Commit 776654ad authored by Dr. Stephen Henson's avatar Dr. Stephen Henson
Browse files

PR: 2295 

Submitted by: Alexei Khlebnikov <alexei.khlebnikov@opera.com>
Reviewed by: steve

OOM checking. Leak in OOM fix. Fall-through comment. Duplicate code
elimination.
parent d6522548

crypto/bn/bn_exp2.c

+2 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -301,7 +301,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp2_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1, 
			r_is_one = 0;

			}

		}

	BN_from_montgomery(rr,r,mont,ctx);

	if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr,r,mont,ctx))

		goto err;

	ret=1;

err:

	if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL)) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);

crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c

+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) 
	if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr,dsa->priv_key,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;/* s = xr */

	if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) goto err;		/* s = m + xr */

	if (BN_cmp(s,dsa->q) > 0)

		BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q);

		if (!BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q)) goto err;

	if (!BN_mod_mul(s,s,kinv,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;



	ret=DSA_SIG_new();

crypto/evp/evp_enc.c

+1 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ skip_to_init: 
			case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE:



			ctx->num = 0;

			/* fall-through */



			case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:

crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c

+27 −19
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, 
	unsigned char *B, *D, *I, *p, *Ai;

	int Slen, Plen, Ilen, Ijlen;

	int i, j, u, v;

	int ret = 0;

	BIGNUM *Ij, *Bpl1;	/* These hold Ij and B + 1 */

	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;

#ifdef  DEBUG_KEYGEN
@@ -144,10 +145,8 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, 
	I = OPENSSL_malloc (Ilen);

	Ij = BN_new();

	Bpl1 = BN_new();

	if (!D || !Ai || !B || !I || !Ij || !Bpl1) {

		PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UNI,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

		return 0;

	}

	if (!D || !Ai || !B || !I || !Ij || !Bpl1)

		goto err;

	for (i = 0; i < v; i++) D[i] = id;

	p = I;

	for (i = 0; i < Slen; i++) *p++ = salt[i % saltlen];
@@ -166,18 +165,12 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, 
		}

		memcpy (out, Ai, min (n, u));

		if (u >= n) {

			OPENSSL_free (Ai);

			OPENSSL_free (B);

			OPENSSL_free (D);

			OPENSSL_free (I);

			BN_free (Ij);

			BN_free (Bpl1);

			EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);

#ifdef DEBUG_KEYGEN

			fprintf(stderr, "Output KEY (length %d)\n", tmpn);

			h__dump(tmpout, tmpn);

#endif

			return 1;	

			ret = 1;

			goto end;

		}

		n -= u;

		out += u;
@@ -186,26 +179,41 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt, 
		BN_bin2bn (B, v, Bpl1);

		BN_add_word (Bpl1, 1);

		for (j = 0; j < Ilen ; j+=v) {

			BN_bin2bn (I + j, v, Ij);

			BN_add (Ij, Ij, Bpl1);

			BN_bn2bin (Ij, B);

			if (!BN_bin2bn(I + j, v, Ij))

				goto err;

			if (!BN_add(Ij, Ij, Bpl1))

				goto err;

			if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, B))

				goto err;

			Ijlen = BN_num_bytes (Ij);

			/* If more than 2^(v*8) - 1 cut off MSB */

			if (Ijlen > v) {

				BN_bn2bin (Ij, B);

				if (!BN_bn2bin (Ij, B))

					goto err;

				memcpy (I + j, B + 1, v);

#ifndef PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN

			/* If less than v bytes pad with zeroes */

			} else if (Ijlen < v) {

				memset(I + j, 0, v - Ijlen);

				BN_bn2bin(Ij, I + j + v - Ijlen); 

				if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, I + j + v - Ijlen))

					goto err;

#endif

			} else BN_bn2bin (Ij, I + j);

			} else if (!BN_bn2bin (Ij, I + j))

				goto err;

		}

	}

	err:

	PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UNI,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);



	end:

	OPENSSL_free (Ai);

	OPENSSL_free (B);

	OPENSSL_free (D);

	OPENSSL_free (I);

	BN_free (Ij);

	BN_free (Bpl1);

	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);

	return 0;

	return ret;

}

#ifdef DEBUG_KEYGEN

void h__dump (unsigned char *p, int len)

crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c

+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 
		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;



	if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))

		BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret);

		if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err;



	p=buf;

	i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p);