

#ifndef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
	if ((form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) || (form == POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID)) 
		{
		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_DISABLED);
		goto err;
		}
#endif

	if ((form != POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
		&& (form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
		&& (form != POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID))
@@ -487,13 +555,11 @@ size_t ec_GF2m_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, po
		if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx)) goto err;

		buf[0] = form;
#ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
		if ((form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) && !BN_is_zero(x))
			{
			if (!group->meth->field_div(group, yxi, y, x, ctx)) goto err;
			if (BN_is_odd(yxi)) buf[0]++;
			}
#endif

		i = 1;