Commit 36bed230 authored by Nicola Tuveri's avatar Nicola Tuveri Committed by Matt Caswell
Browse files

Address code style comments 



Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6009)
parent 40e48e54

crypto/ec/ec_mult.c

+33 −31
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ void EC_ec_pre_comp_free(EC_PRE_COMP *pre) 
    OPENSSL_free(pre);

}



#define EC_POINT_set_flags(P, flags) do { \

#define EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(P, flags) do { \

    BN_set_flags((P)->X, (flags)); \

    BN_set_flags((P)->Y, (flags)); \

    BN_set_flags((P)->Z, (flags)); \
@@ -129,16 +129,15 @@ void EC_ec_pre_comp_free(EC_PRE_COMP *pre) 
static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,

                            const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)

{

    int i, order_bits, group_top, kbit, pbit, Z_is_one, ret;

    ret = 0;

    int i, order_bits, group_top, kbit, pbit, Z_is_one;

    EC_POINT *s = NULL;

    BIGNUM *k = NULL;

    BIGNUM *lambda = NULL;

    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;

    int ret = 0;



    if (ctx == NULL)

        if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new()) == NULL)

            return 0;

    if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new()) == NULL)

        goto err;



    if ((group->order == NULL) || (group->field == NULL))

        goto err;
@@ -159,7 +158,7 @@ static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *sc 
            goto err;

    }



    EC_POINT_set_flags(s, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(s, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);



    BN_CTX_start(ctx);

    lambda = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -217,7 +216,7 @@ static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *sc 
    if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, s))

        goto err;



    EC_POINT_set_flags(r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);



    if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, s, s, ctx))

        goto err;
@@ -259,7 +258,7 @@ err: 


    return ret;

}

#undef EC_POINT_set_flags

#undef EC_POINT_BN_set_flags



/*

 * TODO: table should be optimised for the wNAF-based implementation,
@@ -286,28 +285,6 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, 
                size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],

                BN_CTX *ctx)

{

    if ((scalar != NULL) && (num == 0)) {

        /* In this case we want to compute scalar * GeneratorPoint:

         * this codepath is reached most prominently by (ephemeral) key

         * generation of EC cryptosystems (i.e. ECDSA keygen and sign setup,

         * ECDH keygen/first half), where the scalar is always secret.

         * This is why we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is actually set and we

         * always call the constant time version.

         */

        return ec_mul_consttime(group, r, scalar, NULL, ctx);

    }



    if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 1)) {

        /* In this case we want to compute scalar * GenericPoint:

         * this codepath is reached most prominently by the second half of

         * ECDH, where the secret scalar is multiplied by the peer's public

         * point.

         * To protect the secret scalar, we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is

         * actually set and we always call the constant time version.

         */

        return ec_mul_consttime(group, r, scalars[0], points[0], ctx);

    }



    BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;

    const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;

    EC_POINT *tmp = NULL;
@@ -333,6 +310,31 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, 
                                 * precomputation is not available */

    int ret = 0;



    /* Handle the common cases where the scalar is secret, enforcing a

     * constant time scalar multiplication algorithm.

     */

    if ((scalar != NULL) && (num == 0)) {

        /* In this case we want to compute scalar * GeneratorPoint:

         * this codepath is reached most prominently by (ephemeral) key

         * generation of EC cryptosystems (i.e. ECDSA keygen and sign setup,

         * ECDH keygen/first half), where the scalar is always secret.

         * This is why we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is actually set and we

         * always call the constant time version.

         */

        return ec_mul_consttime(group, r, scalar, NULL, ctx);

    }

    if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 1)) {

        /* In this case we want to compute scalar * GenericPoint:

         * this codepath is reached most prominently by the second half of

         * ECDH, where the secret scalar is multiplied by the peer's public

         * point.

         * To protect the secret scalar, we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is

         * actually set and we always call the constant time version.

         */

        return ec_mul_consttime(group, r, scalars[0], points[0], ctx);

    }





    if (group->meth != r->meth) {

        ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);

        return 0;